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ABSTRACT 
THE IMPACT OF REAGANOMICS ON STATE FINANCING 
OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 
FEBRUARY 1994 
MARC D. KENEN, B.G.S., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
M.Ed., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by; Bailey W. Jackson 
This dissertation addresses the specific relationship 
of federal economic policies of the Reagan administration, 
known as Reaganomics, to public higher education. In 
conducting this study three questions are asked: what were 
the economic policies of the Reagan administration; what was 
the impact on state finances of these policies; and what was 
the effect on access to public higher education of this 
impact on state finances? 
To answer these questions this dissertation studies the 
federal economic policies of the Reagan administration known 
as Reaganomics and their impact on state financing of public 
higher education during the period 1981-1992. 
This study makes clear that Reaganomics was developed 
and implemented based on the faulty assumption that taxes 
could be cut, the needy protected, military spending 
increased and the budget balanced. The impact of these 
economic policies on state government finances was 
significant in two major ways: the substantial reduction in 
federal aid to state governments during the initial phase of 
the implementation of Reaganomics; and the transferring of 
responsibility for certain social services from the federal 
government to state governments, particularly in the 
Medicaid program. These changes in state finances had a 
significant impact on state funding of public higher 
education and access to these institutions. 
The findings of this study have significant 
implications for the understanding of future state financing 
and accessibility of public higher education because they 
clearly establish the relationship between federal economic 
policies, state finances, state financing of public higher 
education, and access to public higher education. Because 
of these relationships it becomes clear that the future 
levels of state financing of public higher education and 
access to these institutions will depend greatly on the 
economic policies of the federal government. The 
dissertation concludes with a an examination of the 
potential impact of the choices facing the Clinton 
administration on state financing of public higher 
education. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PROBLEM/STATEMENT OF RESEARCH 
Field Of Study 
The field of study in which this dissertation is 
conducted is The Political Economy of Public Higher 
Education. This is defined as the external political 
and economic relationship of public higher education to 
state government, the federal government and the 
I 
private sector. In the case of state government this 
relationship takes the form of governance structures, 
resource allocations, financial aid policies and the 
defining of public service for the higher education 
community. In the case of the federal government this 
relationship takes the form of the impact of federal 
economic policies, federal research priorities, and 
financial aid policies. In the case of the private 
sector this relationship takes the form of gifts, 
grants, contracts, and the participation in governance. 
Purpose Of Study 
This dissertation addresses the specific relationship 
of federal economic policies of the Reagan 
administration, known as Reaganomics, to public higher 
education. Its purpose is to answer the following 
primary question: 
2 
How has state government financing of public 
higher education been affected by Reaganomics? 
Upon answering this question the following question is 
addressed: 
What has been the impact on the accessibility of 
public higher education of these policies? 
In conducting this study three questions are asked: 
What were the economic policies of the Reagan 
administration? 
What was the impact on state finances of these 
policies? 
What was the effect on access to public higher 
education of this impact on state finances? 
For the purposes of this study "state financing" is 
defined as the funding appropriated to public higher 
education from state funds. This usually refers to one 
lump sum or line item state appropriation. However, 
state-financing can also include "special" 
appropriations for such specific items as financial 
aid, library, special building projects or other 
particular purposes. When using data on state 
appropriations it will be stated clearly what is 
included as state financing. In the cases where 
individual states utilize different appropriation 
systems data will be used in terms of percentage 
changes during a stated period of time. So, although 
two different states might use different methods to 
3 
appropriate money to public higher education, the 
comparative trends will be apparent through the use of 
percentage changes. "Accessibility" to higher 
education is usually understood in terms of how the 
financial aspects of attending the institution i.e. 
cost of attendance and financial aid affect the ability 
of the population to attend the institution but it can 
also refer to admission standards, diversity of program 
offerings and academic support services such as 
tutoring or child care. However, for the purposes of 
this dissertation accessibility will be used in 
relation to the cost of attendance. The term "Federal 
economic policies" is used primarily to describe the 
tax and spending policies of the federal government. 
Context 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s institutions 
of public higher education in the United States have 
been in severe financial crisis. This crisis has been 
precipitated by a national recession which has led to 
state budget difficulties across the country. In 1990 
33 states reported fiscal problems^ with the number 
^Michael deCourcy Hinds, "To Victors Go the Trials After 
Races Against Taxes," New York Times. 19 November 1990, page B9. 
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rising to at least 37 states in 1992.^ The problem 
has become so severe that state appropriations for 
higher education in 1992-93 will be lower than two 
years previously, likely the first such drop in United 
States history. After adjusting for inflation, 36 
states will provide less money for public higher 
education in academic year 1992-93 than two years 
ago.^ This funding crisis has brought about 
significant changes in public universities across the 
country including the reduction of academic programs 
and layoffs of faculty and staff and are threatening 
the quality of the education being offered. Most 
importantly, as a means for dealing with these 
reductions in state appropriations, tuition and fees at 
public higher education institutions rose 22% between 
1990 and 1992 severely threatening the accessibility of 
public higher education. 
Hypothesis 
This dissertation expects to find that state 
financing of public higher education has been 
^Chronicle of Hicrher Education. 9 January 1991, page A20. 
^Scott Jaschik, “1% Decline in State Support for Colleges 
Thought to be First 2-Year Drop Ever," Chronicle of Higher 
Education. 21 October 1991, page A21. 
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profoundly affected by the federal economic policies of 
the Reagan administration. This federal impact on 
state financing occurs in the following way. Since 
approximately 18% of all state revenue in 1990 came 
directly from federal aid/ any significant shift in 
the level of federal aid creates a direct impact on 
state finances. When state revenues increase there is 
more money available for higher education. When state 
revenues decrease there is less money available for 
higher education. The impact of these shifts is 
magnified because a large proportion of state 
expenditures are either mandated by law (federal or 
state) or viewed as essential services. This leaves 
public higher education as a "discretionary" 
expenditure and therefore much more susceptible to the 
shifts in state financing. When more money is 
available it is often given disproportionately more 
money. When less money is available public higher 
education often receives disproportionately less money. 
The primary impact on public higher education of 
any shifts in state financing is on the degree of 
accessibility of the institutions. Accessibility is 
^U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States; 1992 (112th edition) (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992) 
page 288. 
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measured in terms of cost of attendance taking into 
account available financial aid. Cost of attendance is 
used to refer to the tuition and mandatory fees of 
attending an institution of public higher education. 
When state appropriations to public higher education 
increase there are relatively low increases in the cost 
of attendance and when state appropriations decrease 
there are correspondingly high increases in the cost of 
attendance.^ 
Significance of Study 
This dissertation is significant in two ways: by 
contributing new scholarly research to the field of the 
political economy of public higher education; and by 
proposing new means for policy professionals, higher 
education administrators, government officials and 
union and student advocates to understand the impact of 
federal economic policies on the financing of public 
higher education in the 1990s. 
In the literature on the political economy of 
public higher education there has been no work 
^Arthur M. Hauptman, "Trends in the Federal and State 
Financial Commitment to Higher Education," The Uneasy Public 
Policy Triangle in Higher Education: Quality, Diversity, and 
Budgetary Efficiency (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1991): page 124. 
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published on the primary question of the impact of 
federal economic policies on state financing of public 
higher education. There has been work conducted that 
addresses pieces of the question and these form 
important components of this study. 
In the literature on intergovernmental fiscal 
relations the question of the impact of changes in 
federal spending on state spending is explored in a 
number of works. Benton, Bahl and Sanders, and Hanson 
and Cooper all found that increases in federal aid tend 
to lead to increases in state spending.^ Benton, 
Stonecash and Stotsky in very recent studies found that 
decreases in federal aid tended to lead to decreases in 
state spending.^ Hedge indicates that in the short¬ 
term states may increase spending to compensate for 
federal cutbacks but then decrease spending as the 
®J, Edwin Benton, "Federal Aid Cutbacks and State and Local 
Government Spending Policies," Intergovernmental Relations and 
Public Policy, eds. J. Edwin Benton and David R. Morgan (New York: 
Greenwood, 1986), pages 15-34; Roy W. Bahl and Robert J. Saunders, 
"Determinants of Change in State and Local Government 
Expenditures," National Tax Journal 18 (March 1965): page 50-57; 
and Susan B. Hanson and Patrick Cooper, "State Expenditure Growth 
and Revenue Elasticity," Policy Studies Journal 9 (Autiimn 1980) : 
pages 26-33. 
’'j. Edwin Benton, "The Effects of Changes in Federal Aid on 
State and Local government Spending," Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 22 (Winter 1992): page 73; Jeffrey M. Stonecash, "State 
Responses to Declining Federal Support: Behavior in the Post-1978 
Era," Policy Studies Journal 18 (Spring 1990): page 5; and Janet 
G. Stotsky, "State Fiscal Responses to Federal Government Grants," 
Growth and Change 22 (Summer 1991): page 28. 
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permanency of the cutbacks becomes more apparent.® 
Nathan and Doolittle come the closest to addressing the 
primary question of this dissertation in their 
extensive study of state responses to federal cutbacks 
in the 1980s. They set out to determine the extent to 
which states used their own funds to replace federal 
aid cuts and how states responded differently to cuts 
in different policy areas. Using a fourteen state case 
study they found that states responded in a manner that 
two conclusions could be drawn: that the likelihood of 
replacing federal funds with state funds was determined 
by the political and economic conditions in a 
particular state and that those programs that were most 
redistributive by nature were not only cut the most by 
the federal government but were also the least likely 
to receive state funds to compensate.® However, they 
did not address the impact on state funded programs 
such as public higher education that the state did not 
receive direct aid from the federal government for. 
All of these works contribute to this dissertation 
by providing insight into the behavior of state 
®David M. Hedge, "Fiscal Dependency and the State Budget 
Process," Journal of Politics 45 (February 1983); pages 198-208. 
^Richard P. Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle and Associates, Reagan 
and the States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
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governments in reaction to changes in federal 
expenditures but none directly address the question of 
the impact of federal spending policies on state 
financing of public higher education. 
In the literature on public higher education 
financing there are also works that substantially 
contribute to this dissertation. Arthur Hauptman in 
The College Tuition Spiral does briefly address the 
primary question posed in this dissertation. He points 
out: 
...a state's ability to fund higher education 
may be constrained by increased competition 
between higher education and other state 
priorities brought about by changing federal 
priorities... that lead to more state 
responsibility for functions previously 
performed at the local level. 
In his article "Trends in the Federal and State 
Financial Commitment to Higher Education" Hauptman also 
finds that the way in which states provide funding for 
higher education has a "large and inverse" impact on 
the rate of increase in the cost of attendance that 
public institutions charge their students. This, he 
argues, is because the revenue from tuition and 
mandatory fees at public higher education institutions 
are generally used to fill the gap between state 
^°Arthur M. Hauptman, The College Tuition Spiral (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), pages 14-15. 
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appropriations and the size of institutional budgets. 
So when state funds increase rapidly, the cost of 
attendance tends to increase less since there is a 
smaller gap to fill between state funding and 
institutional spending levels. When the growth of 
state funds slows, then the cost of attendance tends to 
increase faster to make up for the larger difference 
between institutional budgets and state funds. 
Hauptman writes that since the extent of state funds 
available to public higher education is tied in a 
direct way to the state economy there is a "disturbing” 
relationship between changes in economic conditions and 
increases in cost of attendance. When economic 
conditions are bad a state cannot afford to increase or 
even maintain institutional budgets so the cost of 
attendance rises faster. As the economy improves, 
state funding increases so cost of attendance increases 
slow down. Hauptman finds that this is what happened 
in the 1980s. When the economy went into recession in 
the early 1980s and state resources were scarce the 
cost of attendance skyrocketed. When the economy 
recovered in the mid-1980s the cost of attendance 
increases at public institutions eased. Hauptman 
argues that this runs counter to what the policy should 
be where students are asked to pay the highest cost of 
11 
attendance increases when times are good and the 
least increase when students can least afford them, 
when economic conditions are bad.^^ These findings, 
confirmed by Mcpherson et al in an empirical analysis 
found in their article "Recent Trends in U.S. Higher 
Education Costs and Prices: The Role of Government 
Fundinghave significant implications for this 
dissertation. By pointing out the probable 
relationships between federal policies and state 
finances and between state financing of public higher 
education and the cost of attendance they lay a 
foundation on which to build with the aim of 
establishing the link between federal economic policies 
and the accessibility of public higher education. 
The establishment of the role of federal economic 
policies on specific state policy areas such as higher 
education and the impact on the accessibility of public 
higher education would constitute new findings in the 
fields of intergovernmental fiscal relations and the 
^^Arthur M, Hauptman, "Trends in the Federal and State 
Financial Commitment to Higher Education," in The Uneasy Public 
Policy Triangle in Higher Education; Quality, Efficiency and 
Budgetairy Efficiency, David H. Finifter, Roger G. Baldwin, and 
John R. Thelin eds. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1991): pages 124-125. 
^^Michael S. McPherson, Morton Owen Schapiro, and Gordon C. 
Winston, "Recent Trends in U.S. Higher Education Costs and Prices: 
The Role of Government Funding, " AEA Papers and Proceedings 79 
(May 1989): pages 253-257. 
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financing of public higher education and would provide 
new insights into the political economy of public 
higher education. The establishment of these 
relationships would also suggest new lines of inquiry 
in the fields i.e. how the economic, educational, or 
governing philosophies of different federal 
administrations impacted on public higher education 
through this relationship and what does this 
relationship suggest for the advocacy activities in 
support of public higher education. 
This dissertation also has significance for higher 
education administrators, policy professionals, union 
and student advocates, and government officials who 
develop policy and advocate for public higher 
education. In the present financial crisis in public 
higher education most of the focus of administrators, 
policy professionals and other advocates of public 
higher education has been on the actions of state 
government. The discussion has centered on the micro 
level i.e state tax and expenditure policies, without 
an understanding of the macro level i.e. how did state 
government end up in this financial crisis? The 
discussion concerning decreases in state revenues has 
been primarily about whether there should be more 
taxes, who are the players involved in this decision. 
13 
and what are their motivations. The discussion about 
expenditures has been about how to pay for various 
services, what are the choices that state government 
should make, who has the most influence, and who will 
suffer most in the population. Though these are very 
important questions that are certainly worth studying 
and answering, without at least an understanding of the 
role of the Reagan economic policies in causing the 
difficult situation state governments are presently in 
then the discussion about the state financial crisis 
and policy decisions and advocacy activities concerning 
public higher education are based on an incomplete and 
inadequate understanding of the situation. 
The findings of this dissertation will contribute 
significantly in providing this macro level 
understanding. In the dissertation the connection 
between the economic policies of the Reagan 
administration and the present crisis in state 
government finances will be established thus providing 
a context in which to understand the present situation. 
This macro level understanding will inform the analysis 
of state political dynamics involving decisions made to 
deal with the financial crisis. If the role of the 
federal government in causing the crisis is understood 
then the focus of finding solutions should change from 
14 
blaming state legislatures, tax-limitation groups, 
state employees, or social service recipients, to 
lobbying the federal government to enact economic 
policies that would counter those of the Reagan 
administration and bring state government back to 
financial good health. This becomes particularly 
important for the public higher education community 
which often finds itself pitted against social services 
in competition for funds, or against tax-limitation 
groups made up of members of the private sector whom 
higher education needs to be working with instead of 
against. 
The timing of this study is especially significant 
and its findings even more important in the context of 
the new economic plan being put in front of the 
American public by the Clinton administration. As the 
plan is analyzed and acted upon the focus of public 
higher education administrators, policy professionals 
and advocates must be on the impact of the plan on 
state government finances. As introduced to the public 
the plan's impact on public higher education is 
presented primarily in terms of the proposal for 
national service repayment of loans. But this national 
service policy proposal becomes meaningless if the 
economic plan as a whole continues the policies of the 
15 
Reagan administration towards state governments where 
mandates and responsibilities are increased while 
financial resources are decreased. 
If the public higher education community focuses 
on the national service proposal as the primary impact 
on public higher education they do a serious disservice 
to the future of public higher education. If the 
Reagan administration's policies are continued in 
relation to state government then public higher 
education will continue the pattern of the 1980s: 
decreases in state-financing and increases in the cost 
of attendance. And even if the grandiose national 
service plan is enacted, the amount of money available 
for loans will likely not cover ever increasing costs 
of attendance. Therefore, accessibility will be 
further curtailed and the crisis facing public higher 
education will intensify. This dissertation provides 
the framework from which to initiate this broad based 
discussion about the Clinton plan and any other plan 
that follows it. It enables the public higher 
education community to see the forest through the trees 
and hopefully describe that forest to the public. 
16 
Audience 
This dissertation is targeted to higher education 
scholars, administrators, and policy professionals. It 
will also be very useful for any scholars or policy 
professionals in intergovernmental relations or 
political economy as well as for state and federal 
government officials . 
Parameters 
During the discussion of the results of the Reagan 
economic program this dissertation focuses primarily on 
the tax and spending policies. However, there are many 
other variables that play an important role in the 
economy that are not discussed. For example, during 
the 1980s there were significant changes in the private 
sector that influenced the results of the Reagan 
economic program. During the 1970s and 1980s there was 
a dramatic change in the type of jobs being created in 
the United States. Between 1973 and 1980 over 11 
million new jobs were created in the private sector and 
more than 7 0% of them were in retail and service. 
This trend continued into the 1980s and served to 
change the level of income of Americans, thus the tax 
^^John W. Cole and Gerald F. Reid, "The New Vulnerability of 
Higher Education", Thought & Action v.II, no.l, page 33. 
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base, and provided evidence of a transformation of the 
American economic landscape. This change was further 
magnified by the tremendous influx of foreign 
investment during the 1970s and 1980s and the 
internationalization of capital. The computer 
industry, very much a player in the growth of the mid 
1980s saw a huge drop in sales and its place in the 
world market. The manufacturing base of the United 
States economy also declined significantly during the 
198Os.The policies of the Federal Reserve Bank 
also play a significant role in the outcome of federal 
economic policies in terms of their control over the 
money supply. These are all important economic factors 
that influenced the outcome of the Reagan economic 
program and are not fully discussed in this 
dissertation. 
There were also many other forces in society 
advocating significant changes in the role of the 
federal government and its relations with state 
government than just those in the Reagan 
administration. These different forces, especially 
^^Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves 
for 21st Century Capitalism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 
page 136. 
^^Reich, The Work of Nations, pages 159-162. 
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right-wing think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation 
and the Hoover Institute, and Christian fundamentalist 
organizations grouped under the heading of the Moral 
Majority played a significant role in affecting public 
opinion and policy. These forces are not discussed in 
the dissertation. 
There are also many other significant factors that 
affect state finances besides federal economic policies 
such as the national and international competitiveness 
of state-based industries. More importantly during 
the time period discussed there was a powerful tax and 
expenditure limitation movement that played an 
important role in state finances. This movement to 
limit the ability of state government to tax and spend 
forced states to consider spending reductions in the 
face of federal aid reductions and other state tax 
revenue decreases. Although touched upon in this 
dissertation, especially when examining specific state 
finances in Massachusetts, California and New York, the 
impact of these tax and expenditure limitation efforts 
on state finances and therefore funding of public 
higher education are not fully discussed. 
The impact of the Reagan administration's economic 
policies had other effects on public higher education 
besides through the impact on state-financing. Direct 
19 
federal funding of research activities at public 
universities had a significant impact on the priorities 
of universities particularly in terms of program 
support and graduate education.Federal economic 
policies also impacted on public higher education 
through federal financial aid policies. During the 
Reagan administration after adjusting for inflation 
federal financial aid declined 1.3% between 1980-81 and 
1989-90 while institutional financial aid grew 90% 
after adjusting for inflation during the same period. 
The federal share of available financial aid decreased 
from 83% to 75% while institutional aid grew from 12% 
to 19% of the total with state aid increasing from 5% 
to 6%. This despite an increased cost of attendance for 
public higher education of approximately 25% after 
adjusting for inflation.Although touched on in the 
discussion of the effect on access to public higher 
education of changes in state financing, the impact of 
federal financial aid policies is not fully discussed. 
The federal government also affects public higher 
^®Vera Kistiakowsky, "Military Funding of University 
Research," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 502 (March, 1989): page 141. 
^^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid: 1980 to 1989 
(Washington, D.C.: College Entrance Examination Board, August, 
1989) pages 6-13. 
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education through a process known as "ear-marking" of 
funds which represents direct appropriations from the 
federal government to individual institutions for 
designated purposes. In FY 1992 over $600 million was 
appropriated to higher education (public and private) 
through this method.^® The impact of federal ear¬ 
marking on public higher education finance is not 
discussed in this study. 
This dissertation also does not explore the impact 
on state financing of public higher education of the 
significant changes in college-age population 
demographics. The change in demographics during the 
time period discussed affected state financing 
particularly in states that have funding formulas that 
include variables for eligible students or students 
applying for admission. The change in demographics 
also affects states without formula funding when state 
governments take into account the rise and fall of the 
population that most extensively uses the public higher 
education system. 
^®Colleen Cordes and Jack Goodman, "Congress Earmarked a 
Record $684 Million for Non-Competitive Projects on Campuses," 





The literature reviewed for this study represents 
the seminal works in the field of the political economy 
of public higher education as defined in terms of the 
external relationships of public higher education. The 
literature chosen provides the historical perspective, 
theoretical background, and present and future context 
in which the study is conducted. The review focuses on 
the relationship between the private sector and public 
higher education during the industrial revolution, the 
evolving interaction between public higher education 
and the military, and the role of the modern 
"multiversity" in a global economy. 
First literature is reviewed that provides the 
historical context in which the study is conducted. 
This historical perspective entails a brief examination 
of the land grant movement and then a more in-depth 
review of the role of public higher education during 
the industrial revolution and the two world wars. Then 
literature is reviewed which focuses upon the 
characteristics of today's external relationships of 
public higher education. The literature analyzes the 
9 
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term "multiversity" and uses the seminal work The Uses 
of the University by Clark Kerr as a springboard from 
which to present different perspectives on the role of 
public universities' in defining and meeting the needs 
of society. It focuses on the demands on public higher 
education in the global economy and what is and will be 
expected from public higher education today and in the 
future. This examination provides the theoretical and 
contextual framework upon which the study is based. 
The Land-Grant Movement 
Public higher education in the United States began 
in earnest with the establishment of the seventy one 
colleges and universities that were defined as the 
"Land-grant schools. The enabling legislation of the 
land-grant movement was in 1862 when the original 
legislation, the Morrill Land-Grant College Act was 
signed by Abraham Lincoln. This came after an earlier 
attempt in Congress before the Civil War that passed 
both houses but was vetoed by President James Buchanan 
on the grounds that federal involvement in education 
was unconstitutional. Therefore the Morrill Act was 
considered quite a breakthrough. 
The motivation behind the movement was the 
development of two major political forces in the United 
23 
States: the rapid industrial and agricultural 
development of the United States that had developed 
tremendous momentum in the middle of the 1800's and the 
growing democratic, egalitarian, and populist forces 
developing in the country. Both of these forces put 
tremendous pressure on the federal government to become 
involved in education. As the Land-Grant movement 
developed it became supported by many different sectors 
of society who saw its development as potentially 
benefiting their interests: farmers, laborers, and the 
emerging industrial capitalist class. As a result of 
this interesting coalescence of political forces the 
Land-Grant movement developed into a powerful crusade 
to involve the federal government in the business of 
higher education. It was thought that only with the 
massive resources of the federal government involved 
could the far-reaching and ambitious goals of the 
movement be obtained. These goals were the following: 
democratize higher education by making it accessible to 
all members of society with a focus on a more 
vocational philosophy of higher education; and to 
emphasize the emerging fields of applied science in 
agriculture and engineering that were seen to be 
crucial to the development of the United States during 
this period. 
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There have been many books written about the Land- 
Grant movement that are considered authoritative 
histories including those by Edward D. Eddy, Joseph B. 
Edmond, Allan Nevin, and Roger Williams.^® However it 
is Earle D. Ross's Democracy College: The Land-Grant 
College in the Formative State (1942) that is 
considered the seminal work on the Land Grant movement. 
Ross argues that the movement to increase access 
was done in the spirit of moving towards a more 
classless society with the doors to all aspects of the 
political, social, and economic system open to all 
through access to education. By working towards the 
democratization of higher education through increased 
accessibility the architects of the land-grant movement 
were also making a statement about the undemocratic and 
inaccessible nature of existing private colleges and 
universities. In Ross' view the accessibility and 
democratization of higher education was intimately tied 
to implementing a vocational philosophy of higher 
^®see Edward D. Eddy, Jr., Colleges for Our Land and Time: 
The Land-Grant Idea in American Education (New York: Harper, 
1957); J.B. Edmond, The Magnificent Charter: The Origin and Role 
of the Morill Land-Grant Colleges and Universities (Hicksville. 
N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1978); Allan Nevins, The State 
Universities and Democracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1962); and Roger L. Williams, The Origins of Federal Support for 
Higher Education: George W. Atherton and the Land-Grant College 
Movement (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1991.) 
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education. This training would appeal to what he 
describes as the "industrial classes" which included 
nearly 75% of the members of society: farmers and 
laborers. Ross points out that the focus on a 
vocational orientation was partly a result of the 
growing agitation and class consciousness of labor and 
farm groups. He writes that organized labor groups no 
longer sought education merely for general training but 
now were agitating for training in special competence 
in craftsmanship as well. Special training was seen as 
both a protection against losing a job one already had 
and as a means to getting a better one. Specialized 
educational training was also thought to be a way to 
gain competency in management aspects of agriculture 
and the ability to influence the political system, thus 
aiding the struggle against discrimination and 
disparity within the agriculture economy.^® 
Ross writes that the goal of emphasizing science, 
both as a field of study and as an essential aspect of 
the development of the nation, would have tremendous 
consequences for the future of higher education and the 
nation. Agriculture in particular was beginning to be 
^°Earle D. Ross, Democracy's Collecre; The Land-Grant Movement 
in the Formative State (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press, 
1942), page 18. 
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seen as a science and, combined with the emerging 
industrialization of the country, applied science was 
seen as an essential part of economic development by 
the emerging industrial capitalist class. At that 
point, he writes, most Americans who wished to study 
scientific fields were forced to go to Europe and many 
of these people, some of America's most brilliant 
minds, decided to stay there, thus depriving the United 
States of much needed brain power and scientific 
discoveries. 
The relationship between the American military and 
universities and colleges also began with the Morrill 
Act of 1862 which stated that institutions financed 
under the terms of the act through income from the sale 
of federal lands must offer military training as part 
of the curriculum. Ross writes that since the act was 
being considered by Congress eight months into the 
Civil War the sponsor of the Act, Congressman Justin 
Morrill of Vermont, was able to insert into the measure 
the brief clause "and including military tactics". 
There were two underlying motivations behind the 
military provision of the Act. The first was the 
already strong commitment to the concept of a citizen 
^^Ross, Democracy's College, page 15-18. 
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militia and avoiding the need for a standing army. 
There was strong sentiment expressed in the union at 
that point, including that by Congressman Morrill, to 
avoid the possibility that the nation's growing 
military needs might lead to a large professional 
military establishment. By providing military training 
in civilian-run colleges, he argued, it was hoped that 
the establishment of such a professional military could 
be avoided. The second was the tendency of the union 
to judge every public institution by its utility in 
achieving some social purpose thus, according to Ross, 
making it almost inevitable that the public university 
would be called on to serve the military. 
For the first 30 years, the Morrill Act's military 
training provision appears to have had little impact 
since the Act left the states to determine how it was 
to be imposed. Most land-grant states made military 
training compulsory for able-bodied men in their first 
two college years, and curriculum included course work 
on tactics. Most of the training during this time 
period, however, seems to have amounted to a few hours 
of drill each week.^^ 




David Noble, in his seminal work America by 
Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate 
Capitalism, outlines the historical evolution of 
science as a basis of american economic development and 
the role of the educational system in this process. He 
argues that the process of integrating applied 
scientific research and training with the higher 
education system played a fundamental role in the 
development of american capitalism during the 
industrial revolution of the early 20th century. 
Noble writes that in the early 1800s colleges were 
still very traditionally oriented and there was 
considerable disdain among the academics for the study 
of experimental science. Therefore, he writes, 
technical education in the United States developed in 
conflict with what he calls the classical colleges. 
This happened through the development of technological 
studies within these colleges and the rise of technical 
colleges and institutes outside these traditional 
schools. Noble points out that there were numerous, 
though often feeble, attempts at integrating technical 
education into the traditional American higher 
education institutions as early as 1749 when Benjamin 
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Franklin argued for instruction in mathematics, 
surveying, navigation, architecture, and the science of 
agriculture and commerce. In 1756 Franklin helped 
establish the Public Academy in the City of 
Philadelphia which attempted to integrate technical 
education into a traditional education program, but the 
advocates of the traditional perspective were very 
strong and by 1811 the program had been watered down 
such that science was confined to the senior year and 
consisted only of astronomy, natural philosophy, 
chemistry, and electricity.^^ Because of the limited 
success of these attempts to integrate technical 
education into the traditional educational institutions 
the rise of technical education took place more 
prominently outside these traditional institutions. As 
a major step towards this end, in 1861 the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was 
established by scientific and civic leaders in Boston. 
The biggest leap forward however for technical 
education came about as a result of the Land-Grant 
legislation. According to Noble, state legislatures 
that had previously been reluctant to fund technical 
^^David F. Noble, America By Design; Science, Technology & 
the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1979), page 20. 
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instruction now were eager to accept federal grants 
made available by Morrill for the purpose of 
establishing new types of schools for the purpose of 
studying agriculture and the mechanical arts. In the 
first decade after the Act was passed the number of 
engineering schools increased from six to 70. By 1880 
there were 85 and by 1917 there ^ere 126.^^ Still 
when these engineering and agriculture schools opened 
there was considerable resistance to focusing on 
"practical" problems. The mind set of the classical 
college where abstract and theoretical problems were 
the main focus, was still prevalent, but it soon became 
obvious that most of the graduates from these programs 
were ill-equipped for jobs in industry and agriculture, 
and there developed strong support for the curricula to 
be adapted to meet the demands of the "real world". 
For many years this struggle continued with conflicting 
forces pressuring these institutions to be all things: 
academically respectable, based in esoteric knowledge 
and meeting the need of employers for practically 
trained graduates. 
^^Noble, America By Design, page 24. 
^^Noble, America By Design, page 28. 
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Noble writes that during this period in the late 
19th century industrial engineers were focusing their 
attention upon translating the basic research of the 
new university-based scientists into products, but 
rarely concerned themselves with the actual production 
of scientific discovery itself. However, in the early 
20th century this had changed. The introduction of 
organized research laboratories in industry, and the 
effort to integrate universities within this industrial 
structure brought about an attempt by industrial 
engineers to become intimately involved in basic 
research.^® As early as 183 0 some industrial firms 
had employed university scientists to do research. But 
it wasn't until the industrial revolution of the late 
1800s and early 1900s that industry became convinced 
that research was an essential part of its work. And 
with this realization came the understanding that they 
needed to look outside industry for this research. 
This led to the idea of a coordinated system of 
industry, universities and government. This meant that 
the historical distinctions between basic and applied 
research and industry and the university were melting 
away and, as Noble points out, the distinction between 
^®Noble, America By Design, page 110. 
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scientific research and industrial research became one 
only of motive. The motive for scientific research was 
the search for truth while the motive behind industrial 
research was to maximize prof its. 
It was during the first 25 years of the 20th 
century that industry began establishing in-house 
research facilities and started attracting university 
based scientists to work in these facilities. Noble 
views this period as the beginning of the link between 
university and industry research efforts.^® It was 
also during the early 1900s that the first faculty 
exchanges between industry and universities occurred. 
The purpose was to enable universities to keep abreast 
of the changes in the industries and to enable 
manufacturers to obtain needed expertise. This was 
modeled after a system in Germany where universities 
and manufacturers worked closely together.At the 
University of Kansas the Industrial Fellowship system 
was established where members of the faculty were 
appointed for a two-year period to work exclusively on 
projects defined by the sponsoring company, which would 
^’^Noble, America By Design, page 112. 
^®Noble, America By Design, page 118. 
^^Noble, America By Design, page 122. 
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also undeinvrite the cost. Any discoveries made during 
this work would become the property of the company. 
During this time industry began to recognize that 
universities were the ideal places for research. One 
reason was that universities could provide a continuous 
stream of personnel both new faculty and the constant 
influx of new graduate students. Because of meager 
resources within the university, industry was in a 
perfect position to provide the funding necessary for 
these universities to expand their research 
capabilities. Many leaders in industry argued 
fervently for increased support for both basic and 
applied research. Noble points out that these 
industrial leaders saw clearly that not only would this 
support meet their needs in the short-term but, perhaps 
more importantly, would "retool" american higher 
education to be more in tune with the demands of 
industry. This, according to Noble, is one of the most 
important aspects of this period. 
Noble points out that the first official 
recognition of the university's responsibility to 
industry was in 1903 when the University of Illinois 
established the first university "engineering 
^°Noble, America By Design, page 131. 
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experiment station" in the country. The Hatch Act of 
1887, the second land grant legislation, had provided 
the federal funds for the establishment of agricultural 
experiment stations at land-grant institutions 
throughout the country and, while this succeeded in 
greatly stimulating research for agriculture, it did 
not encourage the development of the second aspect of 
the Morrill Act: the promotion of the mechanic arts. 
In 1896 Congress passed additional legislation 
appropriating funds for the establishment of 
engineering experiment stations. Noble writes that as 
the 2 0th century arrived many politicians and 
industrial leaders argued that industry was the 
economic future of America (and therefore the needs of 
industry were equal or greater than those of 
agriculture) , and that the role of land-grant 
institutions in meeting these demands of industry was 
essential, hence the establishment of the engineering 
experiment stations. Recognition of the preeminence of 
industry was also reflected in the federal government's 
creation of the Bureau of Standards and the transfer of 
industry oriented bureaus from the Department of the 
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Interior to that of Commerce where they didn't have to 
compete with agriculture for government support. 
The most advanced cooperation between industrial 
and university research developed at MIT, which had 
originally received 30% of the land-grant college 
appropriation in Massachusetts as a school of mechanic 
arts. MIT established the "Technology Plan" in which a 
standard contract was made available by the institute 
whereby industry could benefit from the Institute's 
resources in exchange for a standard fee. According to 
the contract, MIT agreed to make available to the 
companies the library, as well as faculty for meetings 
to discuss the company's problems. MIT went further 
and maintained a record of the qualifications and 
special expertise of its alumni so as to assist the 
companies in obtaining qualified personnel for 
permanent employment. Those in charge at MIT perceived 
this plan to be mutually beneficial' to industry and the 
educational processes at the institute.According 
to Noble, the plan was an immediate success. MIT's 
cooperation provided industry with an essential source 
of basic and applied research and trained personnel. 
^^Noble, America By Design, pages 135-36. 
^^Noble, America By Design, pages 142-43. 
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As the industrial revolution grew, and other industries 
developed a need for resources such as these, the 
dependence of industry on places such as MIT grew 
accordingly. 
Noble points out that this increased cooperation 
between industry and university research not only 
shifted much of the cost of scientific research and 
training from industry to the public sector (land-grant 
universities) but also transformed the form and content 
of scientific research itself. This meant more than 
the shift in emphasis from basic to applied research. 
There occurred a fundamental transformation in the 
agenda of the research efforts: what kinds of questions 
would be asked; what specific questions would be asked; 
which problems would be investigated; what sorts of 
solutions would be sought; what conclusions would be 
drawn. Noble argues that it is this point in history 
that science had been fully enlisted in the service of 
capital and was now fully integrated in the capitalist 
economy. 
^^Noble, America By Design, page 145. 
^^Noble, America By Design, page 147. 
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Training 
The connection between industry and university 
took the shape of more than just research. The need of 
industry for a trained work force was as essential as 
that of research because without the trained personnel 
there could be no research conducted nor their industry 
managed. Noble writes that during this period there 
were two general categories of workers needed by 
industry: the skilled and unskilled labor that did the 
actual work and the managers who designed and 
supervised the production process. Accordingly, Noble 
divides the educational process into two categories: 
industrial education as the means for producing the 
labor; and higher education, especially engineering 
education, as the means of producing the managers. 
At the beginning of the 20th century industry was 
working closely with higher education on issues of 
curriculum and recruitment, and promoted the industrial 
education of workers. They sought to educate the 
working population, mostly through the public K-12 
system, on how to carry out the directives of 
management most efficiently. Engineering education, 
however, was viewed in a different light as it was the 
^^Noble, America By Design, page 168. 
38 
source of their managerial work force. Therefore, 
Noble writes, industry sought to bring both the form 
and content of the engineering education into line with 
what they saw to be both the short-term and long-term 
needs of industry. Procedures for rating and 
evaluating students had to be standardized and a state- 
of-mind had to be instilled that included a sense of 
"corporate responsibility, teamwork, service and 
loyalty and had to provide fundamental training in 
social sciences and humanities which were then 
perceived as essential for an effective manager".^® 
As in the development of research, the 
transformation of higher education evolved at three 
levels: corporate in-house training programs, 
educational institutions that formed cooperative 
programs with industry and new federal agencies created 
during World War I that would coordinate these 
activities on a nationwide level. During the 
beginnings of the industrial revolution corporations 
educated prospective managers through their own schools 
set up precisely for this purpose. But in 1913 the 
National Association of Corporation Schools (NACS) was 
created for the purpose of coordinating the efforts of 
^®Noble, America By Design, page 170. 
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industry to obtain trained managers and, more 
importantly, to influence the established educational 
institutions to gear their efforts toward the needs of 
industry. In fact, it was openly acknowledged that the 
ideal would be to put the corporation schools out of 
business by gearing the established educational 
institutions so that they could provide the services 
and training for which the corporation schools had been 
created. Thus NACS became the agency for industry- 
education cooperation for these matters. 
Up to that point the gap between the engineering 
schools and industry had resulted because the majority 
of engineering schools had been created as extensions 
not of the industries, but of the established schools 
of science in state and private universities which 
demanded an academically respectable approach to 
engineering. As stated earlier, this included an 
emphasis upon scientific theory rather than industrial 
practice. As a result the schools remained relatively 
independent of industry and produced graduates who were 
either ill-suited for the discipline of applied 
industrial work or poorly trained in the practical 
^’'Noble, America By Design, pages 182-83. 
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applications necessary to do the work.^® Ironically 
it was the alumni from many of these engineering 
schools within universities that led the fight to 
change this. As these alumni became leaders in industry 
they put pressure upon their alma matas to change the 
focus of the curriculum so as to bring it into line 
with the requirements of practical work in industry. 
A major aspect of this effort was the 
establishment of cooperative education where students 
combined on the job training with classroom work. This 
began as early as 1910 at the University of Pittsburgh, 
the University of Cincinnati and MIT. The Cooperative 
system was seen as a bridge between the pure science 
approach and the practical needs of industry. The next 
step was the development of the university as a keeper 
of records and files on students and alumni so as to 
help fit them with the needs of industry. This 
information focused on character evaluations as well as 
the scholastic record.Soon the cooperative 
education movement spread to other areas of the economy 
besides engineering. Banks established business- 
fellowship plans with various schools that involved one 
^®Noble, America By Design, page 184. 
^^Noble, America By Design, pages 197-99, 
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year of employment at the bank during the four year 
college career. However, it wasn't until the 
involvement of the military in the years preceding 
World War I that industry was able to dramatically 




Early in May, 1917 leading educators gathered in 
Washington to formulate a comprehensive policy for the 
cooperation between higher education and the government 
which would make the most effective use of the higher 
education institutions in the World War I effort.^° 
Representatives of 187 institutions gathered and 
decided to modify curricula to fulfill the need for 
technical and vocational training, to coordinate their 
efforts so as to provide the "efficient use of 
institutional plant, force and equipment", and to urge 
students below draft age, (especially those in 
engineering and other technical fields) to stay in 
school and complete their training. Most importantly 
^°Noble, America By Design, page 209. 
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the educators decided to provide military training for 
all able-bodied college men/^ 
The military expressed a priority need for 
vocationally trained men, which coincided with an 
expressed need of industry. The U.S. War Department 
established a Committee on Education and Special 
Training (CEST) whose membership consisted of national 
leaders in industry and higher education. CEST 
formally took charge of American vocational and higher 
education during the war. Secretary of War Baker 
explained that CEST was established for the "purpose of 
organizing and coordinating all the educational 
resources of the country with relation to the needs of 
the Army, and to represent the War Department in its 
relations with the educational institutions of the 
country and to develop and standardize policies as 
between the schools and colleges and the War 
Department" . 
During the summer of 1918 the Vocational Division 
of CEST trained 38,000 draftees in twenty basic trades 
at educational institutions selected by CEST. They 
developed unprecedented short courses for intensive 
^^Noble, America By Design, page 210. 
^^Noble, America By Design, page 215. 
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training in technical, vocational and military 
subjects. While this was happening, the United States 
Bureau of Education called a conference "to consider 
the permanent effect on industrial education of the 
plans and methods which were developed under the stress 
of the war emergency and to formulate plans for 
utilizing the best of the experience thus gained". 
CEST also focused upon the problem of supplying 
officers for the war effort through the training and 
recruitment of college students. It was assigned the 
task of developing a large body of men in the colleges 
that would serve as a military asset. Since the draft 
age was 21, students between 18 and 21 were encouraged 
to enroll in the Student Army Training Corps (SATC) 
which would grant them military status, bring them 
under military authority, and allow them to continue 
their education until called upon by the military. 
In August, 1918 the draft age was lowered to 18, 
thus jeopardizing the efforts of CEST. But CEST 
developed a plan, however, to make the SATC mandatory 
which led to the Government taking charge of nearly all 
colleges and universities in the United States. 
American education thus was placed under military 
^^Noble, America By Design, page 216. 
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authority as exercised through CEST. This opportunity 
provided industry and their supporters in higher 
education the chance to break down the academic 
barriers that had made difficult their efforts to 
transform higher education institutions from 
theoretical-based institutions to ones serving the 
practical needs of industry. Old courses of study were 
abolished and were substituted with short intensive 
courses for men with specific duties in the Army. 
Changes that previously seemed nearly impossible were 
now easily envisioned. On October 1, 1918 the new SATC 
was formally implemented at 500 colleges throughout the 
country and American higher education came officially 
under military command. CEST insisted on such 
uniformity that it ordered that the ceremonies on all 
campuses be identical and take place simultaneously. 
However this unprecedented situation was short-lived as 
the Armistice of November 11 caught CEST by surprise. 
The CEST final report expressed regret that there was 
not more time to perfect the organization. Therefore 
the guise of the military authority was now gone and in 
order to implement their plans they were forced to do 
so under different auspices. 
^^Noble, America By Design, pages 221-223. 
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These events demonstrate that the first World War 
had a tremendous effect on the relationship between 
industry, the federal government and higher education. 
For the first time there was a national effort to 
coordinate research and training activities in 
accordance with a national plan. It was clear that 
this plan was mainly being devised by industrial 
leaders and their sympathizers in the federal 
government and institutions of higher education. Noble 
points out that after the war many industrialists who 
were part of the efforts to reform higher education 
wrote about the changes of the student body under 
military authority. Particularly noteworthy to them 
was the greater efficiency of the student body in terms 
of "physical fitness, the development of courtesy and 
the spirit of service and self-sacrifice". According 
to Noble, their goal became the implementation of these 
changes in the peace-time era. Since the legislation 
establishing CEST allowed its members to retain their 
military status and authority in peacetime, their first 
act was the revitalization of the Reserve Officers 
Training Corps (ROTC) which had been suspended during 
the war when SATC was established. 
^^Noble, America By Design, pages 224-25. 
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Soon after the end of the war the CEST was 
officially dissolved but a new Education and Recreation 
Branch of the War Plans Division was created (E & R) . 
Enrollment in the ROTC grew from 35,000 in 1916 to 
120,000 in 1925 and the program served to maintain a 
military presence on college campuses thereby extending 
the benefits of "military discipline beyond the active 
Army". This was very important from the industrial 
standpoint as the ROTC units on the campuses provided 
technical education for potential officers at the 
government's expense, in addition to the purely 
military instruction. The E & R pushed for the 
extension of military discipline into all areas of 
national life and established the new military 
philosophy which identified training for industry with 
military training.'*® The end of the war did not 
signal the end of "universal military training"; it 
only meant that this training would now be carried on 
outside of the military proper in the country's 
educational institutions. Efforts were made to promote 
physical fitness as well as loyalty to and support of 
"American ideals". 
^®Noble, America By Design, page 226. 
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The most important activity of the E & R, however, 
was how to select, train and assign men to the right 
jobs as defined by the demands of the military and 
industry. They were anxious to adopt the practices 
that had proved effective for military mobilization in 
a manner that would improve the organization of 
personnel for industrial work.^"^ The E & R was not 
the only agency that kept the CEST activities alive 
during peacetime. In 1919 the Personnel Research 
Federation (PRF) was established and became the 
country's central agency for personnel research. The 
PRF was responsible for conducting personnel research 
for industry which measured human usefulness, the 
standardization of vocational terminology, and the 
preparation of job specifications.'*® During the next 
few years the focus turned to the question of who would 
take responsibility for achieving the standardization 
of terminology and specifications. Representatives of 
government, industry and educational institutions that 
were members of PRF agreed that educational 
institutions were the appropriate place for such work. 
^’^Noble, America By Design, page 228. 
^®Noble, America By Design, page 231. 
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This brought the issue of industry-university 
cooperation back to the forefront. It was proposed 
that industry as a whole would develop the job 
specifications and requirements that the schools 
demanded and the schools would provide the 
complementary testing, training, selection and 
distribution of manpower for industry. This was to 
deal with one of the pressing problems facing industry: 
the shortage of technically trained personnel as a 
result of casualties during the war, the decline in 
attendance at universities and the drop in 
immigration. 
These efforts were centered on three ideas: "to 
perpetuate the centralized authority achieved during 
the war which entailed the extension of governmental 
and industrial authority over education; the 
standardization of american education procedures and 
institutional classification; and the extension within 
the educational institutions themselves of the testing, 
rating and guidance procedures developed by the 
science-based industries before the war".^° However, 
the war had generated deep divisions within the 
^®Noble, America By Desicrn, page 237. 
®°Noble, America By Design, pages 247-48. 
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American population and many educators outside the 
industry-university-government circles were now arguing 
strenuously that it was specifically the role of the 
university to stand apart from government and industry 
so that it might encourage the unrestricted pursuit of 
knowledge. The governmental repression during and 
/ 
after the war also gave birth to a powerful social 
movement to establish academic freedom as a foundation 
of american university life. People in this movement 
viewed military training as coercive which was a 
dramatic change from the ideology of the 19th century, 
when military training was viewed as an integral part 
of character building and responsible citizenship. 
Research 
Noble points out WWI was also the turning point 
for federal involvement in university research. This 
increased involvement of the federal government began 
after the sinking of the Lusitania in July, 1915 when 
the Secretary of the Navy wrote to Thomas Edison to ask 
about the possibility of creating "machinery and 
facilities for utilizing the natural inventive genius 
of America to meet the new conditions of warfare..." 
This inquiry led to the establishment of the Naval 
Consulting Board. One of the first actions of the NCB 
was to recommend the creation of a special naval 
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laboratory under the command of civilian scientists. 
The Navy agreed and a substantial appropriation was 
made for that purpose. When the war broke out in 
April, 1917 the project was dropped, leaving as the 
major activity of the NCB during the war the screening 
of public suggestions and inventions for possible 
military use. This proved to be quite fruitless as 
110,000 suggestions led to 100 detailed examinations 
and only one project that actually went into 
production. 
In 1916 President Wilson approved the creation of 
the National Research Council. Its stated objectives 
included the "preparation of an inventory of scientific 
personnel, equipment, and current research work; 
cooperation with educational institutions and research 
foundations; the promotion of research relating to 
national defense; the creation of a clearinghouse; and 
for the coordination of research projects and 
scientific information".®^ With the outbreak of war 
in 1917 the National Research Council (NRC) was charged 
with the organization of military research and the 
coordination of scientific resources for the war. The 
^^Noble, America By Design, pages 149-50. 
^^Noble, America By Design, pages 152-153. 
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NRC was the first federal agency created for the 
purpose of coordinating and influencing research 
activities. Though the war ended before much of these 
efforts could get off the ground they served as a warm¬ 
up for American scientists who became accustomed to 
working together for the quick solution of an immediate 
problem. 
From the outset the NRC was an industrial as well 
as a military research agency. Its original purpose 
was "to bring into cooperation existing governmental, 
industrial and other research organizations. Though 
the early part of the war served as an opportunity for 
the consolidation of scientific efforts Noble points 
out that as early as eight months before the Armistice 
leaders of the council began to shift the emphasis 
explicitly from a military to an industrial focus. 
In the years just prior to World War II, the 
relationship between the military and university 
research intensified. According to Richard DeLauer in 
his article "The Good of It and Its Problems", the 
military began specific programs to underwrite certain 
scientific and technological research projects at a 
^^Noble, America By Design, pages 153-54. 
^^Noble, America By Design, page 155. 
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number of the leading colleges and universities in the 
country.As the war approached, a group of 
scientists brought to President Roosevelt's attention 
the important role that science was likely to play in 
the war. They pointed out the urgency of mobilizing 
american scientists to meet the military need. The 
result of their effort was that in June 1941, President 
Roosevelt established, by executive order, the Office 
of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) and, for 
the first time, endorsed the view that the proper 
functions of government included support of basic 
research by university scientists. According to 
Richard Abrams in his article "The U.S. Military and 
Higher Education: A Brief History", although that 
office's mandate focused on national security 
priorities, its acknowledgement of the importance of 
pure science lent assurance to academic researchers 
that their work need not be confined specifically to 
military objectives.^® The OSRD realized at the 
outset that government laboratories were too few in 
^^Richard D. DeLauer, "The Good of It and Its Problems", The 
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 502 
(March 1989): page 132. 
®®Richard M. Abrams, "The U.S. Military and Higher Education: 
A Brief History", The ANNALS of The American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 502 (March 1989): page 20. 
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number to meet even a fraction of the research needs of 
the war effort and rather than create a vast new 
federal bureaucracy, it adopted the policy of working 
through organizations with established research 
facilities. This policy gave rise to the no-profit-no- 
loss research and development contract, a device 
through which hundreds of universities and industrial 
companies contributed to the wartime research and 
development effort. 
Abrams explains that the military identified the 
need to apply new technologies for communications, 
radar, sonar and long range aircraft to military 
purposes and they looked to universities for the 
scientists to perform these tasks. From the beginning 
of the war, university science and engineering 
facilities took on much of the research that produced 
missile technology, gun sights, bomb sights, radar, and 
the atom bomb. More than 25 universities secretly took 
contracts to develop chemical and biological weapons. 
This new relationship between university research 
facilities and military departments of research and 
development set the U.S. apart from other industrial 
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nations, where most of such work was done in government 
or private installations^”^. 
It was also during this period that social 
scientists began to establish relationships with the 
military for the first time. Richard D. Lambert in his 
article "DoD, Science and International Studies" writes 
that in preparation for World War II, key social 
scientists moved from positions of external advisers to 
those of internal policy makers, conducting research 
intended to influence policy directly. During the war 
sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists 
worked in the Research Branch of the Information and 
Education Division of the War Department and in the 
Foreign Morale Analysis Division. This helped lead to 
a new field: area studies. Two well known examples are 
the study of the morale of the Japanese population near 
the end of the war and a major survey in Germany 
immediately after the War to study the effects of 
saturation bombing on population morale during the last 
phase of the European war effort.^® 
^’Abrams, "The U.S. Military and Higher Education," page 20. 
®®Richard D. Lampert, "DoD., Science and International 
Studies," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 502 (March 1989) page 96. 
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World War II was a popular war in the academic 
community, where strong sentiment for fighting the 
fascist powers existed. Support for the U.S. entering 
the war led to a widely held belief that the proper 
function of the university included making positive 
contributions to the military effort. The success of 
the academic/military relationship during the war 
helped solidify the support for continuing this 
function of the university during the post-war period. 
In order to institutionalize the wartime 
relationship between the military and university 
research, three important structures were put in place: 
the establishment of university run research facilities 
separate from the university proper; research offices 
in the individual military services; and academic- 
industry-military scientific advisory boards. 
University Run Research Facilities 
Delauer argues that the practice of contracting 
military research (and development) to university-run 
research centers was vital to the military effort in 
World War II and the Defense Department's plans for the 
post-war period. During the war the Los Alamos 
Scientific Laboratory in New Mexico was the 
headquarters for the research and development of the 
atomic bomb. At the time, Los Alamos was under 
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contract with the University of California on behalf of 
the Atomic Energy Commission. During the late 1940s 
two other university-military research laboratories 
were institutionalized: the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
at California Technology and the Lincoln Laboratories 
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).^® 
Research Offices in the Military Services 
Carl Kaysen explains in his article "Can the 
Universities Cooperate with the Defense Establishment?" 
that after the war's end, the Navy continued to support 
research in the universities through the Office of 
Naval Research (ONR) which was established in 1946. 
Its support shifted from the design of specific weapons 
for specific military situations to general support of 
scientific research in areas, very broadly defined, 
that were of potential Naval concern. Soon the other 
armed services followed the same path; the Air Force 
Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) was created in 
1952 followed by that of the Army in 1958. These last 
two organizations followed the creation of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950, which was given a 
“DeLauer, "The Good of It and Its Problems," page 132. 
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broad charter to support the advancement of 
/ 
knowledge.In the late 1950s, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was formed and, joined 
by ONR and (AFOSR, helped direct DoD funding for 
specific military research projects.®^ 
Advisory Boards 
The role of scientists in convincing President 
Roosevelt to mobilize scientific resources in 
preparation for World War II, and the decision to 
contract for military research and weapon development 
through universities, led to the development of 
committees through which distinguished members of 
academia met with military personnel to advise the 
military and develop research priorities. These 
contacts soon became widespread and have served as one 
of the most fundamental means for institutionalizing 
the relationship between academia and the military. 
According to Michael Klare in his seminal work War 
Without End, panels were formed "to provide a means of 
obtaining advice, views and recommendations of benefit 
to the operation of the Government from industrialists. 
®°Carl Kaysen, "Can the Universities Cooperate With the 
Defense Establishment," The ANNALS of The American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 502 (March 1989) page 32. 
®^DeLauer, "The Good of It and Its Problems," page 132. 
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businessmen, scientists, engineers, educators, and 
other public and private citizens whose experience and 
talents would not otherwise be available to DoD". These 
panels informi the DoD of new scientific discoveries 
that might be applicable to weapons development, help 
find scientists and research organizations best able to 
accomplish a specified research task, and lobby in the 
academic community for support of Pentagon policies.®^ 
During World War II, many people in the military 
and in academia hoped that the close relationship 
between the military and academia would continue after 
the war was over. Edward Bowles, Science Advisor to 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote..."the opportunity 
exists to encourage the training of brilliant minds and 
to instill in them a consciousness of their 
responsibility to the nation's security". Abrams 
argues that the onset of the Cold War, it seemed, 
assured that government leaders would stress the 
obligation of higher education to service national 
security needs, and providing the large federal funding 
needed for this scientific research would make great 
®^Michael T. Klare, War Without End, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 
1972), page 82. 
“Clayton R. Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program: A 
History of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1982), page 26. 
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strides towards securing a receptive reaction from 
university faculty.®^ 
However, as the war ended and comprehension of the 
destruction wreaked by the atomic blasts in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki settled into american social 
consciousness, many university scientists began to 
publicly question whether their function as educators 
was being corrupted by continuing to accept funding for 
military research. In response to these concerns, many 
universities took steps to protect their faculty from 
the possibility of this corruption. Most important 
actions were taken in two major areas: the opposition 
to secrecy and the need for peer review for funded 
research initiatives. In 1946, Harvard President James 
Conant, himself an important science advisor to the 
government during the war, established a policy 
prohibiting university sponsorship of classified or 
secret research. Many other universities quickly 
adopted this policy, though MIT continued to permit 
classified research and even classified doctoral 
theses. 
The debate raged. Those in favor of allowing 
classified research argued that the ban on such 
®^Abrams, "The U.S. Military and Higher Education," page 29. 
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research would either endanger national security by the 
failure to have such research done, or top faculty 
members would be wooed from the universities to conduct 
research elsewhere by large grants and facilities. It 
was as much this second argument as the first that 
persuaded most universities to continue their wartime 
relationship with the military. 
University acquiescence during the immediate post¬ 
war period cemented the relationship between scientific 
research and the military. The tremendous explosion of 
new technology and the rise to preeminence of American 
science in the world community occurred within the 
relationship between academia and the military. Much 
of this new technology was discovered at university- 
military research centers such as the Jet Propulsion 
Lab, the Lawrence Livermore Lab, the Los Alamos 
Laboratory and Lincoln Laboratory. The broad scope 
given in Department of Defense (DoD) grants for basic 
research enabled the university researchers to minimize 
the apparent military nature of their work. The 
guaranteed peer review of contract awards added 
legitimacy to research sponsored by the military 
establishment, and those projects which required 
secrecy were conducted at the off-campus research 
facilities federally owned and financed but 
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administered by universities. By the 1960s, there were 
at least twenty centers known as Federally Funded 
Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) sponsored by 
the Atomic Energy Commission, the DoD, or NASA.®^ 
When President Kennedy took office in 1961 the 
emphasis of military research and development shifted 
from the development of nuclear weapons to efforts to 
combat indigenous uprisings in the third world. This 
strategy was called counterinsurgency. Klare argues 
that the Kennedy administration felt that the military 
had to be more oriented towards fighting guerilla wars, 
as these were to be the battles of the future. This 
new emphasis focused specifically on the cooperation of 
social scientists and foreign-area specialists to 
acquire knowledge about the unfamiliar populations of 
Africa, Asia, and Latin American so as to better 
understand these peoples and be more equipped to wage 
counterinsurgency wars on these continents. 
Recognizing this, in 1964 the Pentagon turned its 
attention and resources toward developing this new 
perspective on warfare and set out to enlist 
anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, political 
scientists, and economists in the world of military 
23. 
®®Abrams, "The U.S. Military and Higher Education," pages 22- 
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sponsored research and development.^^ These efforts 
on the surface appeared to be innocuous research tasks 
discretely distributed to several universities and 
think tanks. As the Vietnam War raged and american 
forces became more bogged down in their 
counterinsurgency efforts, these studies became more 
essential to the Pentagon's activities. 
During this period the FFRDCs became even more 
crucial. The DoD established military research centers 
at select universities and asked university 
administrators to create independent research 
organizations, with the added bonus of financial 
incentives to their universities should they 
participate in this plan. Where direct university 
participation was not feasible, the Pentagon created a 
network of independent research organizations that were 
to be known as "think tanks". Although these centers 
were not directly related to universities, they became 
an extension of the university community as faculty 
were attracted to spend time there contributing to the 
purpose of the centers, or were recruited away from the 
universities all together and worked full-time at these 
"think tanks". 
®®Klare, War Without End, pages 71-72. 
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In an attempt to clearly define the role of 
military research at universities in 1970 Congress 
passed the Mansfield Amendment to the "Authorization 
for Military Procurement, Research and Development, 
Fiscal Year 1970, and Reserve Strength" which stated in 
part: 
None of the funds authorized by this act may be 
used to carry out any research project or study 
unless such a project or study has a direct and 
apparent relationship to a specific military 
function or operation.®”^ 
The purpose of this Amendment was to reduce the DoD's 
role in the shaping of basic research, though many 
argue that the exact opposite happened. Although 
Congress later modified the Mansfield Amendment so that 
research sponsored by the military had to have a 
"potential relationship to a military function", 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s DoD guidelines for grant 
applications insisted on "the relevance of the proposed 
research to the DoD mission," and also encouraged "pre¬ 
proposals" so that university researchers could modify 
projects when their initial ideas did not precisely 
meet DoD interests. Abrams writes that the DoD 
®'^Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings 
Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 91st 
Congress, 2nd Session on S3376 and HR17123, 91st Congress, 2nd 
Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970): page 
159; quoted in Stanton A. Glantz and Norm V. Alberts, "Department 
of Defense R & D in the University," Science, November 1974, page 
76. 
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explicitly rejected peer review of research proposals, 
substituting merit review including such criteria as a 
balanced geographic and institutional distribution of 
awards so that the DoD could more easily please a 
broader constituency of Congressmen and women.®® 
During this time the Reserve Officers' Training 
Corps (ROTC) programs came under attack and a 
significant number of universities closed the ROTC 
programs on their campuses. At about the same time a 
strong movement against classified military research on 
campus developed and many universities adopted policies 
prohibiting such research on their campuses, including 
MIT, which motivated Draper Laboratory to separate 
itself from MIT and become an independent FFRDC. The 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory also moved away from 
classified military research and became primarily a 
NASA support center. The rift between the military and 
universities was deepened by the apparent neglect of 
the defense technological base by the Nixon 
Administration. Between 1968 and 1974, funding for DoD 
research and development dropped dramatically in all 
areas: government laboratories, industrial contractors, 
FFRDCs, and universities. Presidents Johnson and Nixon 
®®Abrams, "The U.S. Military and Higher Education," pages 27- 
28. 
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cut back on research and development funding to control 
the defense budget while continuing to escalate the 
war. These decreases continued until 1975 and would 
not increase significantly until the Reagan 
Administration took power in 1981. 
The Federal Grant Multiversity 
The end of World War II also brought dramatic 
enrollment increases for land-grant universities. The 
G.I. Bill and a subsequent similar one for Korean 
veterans pushed the state universities to the forefront 
of absorbing and educating a booming population. 
Combined with the increased research funding this 
dramatic increase in higher education student aid gave 
the federal government an unprecedented role in higher 
education. There followed an increase in the role and 
visibility of higher education in the society at-large. 
Many different sectors were now pulling at what had 
become vast bureaucratic institutions from many 
different directions. The federal government, state 
government, the private sector, were now joined by a 
rapidly expanding student body in laying claim to the 
resources of the institution. A new university was 
born. 
Clark Kerr, President Emeritus of the University 
of California writes in his seminal work The Uses of 
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the University about this new university which he terms 
the "multiversity". Kerr writes of the role of this 
new university he calls the multiversity: 
"The multiversity is an inconsistent 
institution. It is not one community but 
several -- the community of the undergraduate 
and the community of the graduate; the 
community of the humanist, the community of 
the social scientist, and the community of 
the scientist; the communities of the 
professional schools; the community of all 
the nonacademic personnel; the community of 
the administrators. Its edges are fuzzy -- 
it reaches out to alumni, legislators, 
farmers, businessmen, who are all related to 
one or more of these internal communities. 
As an institution, it looks far into the past 
and far into the future, and is often at odds 
with the present. It serves society almost 
slavishly -- a society it also criticizes, 
sometimes unmercifully. Devoted to equality 
of opportunity, it is itself a class society. 
A community, like the medieval communities of 
masters and students, should have common 
interests; in the multiversity, they are 
quite varied, even conflicting. A community 
should have a soul, a single animating 
principle; the multiversity has several -- 
some of them quite good, although there is 
much debate on which souls really deserve 
salvation. 
The multiversity is expected to meet the very different 
and sometimes competing needs of the different sectors 
of society. This means that there are more voices 
®®Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University, 3rd ed., 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), pages 18-19. 
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attempting to define what society's needs are in terms 
of the allocation of university resources. And who 
controls the university's resources does much to define 
these needs. This is the reason why the external 
relationships of the university play such a significant 
role in shaping its character. 
Kerr points out that among the casualties of these 
competing forces is the internal harmony of the 
university. He points out that when trying to meet 
these often conflicting needs an institution must 
itself become internally diverse which puts at risk 
unity and harmony that once was a trademark of United 
States universities. This, Kerr argues, is not 
necessarily a bad thing. By making internal harmony a 
goal for the multiversity, one is really asking the 
university to serve only a single social interest, not 
the many that conflict with each other. 
Robert Paul Wolff, in his book The Ideal of the 
University agrees with Kerr's analysis that the 
university has a responsibility to serve the needs of 
society. He writes that it is not only traditional and 
just for the university to address and serve society's 
needs, it is also very useful for it to do so. He 
’°Kerr, Uses of the University, page 11. 
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argues that social justice requires the university to 
serve the society in which it resides. It is 
inherently, he writes, parasitic upon the community, 
consuming resources that are produced from the labor of 
the working classes. He argues that the more 
intellectually pure, and therefore removed from the day 
to day life of society, are its activities the more 
parasitic it becomes. Therefore, he writes, it is 
reasonable that the recipients of these resources 
(professors and students) should return a part of its 
value to the society. He goes one step further to 
argue that if tradition, justice, and social utility 
are not sufficient to justify the multiversity, then 
the upward mobility and opportunity that it provides 
for those who would otherwise be trapped at the lower 
levels of the social structure is in and of itself 
reason enough for its existence.However, Wolff 
differs with Kerr on a crucial point. Wolff argues 
that one must draw a distinction between the concepts 
of effective or market demand and human or social need. 
Human or social need, he writes, is a want or lack of 
something material or social whose presence would 
contribute to physical and emotional health, to the 
^^Robert Paul Woolf, The Ideal of the University, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1969), page 32. 
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full development of human power such as food, leisure, 
privacy, self esteem or productive work. Communities 
have collective needs like social justice, peace, 
cultural and political community. Effective or market 
demand is simply the existence in a market economy of 
buyers who are in the market and are prepared to spend 
for a particular commodity. Many human needs cannot 
get themselves expressed as market demands. He cites 
as an example the great need for cheap clothing and 
housing in the United States. He argues that it is 
possible to make a profit on cheap clothing and so most 
americans are attractively clothed. At the same time, 
well designed, low cost housing returns little or no 
profit. Therefore, Wolff argues, the multiversity as 
defined by Kerr does not necessarily meet social needs. 
What it does meet is the market place demands through 
federal research grants, scholarships etc. The nation 
does not necessarily need more engineers. There is a 
demand for engineers because of the planned economic 
policies of the government in support of such programs 
as the space program or the enhancement of the 
military-industrial complex. 
’'^Woolf, The Ideal of the University, pages 36-40. 
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Wolff also argues that serving the needs of 
society as defined by effective or market demands, 
especially as defined or created by the federal 
government, neutralizes one of the major purposes that 
he sees higher education serving society: its role as a 
social critic. If the multiversity is an instrument of 
the federal government then it can no longer be a 
critic of the federal government. In our society, 
where the federal government is so strong and all 
encompassing, there are very few institutions strong 
enough to challenge and critique it. Historically, 
Wolff argues, universities have been one of those 
places. But when the university is so tied to federal 
money and has developed what he calls a symbiotic 
relationship with the federal government it becomes 
extremely difficult to be a place for critique. Wolff 
is adamant that there is no middle ground. A 
multiversity cannot accept the government's money and 
be admitted to the inner circle, yet remain free to 
dissent. He poses the question: is there a greater 
social need for full-scale integration of the resources 
and activities of the university into existing domestic 
and foreign programs, or for the university to maintain 
its role of providing resources and activities that can 
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serve as a critic of those program from an independent 
position of authority and influence?"^^ 
In his book, Beyond the Ivory Tower: Social 
Responsibilities of the Modern University, Derek Bok, 
President Emeritus of Harvard University also explores 
this question of the role of the multiversity in 
responding to society's needs and the relationship the 
university holds with different forces in society. 
Bok writes that it is the university's unique 
combination of education and research that is its chief 
contribution to society. In order to facilitate 
education and research a university must first be able 
to recruit the most able and creative people that it 
can and second, be able to provide an environment of 
freedom in which these people can do their best work. 
It is here that the concept of academic freedom becomes 
so important. Bok views academic freedom not merely as 
a reflection of society's commitment to free speech; 
but also as a safeguard essential to the university's 
ability to accomplish the goals society sets for it. 
Any attempts to compromise the ability to recruit or 
the environment to speak, he argues, compromises the 
university. Bok is quick to point out that there are 
’^Woolf, The Ideal of the University, pages 41-42. 
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very distinct, if subtle forces at work that constantly 
threaten academic freedom at universities. Most 
specifically this threat comes from the increasingly 
closer contacts that have developed between university 
faculty and the outside world and the subsequent 
dependence on outside funding for research activities, 
consulting activities, and summer stipends from 
business and government. 
Through these outside connections faculty have 
increased their income, enlarged their research and 
added variety to their lives, but in return, their 
research focus or personal expertise becomes 
significantly influenced by the opportunities available 
to obtain necessary resources or compensation for such 
activities. The agenda of faculty can quickly become 
that of the government and the private sector. This 
could compromise the independence of the faculty and, 
in subtle forms, academic freedom. 
Bok argues that there is no reason for 
universities to feel uncomfortable in taking into 
account society's needs; in fact, he agrees, they have 
a clear obligation to do so. The challenge is deciding 
74Derek Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower, (Carnbridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), pages 20-21. 
■^^Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower, pages 67-68. 
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what kind of response is appropriate. He argues 
strongly that the proper response is through the normal 
academic functions, such as teaching, research or 
technical service. For instance, he suggests that 
racial inequality be dealt with by making a special 
effort to enroll minority students; that economic 
progress be helped by translating discoveries into 
products, that specialized knowledge be made available 
to assist the development of poorer nations. These 
initiatives, he argues, are all consistent with the 
proper activities of an academic institution.”^® 
The university's social obligations are as an 
educational institution practicing teaching and 
research. Society has the right to ask the university 
to respond to its needs in exchange for public 
resources. Society paid for, and expects in return, 
educational programs and research. Bok argues that 
universities have social responsibilities as a result 
of being allocated scarce and valuable public 
resources.He argues strongly that in order for the 
university to exercise this responsibility it must 
adhere to a principle of institutional neutrality. 
Beyond the Ivory Tower, pages 301-302. 
“^^Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower, page 88. 
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And, he states, that this principle of institutional 
neutrality does not prevent the university from 
addressing moral and ethical issues. To the contrary, 
he argues that institutional neutrality is essential in 
order for the university to do so. Only by 
institutional neutrality, Bok argues, can the 
university protect faculty when exercising their 
academic freedom and taking controversial public 
positions. Bok argues that by fudging institutional 
neutrality the university invites retaliation from the 
outside world. And that retaliation often takes the 
form of efforts to inhibit the academic freedom of the 
institution. 
Sam Bowles and Herbert Gintes, in their seminal 
work Schooling in Capitalist America; Educational 
Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life, take a 
much more critical look at Kerr's multiversity. Bowles 
and Gintes point out that between 1967 and 1973 the 
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, chaired by 
Clark Kerr researched and articulated the strategy for 
restructuring higher education to meet the needs of 
society. According to Bowles and Gintes, three major 
aspects of this strategy emerged: first a concerted 
"^^Bok, Beyond the Ivo2rv Tower, pages 300-305. 
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attempt to fragment the culture of the university 
community; second the support of community colleges to 
stratify higher education; and third an effort to 
restrict the growth of the higher educational system so 
as to keep the size of the "reserve army" of white- 
collar workers to a politically acceptable level. 
Bowles and Gintes argue that this strategy was in 
response to dramatic structural economic change going 
on in the United States. This change manifested itself 
in the expansion of the corporate and state sectors of 
the economy which led to an increasingly peripheral 
role of the self-employed and the birth of a new class 
of technical, lower supervisory and white-collar 
services workers that were to play a central role in 
production. These changes, they argue, were 
manifesting themselves in higher education: the vastly 
expanded demand for technical, clerical and other white 
collar skills by employers in the corporate and state 
sectors in the post - World War II period and the 
development of the wage labor white-collar class. 
"^^Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintes, Schooling in Capitalist 
America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic 
Life (New York: Basic Books, 1976), page 206. 
®°Bowles and Gintes, Schooling in Capitalist America, page 
204. 
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Bowles and Gintes point out that this 
manifestation of economic change within the higher 
education system is a logical extension of the 
fundamental contradiction that has always dominated the 
relationship between industry and higher education: how 
to train both leaders and followers. The educational 
processes best suited to train the leaders of society 
are not necessarily ideal for fostering the 
acquiescence needed from the followers. Resolving this 
contradiction, they argue, is one of the major goals 
behind Kerr's articulation of the multiversity.®^ 
Bowles and Gintes argue that the overexpansion of 
college enrollments have been, in part, a response to 
the industrial needs generated by this changing 
economic structure of the work place and that one of 
the major motivations of the G.I. Bill was to meet 
these needs of industry. They explain that this 
increasing fragmentation of the work force has brought 
about a corresponding fragmentation of curriculum and 
research in higher education. Students and faculty are 
discouraged from examining the problem as a whole just 
as a worker is forbidden to produce a whole product in 
the work place. This compartmentalization is ideal for 
®^Bowles and Gintes, Schooling in Capitalist America, page 
207. 
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industry because it allows the development of advanced 
technology or achievement while simultaneously 
discouraging the understanding and application of the 
moral, political or social implications of the 
individuals' work.®^ 
Ernest Boyer, in his seminal study College: The 
Undergraduate Experience, documents the concrete 
effects of the development of the multiversity upon 
undergraduate education. According to Boyer, the study 
found that serious deficiencies have developed that 
need to be addressed. These are the following: the 
difficulty of the transition from high school to 
college for an undergraduate is mostly ignored by the 
institution; the goals and curriculum of the education 
have become clouded as different forces in society 
struggle over its purpose; the priorities of the 
faculty has become skewed to the point that research is 
more important than teaching; the quality of campus 
life has been forgotten as the concern for research 
dollars has increased; the governing of the college has 
become muddled as too many people claim leadership 
roles and no one seems to be able to coordinate them; 
there is little effort to assess the outcome of the 
®^Bowles and Gintes, Schooling in Capitalist America, pages 
208-213. 
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undergraduate education and what an undergraduate ends 
up with when he or she graduates; and, while the 
connection between the campus and industry and the 
federal government thrives there seems little 
connection between undergraduate education and any 
aspect of the world outside the college. These 
effects, he argues, threatens the very nature of 
undergraduate education. He stresses that unless 
undergraduate education is restored to an equal footing 
with research operations then an entire generation of 
youth will be ill-equipped for adulthood.®^ 
During the years after World War II another 
important aspect developed in the relationship between 
the federal government and the public research 
university that would have a profound effect on higher 
education: government regulation. In Beyond the Ivory 
Tower Bok explains the scope and consequence of this 
federal regulation. He writes that the involvement of 
the federal government has taken the form of either 
commands to do something, procedures on how things are 
to be done, subsidies to entice action or by 
strengthening market forces, thus increasing 
competition as a way to achieve the government's 
®^Ernest Boyer, College: The Undergraduate Experience in 
America (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), pages 1-8. 
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desired end. Bok cites as examples of these 
regulations as discrimination laws concerning 
admissions; quotas on medical schools to secure the 
entry of Americans studying abroad; affirmative action 
requirements in faculty hiring; requirements that 
dental school students train for six weeks in under 
served areas; prohibitions against certain types of 
fetal experiments; restrictions on investigations 
involving human subjects and regulations concerning DNA 
research. Bok points out that much of this regulation 
does not take the form of conventional laws, but 
instead are attached as conditions to the receipt of 
federal funds. In other words, do it our way or we 
don't pay. He does not argue that the federal 
government has no role in determining rules and 
regulations for higher education, only where the line 
is drawn. He argues that it is a fine line between 
assuring that society's needs are met and stifling the 
creativity and autonomy that he feels is such an 
integral part of the university's existence.®^ 
And though Bok argues that it is impossible, and 
in some cases unwise, to remove the scrutiny and 
regulation from higher education he calls for the 
®^Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower, pages 38-40. 
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federal government to play a more constructive role as 
opposed to being a hinderance which, he argues, is 
often the case. This can be done, he argues, by the 
government respecting what he considers the four 
essential freedoms of the university: to determine for 
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it should be taught, and who may be 
admitted to study. Bok explains how universities have 
worked for generations to establish this autonomy over 
its academic affairs, thus keeping out interference by 
political and private forces in the outside world. 
Despite the best efforts of universities, however, all 
four of these freedoms have become the subject of 
considerable federal scrutiny and regulation.®^ 
In their article, "A New Era of Technological 
Challenge" in the inaugural edition of Thought and 
Action, Paul Tsongas, then Senator from Massachusetts, 
and his legislative assistant Mitchell Tyson argue 
passionately that the future standard of living in the 
United States depends on an increased relationship 
between industry and higher education and that it is 
the responsibility of the federal government to 
facilitate this relationship. They argue that without 
®^Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower, pages 40-42. 
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a more deliberate and extensive federal program that 
enhances United States competitiveness with Japan and 
Europe then the United States' standard of living will 
fall dramatically. They further argue that this 
program should focus on improving the process by which 
scientific knowledge is transformed into marketable 
technology. They point out that new inventions have 
not been translated quickly enough into new products 
and processes so that even technological discoveries 
made in America were being developed and commercialized 
by "competitors" overseas. Tsongas and Mitchell write 
that the nation that develops the new technologies, 
builds new industries around them and incorporates them 
into existing industry the fastest will have the edge 
in global competition. Tsongas and Tyson offer a 
scathing critique of the United States federal policies 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s towards the 
industry-government-university relationship. They 
argue that in the early 1980s over 60% of federal R & D 
expenditures were allocated for military activities and 
that the transfer of technology from military to 
civilian sectors was very limited. They call for the 
creation of new technology transfer processes to 
improve these efforts. They argue that the role of 
education in the development of a skilled and highly 
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trained work force is essential and they argue that 
there are too few engineers and many who do become 
engineers lack first-rate training. This lack of a 
trained work force even extends to managers who, they 
argue, have established a mode of operation that 
underutilizes workers who feel isolated and alienated, 
the result being the inadequate utilization of 
resources, high turnover and unsuccessful 
production. 
They argue that new R & D companies are often weak 
in managerial and business skills. They write that a 
support system involving universities, government and 
the private sector is needed to provide the necessary 
financial, technological and managerial assistance to 
help these companies thrive. They argue that the U.S. 
has been at a serious disadvantage relative to Europe 
and Japan in advanced production technologies. This, 
they point out, is because of the neglect of university 
programs in industrial engineering and that there is no 
coordinated federal program to stimulate technological 
innovation. Tsongas and Tyson argue that the United 
States should do all that it can to enhance the 
®®Paul E. Tsongas and Mitchell G. Tyson, "A New Era of 
Technological Challenge," Thought & Action 1 (Fall 1984): pages 
95-98. 
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competitiveness of American industry and that higher 
education plays an integral role in that mission. They 
propose that a growing supply of basic and applied 
research be assured and that a technologically 
sophisticated work force should be provided while all 
barriers that inhibit innovation and technology 
transfer be removed.®”^ 
They point out that unless the capacity of our 
educational systems to provide technologically trained 
students is increased it will be impossible to remain 
competitive. Therefore, they call for a "High 
Technology Morrill Act, based on the original Morrill 
Act which would provide federal matching funds for 
joint initiatives by industry, educational institutions 
and government to strengthen science, engineering and 
technical education. This would include a multi¬ 
billion dollar commitment to upgrade faculty, 
equipment, facilities and curricula in higher 
education. They also propose that a mechanism be 
established to bring together industry, academia and 
government laboratories to identify economically 
strategic technologies, assess the targeted efforts of 
foreign competitors and plan cooperative technology 
®’'Tsongas and Tyson, "Technological Challenge", page 160. 
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developmerit programs to meet the competition. They 
further propose that Technology Extension Services 
modeled after the Agricultural Extension Services, be 
established at state universities to help assure the 
effective transfer and utilization of new technology. 
These centers would function as clearinghouses for new 
technology and serve as the primary means for 
transferring federally supported R & D to the private 
sector, utilizing demonstrations, conferences, training 
courses and field agents. They state clearly that 
cooperation between industry and our educational and 
scientific institutions is essential to our well¬ 
being.®® 
Robert Reich in his recent book The Work of 
Nations provides an in-depth analysis of the role of 
higher education in relation to the economy in the 21st 
century. Reich focuses his attention on the role of 
educating who he terms the "symbolic-analyst". He 
defines the symbolic analyst as those members of 
society who do the "problem-solving, problem- 
identifying and strategic-brokering" activities such as 
the research scientists, engineers, bankers, lawyers, 
real estate developers and the field of consultants 
®®Tsongas and Tyson, "Technological Challenge", pages 100- 
101. 
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including management, financial, tax, energy, 
agricultural, armaments, architectural, etc.®® These 
professions represent to Reich the management or upper- 
class of the 21st century economy. 
Reich writes that educating these people is a 
different task than educating the managers and upper- 
class of previous eras. He explains that providing the 
necessary education will be key to the success of the 
american economy in the global economy. He argues that 
although the american economy has changed dramatically 
in the last decade the american educational system has 
not.®° Still, he writes, the american education 
system has always been very well equipped to educate 
the elite of our country. He writes that: 
...no other society prepares its most 
fortunate young people as well for lifetimes 
of creative problem-solving, -identifying, 
and brokering. America's best four-year 
colleges and universities are the best in the 
world (as evidenced by the number of foreign 
students who flock to them): the college- 
track programs of the secondary schools that 
prepare students for them are equally 
exceptional. 
Reich explains that the formal education of a future 
symbolic analyst entails four basic skill: abstraction. 
®®Reich, The Work of Nations, pages 177-178. 
®°Reich, The Work of Nations, page 226. 
®^Reich, The Work of Nations, page 228. 
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system thinking, experimentation and collarboration. 
For most children in the United States, he argues, 
formal education entails just the opposite kind of 
learning. Instead of being given the skills to 
construct meanings, meanings are constructed for them. 
Information is prepackaged and the good student must 
only commit it to memory. But america's elite students 
mostly escape this kind of education in the best 
primary, secondary and universities where the 
curriculum is "fluid and interactive".^^ This abilty 
of the american elite to receive the education and 
training necessary to compete in the global economy 
will allow the american economy to survive amidst the 
international competition but will further accentuate 
the class differences within the United States itself. 
The role of higher education in the 21st century 
also involves a critical role in the development and 
production of new technology. He explains about the 
crucial role of universities in what he calls the 
"symbolic-analytic zones". The symbolic-analytic zones 
are geographic pockets where symbolic analysts "work, 
live, and learn with other symbolic analysts devoted to 
a common kind of problem-solving, -identifying, and 
®‘Reich, The Work of Nations, page 230. 
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brokering".These zones function as a kind of 
large, informal organization where members' skills are 
combined in certain ways for particular projects and 
then recombined in different ways for others. Higher 
education and particularly universities play an 
important role in these zones. They offer state-of- 
the-art research facilities and a steady supply of 
well-educated students who are willing to work for low 
inital wages in order to gain the experience and 
contacts necessary to provide them a door into the 
world of symbolic analysts. And, he argues, as the 
global economy continues to break down national 
economic boundaries the importance of the resources 
that universities provide to this form of 21st century 
economic development, research facilities and training 
grounds for symbolic analysts, will continue to 
increase. 
®^Reich, The Work of Nations, page 234. 
CHAPTER 3 
DESIGN 
As stated previously, this dissertation addresses 
the specific relationship of federal economic policies 
of the Reagan administration to public higher 
education. Its purpose is to answer the following 
primary question; 
How has state government financing of public 
higher education been affected by Reaganomics? 
Upon answering this, the following question is 
addressed: 
Has there been any impact on the accessibility of 
public higher education as a result of these 
policies? 
In order to answer these questions this dissertation 
studies the federal economic policies of the Reagan 
administration known as Reaganomics and their impact on 
state financing of public higher education during the 
period 1981-1992. In conducting this study three 
questions are asked: 
What were the economic policies of the Reagan 
administration? 
What was the impact on state finances of these 
policies? 
What was the effect on access to public higher 
education of this impact on state finances? 
First the study analyzes the economic policies of 
the Reagan administration known as "Reaganomics" by 
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asking the questions: What was Reaganomics? What were 
its political and economic roots? What were the 
components of the economic program? What were the 
results? The roots are examined through an historical 
review of the changing economic ideology of the United 
States Republican Party during the Post-World War II 
period with a particular emphasis on the development of 
the "supply-side economics" school of thought. This 
review includes the writings by Barry Goldwater, 
Conscience of a Conservative, Martin Anderson, 
Revolution, Jude Wanniski, The Wav the World Works, 
Paul Craig Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution, William 
Niskanen, Reaganomics, and Jack Kemp, An American Idea, 
and An American Renaissance. Then the specifics of the 
economic program are outlined as described by the 
Reagan administration in America's New Beginning: A 
Program for Economic Recovery and as explained by 
Michael Boskin in Reagan and the Economy and David 
Stockman in Triumph of Politics. The review of 
Reaganomics is concluded with an examination of the 
results of the program primarily through two extensive 
studies, one conducted by Lawrence Lindsey The Growth 
Experiment and one prepared by Fiscal Planning 
Services, Inc. for the National Office of the American 
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Federation of State, Community and Municipal Employees, 
\ 
The Republican Record. 
Second the impact of the economic program on state 
finances is examined. This examination begins with an 
historical overview of the relationship between federal 
and state government concerning the funding of social 
programs. Historical research is surveyed including 
articles by John Joseph Wallis, Timothy Conlan, Deli S. 
Wright, and Lawrence D. Brown^^ and books by Jane 
Perry Clark, David Walker, and William Anderson. 
Then the Reagan "New Federalism" plan is explained and 
writings about the program are surveyed. Governor 
Scott Matheson's writings from Out of Balance^^ and 
Governor Bruce E. Babbit's, "Federalism: Reagan's 
®^John Joseph Wallish, "New Deal Fiscal Federalism,," 
Economic Incruiry XXIX (July 1991): page 510-524; Timothy J. 
Conlan, "The Politics of Federal Block Grants from Nixon to 
Reagan", Political Science Quarterly 99, No. 2 (Summer 1984) 247- 
257; Deii S. Wright, "Policy Shifts in the Politics and 
Administration of Intergovernmental Relations, 1930s-1990s. " The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 509 
(May 1990):60-72; and Lawrence D. Brown, "The Politics of 
Devolution in Nixon's New Federalism." In The Changing Politics of 
Federal Grants, pp. 54-107. Edited by Lawrence D. Brown, James W. 
Fossett and Kenneth Palmer. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution): 54-107. 
®^Jane Perry Clark, The Rise of a New Federalism: 
Federal-State Cooperation in the United States (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1938); David B. Walker, Toward a Functioning 
Federalism (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1981); and William 
Anderson, The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners? 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955). 
®®Scott Matheson, Out of Balance (Salt Lake City: Peregrine 
Smith Books, 1986). 
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Trojan Horse," in Facing the Facts: The Democratic 
Governor ^ s View From the States^"^ are used to address 
Reagan federalism from a state's perspective. Richard 
P. Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle, and Associates' Reagan 
and the States^^, George E. Peterson's, "Federalism 
and the States: An Experiment in Decentralization,"^^ 
and Timothy J. Conlan and David B. Walter, "Reagan's 
New Federalism: Design, Debate and Discord, are 
used as primary sources on the components of the Reagan 
federalism program, the results and how states 
responded. Edward M. Gramlich's article, "The 1991 
State and Local Fiscal Crisis," draws the connection 
between the Reagan program and the 1990's state and 
local fiscal crisis. He argues that the state's fiscal 
problems began in 1984, a few years after the cuts in 
federal grants by the Reagan administration, and 
Federalism: Reagan's Trojan Horse," in Facing the Facts: 
The Democratic Governor's View From the States (Washington, D.C.: 
Democratic Governors' Association, 1984). 
®®Richard P. Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle, and Associates, 
Reagan and the States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University- 
Press , 1987) . 
^^George E. Peterson, "Federalism and the States: An 
Experiment in Decentralization," The Reagan Record, John L. Palmer 
and Isabel V. Sawhill, eds. (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1984): pages 217-260. 
“°Timothy J. Conlan and David B. Walter, "Reagan's New 
Federalism: Design, Debate and Discord," American 
Intergovernmental Relations Today: Perspectives and Controversies, 
Robert Jay Dilger, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1986): pages 189-200. 
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continued through the prolonged economic expansion. 
A study of Medicaid by the United States Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) is 
used to explore both the role of health care in state 
fiscal crises and to demonstrate how the Reagan 
administration federalism program worked concerning a 
specific policy area. The report finds that many 
states were forced to, among other things, cut other 
spending to meet the increased costs of medicaid. 
National statistics from the United States Census 
Bureau are then utilized to document the changes in 
federal aid to state and local governments and in the 
percentage of all state revenue that comes from federal 
aid during the period in question. The AFSCME study is 
utilized to document the specific funding reductions 
from the federal government to state governments and 
studies cited earlier by Benton, Stonecash and 
Stotsky^°^ are used to document the response of state 
^°^Edward M. Gramlich, "The 1991 State and Local Fiscal 
Crisis," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1991): page 274. 
^°^Advisory Coinmission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
Medicaid: Intergovernmental Trends and Options (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1992. 
^°^Benton, J. Edwin. "The Effects of Changes in Federal Aid on 
State and Local Government Spending." Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 22 (Winter 1992): pages 71-83; Stonecash, Jeffrey M. 
"State Responses to Declining Federal Support: Behavior in the 
Post-1978 Era." Policy Studies Journal 18 (Spring, 1990): pages 
755- 767; and Stotsky, Janet G. "State Fiscal Responses to Federal 
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governments to these changes in federal spending. 
National data is then used to illustrate the resulting 
financial problems of states across the country. Three 
major states: Massachusetts, California and New York 
are reviewed briefly to illustrate the relationship of 
direct federal aid and state finances. State-wide data 
is used as gathered by state economic offices and 
independent research institutes. 
Finally, how the Reagan program's impact on state 
financing affected access to public higher education is 
studied. Historical research on state financing of 
public higher education is surveyed including books by 
Alice M. Rivlin and M.M. Chambers, articles by 
Roger E. Bolton, Selma J. Mushkin, Elchanan Cole and 
Larry L. Leslie, and a study conducted by the Tax 
Government Grants." Growth and Change 22 (Summer, 1991): pages 
17-31. 
^°^Alice M. Rivlin, The Role of the Federal Government in 
Financing Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1961) and M.M. Chambers, Higher Education: Who Pays? 
Who Gains? (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers & 
Publishers, Inc., 1968). 
^°^Roger E. Bolton, "The Economics and Public Financing of 
Higher Education: An Overview," in Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee, The Economics of Financing of Higher Education in the 
United States: A Compendium of Papers, 91st Congress., 1st session 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969); Selma J. 
Mushkin, "A Note on State and Local Financing of Higher 
Education," in Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Economics 
of Financing of Higher Education in the United States: A 
Compendium of Papers, 91st Congress., 1st session (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969); and Elchanan Cohn and 
Larry L. Leslie, "The Development and Finance of Higher Education 
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Foundation Inc. Then more recent studies including 
articles by Arthur M. Hauptman, Richard D. Anderson, 
and Michael McPherson et and a study by 
Hauptman^°® are used to explore the impact of state 
financing on access to public higher education. Then 
national data is used to identify the effect on cost of 
attendance of changes in state appropriations during 
the study's time period. After analyzing this national 
data the impact on state appropriations for higher 
education and the cost of attendance in the three 
states previously mentioned: Massachusetts, New York, 
and California is examined in order to demonstrate the 
relationship on a state and institutional level. 
in Perspective," in Subsidies to Higher Education, Howard P. 
Tuckman and Edward Whalen eds. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1980) 
^°®Tax Foundation Inc, Public Financing of Higher Education 
(New York: Tax Foundation Inc., 1966). 
^“’'Arthur M. Hauptman, "Trends in the Federal and State 
Financial Commitment to Higher Education," in The Uneasy Public 
Policy Triangle in Higher Education: Quality, Efficiency and 
Budgetary Efficiency, David H. Finifter, Roger G. Baldwin, and 
John R. Thelin eds. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1991): pages 113-128; Richard E. Anderson, "The Economy and Higher 
Education," in Financing Higher Education in a Global Economy, 
Richard E, Anderson and Joel W. Meyerson eds. (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1990): pages 13-40; and Michael S. McPherson, 
Morton Owen Schapiro, and Gordon C. Winston, "Recent Trends in 
U.S. Higher Education Costs and Prices: The Role of Government 
Funding," AEA Papers and Proceedings 79 (May 1989): pages 253-257. 
^°®Arthur M. Hauptman, The College Tuition Spiral (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990). 
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In summary, conclusions are drawn as to what the 
results of this study say about the relationship of 
Reaganomics to state financing of public higher 
education and the accessibility of these institutions. 
Observations are then made about the implications of 
these findings for the future. In particular, the 
relevance of these findings to understanding the 
potential impact of the Clinton administration's new 
economic program on state financing of public higher 





This chapter analyzes the economic policies of the 
Reagan administration known as "Reaganomics". It 
begins with an examination of the political and 
economic roots of Reaganomics. This includes tracing 
the development of the theory of supply-side economics 
in the Republican Party during the post World War II 
era and contrasts it to the traditional conservative 
ideology of "minimalist" economics. Then it details 
the actual components of Reaganomics as outlined in 
Reagan's economic message to Congress delivered in the 
first month of his presidency focusing primarily on the 
proposed individual and business income tax reductions 
and the reordering of domestic spending priorities. 
The chapter then describes the actual economic program 
passed by Congress and how it differed from the Reagan 
administration proposal. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with an evaluation of the program in relation 
to the stated goals espoused by the Reagan 
administration and its impact on the United States 
economy and the lives of its population. 
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The Roots of Reaganomics 
The roots of Reaganomics lie in two distinct 
economic philosophies. These different philosophies 
are called "minimalist" economics and "supply-side" 
economics and have shaped the economic debate within 
the United States Republican Party throughout the Post- 
World War II period. Both of these economic 
philosophies are based upon a similar foundation 
concerning the fundamental question of the role of the 
federal government in the economic sphere. This 
foundation was clearly articulated by one of the most 
prominent spokespersons for the "minimalist" 
perspective, former United States Senator and 
Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. In his 1960 
book Conscience of a Conservative, Goldwater explored 
the role of the federal government in economics and 
presented the conclusions upon which the foundation of 
both the "minimalist" and "supply-side" economic 
philosophies are based. He argues fervently that the 
role of government in the economic sphere should be 
extremely limited and rests primarily in preserving and 
maximizing freedom. He wrote: 
The legitimate functions of government are 
actually conducive to freedom. Maintaining 
internal order, keeping foreign foes at bay, 
administering justice, removing obstacles to 
the free interchange of goods - the exercise 
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of these powers makes it possible for men to 
follow their chosen pursuits with maximum 
freedom. 
However, he wrote, this has not been the reality: 
Throughout history, government has proved to 
be the chief instrument for thwarting man's 
liberty. Government represents power in the 
hands of some men to control and regulate the 
lives of other men.^^° 
He notes that it is vital that government have the 
power of taxation in order to pursue these goals, 
especially that of a national defense, but that this 
power gives the government a tremendous ability to 
control people's lives. Therefore, he writes, the 
powers of the government to tax members of society must 
be strictly limited: 
Government does not have an unlimited claim 
on the earnings of individuals. One of the 
foremost precepts of the natural law is man's 
right to the possession and the use of his 
property. And a man's earnings are his 
property as much as his land and the house in 
which he lives. Indeed, in the industrial 
age, earnings are probably the most prevalent 
form of property...This attack on property 
rights is actually an attack on freedom. It 
is another instance of the modern failure to 
take into account the whole man. How can a 
man be truly free if he is denied the means 
to exercise freedom? How can he be free if 
the fruits of his labor are not his to 
dispose of, but are treated, instead, as part 
of a common pool of public wealth? Property 
^°®Barry Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative, (New York: 
Macfadden Books, 1960), pages 16-17. 
^^°Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative, page 17. 
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and freedom are inseparable: to the extent 
government takes the one in the form of 
taxes, it intrudes on the other...But having 
said that each man has an inalienable right 
to his property, it also must be said that 
every citizen has an obligation to contribute 
his fair share to the legitimate functions of 
government. Government, in other words, has 
some claim on our wealth, and the problem is 
to define that claim in a way that gives due 
consideration to the property rights of the 
individual... The size of the government's 
rightful claim -- that is, the total amount 
it may take in taxes -- will be determined by 
how we define the "legitimate functions of 
government." With regard to the federal 
government, the Constitution is the proper 
standard of legitimacy: its "legitimate" 
powers, as we have seen are those the 
Constitution has delegated to it. Therefore, 
if we adhere to the Constitution, the federal 
government's total tax bill will be the cost 
of exercising such of its delegated powers as 
our representatives deem necessary in the 
national interest. But conversely, when the 
federal government enacts programs that are 
not authorized by its delegated powers, the 
taxes needed to pay for such programs exceed 
the government's rightful claim on our 
wealth. 
Another important aspect of this "minimalist" 
perspective is the role of the federal government 
versus that of state government. The question of this 
relationship has been debated since the founding of the 
union, and the Goldwater position on this issue formed 
a primary ideological aspect of Reaganomics. Goldwater 
left little doubt as to where the Republican Party 
should be on the issue: 
^^^Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative, pages 61 65. 
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The Constitution...draws a sharp and clear 
line between federal jurisdiction and state 
jurisdiction. The federal government's 
failure to recognize that line has been a 
crushing blow to the principle of limited 
government... There is a reason for its (the 
Constitution) reservation of States' Rights. 
Not only does it prevent the accumulation of 
power in a central government that is remote 
from the people and relatively immune from 
popular restraints; it also recognizes the 
principle that essentially local problems are 
best dealt with by the people most directly 
concerned. 
It was these positions on the roles and relationships 
of government which provided the parameters for the 
debate that followed within the Republican party during 
the next 20 years. 
The "minimalist" wing of the party reached its 
most powerful moment during Goldwater's 1964 campaign 
for president. Goldwater argued that in order to 
reduce the role of the federal government dramatic 
spending cuts would have to be made. This, he 
realized, would cause pain and suffering, but was a 
necessary step to achieve the goal of reducing the 
involvement of the federal government in the economy. 
In a crucial point that was to be a major point of 
disagreement among Republicans, he argued that it was 
only after these spending cuts were made that there 
could be tax cuts. He wrote: 
^^^Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative, page 30. 
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While there is something to be said for the 
proposition that spending will never be 
reduced so long as there is money in the 
federal treasury, I believe that as a 
practical matter spending cuts must come 
before tax cuts. If we reduce taxes before 
firm, principled decisions are made about 
expenditures, we will court deficit spending 
and the inflationary effects that invariably 
follow. 
Even though Goldwater was defeated in the 1964 
presidential election by Lyndon Johnson in one of the 
biggest landslides in United States Presidential 
electoral history, his mind set of first suffering 
through spending cuts and later receiving the bonus of 
tax cuts continued to be the dominant economic 
philosophy of the Republican party until well into the 
1970s. 
During the mid 1970s a different economic 
philosophy, "supply-side" economics, began to emerge in 
the Republican Party. Supply-side economics was 
actually quite simple. It focused on the effect of tax 
rates on economic activity, particularly how these tax 
rates affected people's incentives to work, earn money, 
produce goods, invest and save.^^^ Martin Anderson, a 
key economic advisor to Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan 
^“Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative, page 65. 
^^^Martin Anderson, Revolution, (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Publishers, 1988), page 141. 
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and a fellow at the Hoover Institute at Stanford 
University, describes it this way: 
As a government raises tax rates, the amount 
of earnings that taxpayers get to keep for 
themselves declines. If the government 
raises tax rates high enough, people respond 
by not working as hard, and they hide more of 
their earnings from the government. The 
result is that there is less money available 
for the government to tax. At some point 
increases in the tax rate become 
counterproductive as far as tax revenue is 
concerned. Higher tax rates simply produce 
less tax revenue. When that point is reached 
tax revenues can be increased, paradoxically, 
by cutting tax rates. 
This argument was explained through what was to be 
named the "Laffer Curve", after Professor Arthur 
Laffer, a prominent economist and supply-side 
proponent. The curve is explained as follows: when the 
tax rate is 100 percent, all economic activity will 
cease because people will not work if everything they 
earn is taken by the government. When the tax rate is 
0 percent, there is a state of anarchy because the 
government cannot work if it has collected no revenue. 
In between these extremes lies the laffer curve, and 
the goal is to find the spot on the curve in which the 
electorate "desires to be taxed." When the point is 
reached where higher taxes discourages economic 
activity, then tax revenue actually decreases with 
^^^Anderson, Revolution, page 141. 
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further tax increases. Conversely, there is a point on 
the curve where, if government decreases taxes, then 
revenue will actually increase because of the increase 
in economic activity (in the money economy as opposed 
to the barter economy). This point on the curve always 
changes depending on the political and economic 
conditions, i.e. in wartime people are willing to be 
taxed at a higher level but as soon as the war is over 
people will expect taxes to be lowered in order that 
they may participate in the economy. 
This philosophy contrasted to the traditional 
perspective known as "Keynesian economics" so named 
after economist John Maynard Keynes, which held that 
government could most effectively manage the economy by 
managing the demand for goods and services. In times 
of economic contraction the government would spend more 
thus directly increasing demand and/or would lower 
taxes, thus raising the income of consumers and 
increasing demand indirectly. Keynesian economics 
stated that this increase in demand would stimulate new 
economic activity and the economy would grow. In cases 
where the economy was growing too fast and becoming 
inflationary the government would reduce spending 
^^®Jude Wanniski, The Wav the World Works, (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1978), pages 7-8. 
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and/or raise taxes to slow the economy, thus reducing 
inflation. 
Supply-side proponents were quick to point out 
that supply-side economics was not a new idea in the 
1970s.^^® In fact it has a long history in economic 
thought dating back to Adam Smith who wrote: 
"High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the 
consumption of the taxed commodities, and 
sometimes by encouraging smuggling, 
frequently afford a smaller revenue to 
government than what might be drawn from more 
moderate taxes. When the diminution of 
revenue is the effect of the diminution of 
consumption, there can be but one remedy, and 
that is the lowering of the tax."^^^ 
This concept of reducing the tax rate in order to 
increase tax revenue was first implemented in United 
States economic policy during the 1920s when President 
Calvin Coolidge, at the urging of his Secretary of the 
Treasury Andrew Mellon, reduced taxes which, argued 
many supply-siders, spurred economic growth. Mellon 
argued: 
It seems difficult for some to understand 
that high rates of taxation do not 
^^^Lawrence Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax 
Policy is Transforming the U.S. Economy, (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc., 1990), page 6. 
^^®Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics, (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1984), page 241. 
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, (London: Grant Richards, 1904), Volume II, 
pages 544-545. 
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necessarily mean large revenues to the 
Government and more revenue may often be 
obtained by lower rates. 
Coolidge's proposal reduced the top tax rate from 73 
percent to 25 percent (to begin at a taxable income of 
$100,000) with dramatic cuts from other brackets. The 
lowest tax rate was cut from 4 percent to 1.5 percent. 
Though the total tax package did lose revenue at first, 
the final results seem to support the supply-side 
analysis. After an initial drop of revenue from $861 
million in 1922 to $734 million in 1925, strong total 
revenue growth continued for the next several 
years.Even Keynes noted the possibilities of 
generating more tax revenue through tax reductions. In 
1933 he wrote: 
Nor should the argument seem strange that 
taxation may be so high as to defeat its 
object, and that, given sufficient time to 
gather the fruits, a reduction of taxation 
will run a better chance, than an increase, 
of balancing the budget. 
^^°Robert E. Keleher and William Orzechowski, "Supply-Side_ 
Fiscal Policy: An Historical Analysis of a Rejuvenated Idea," in 
Richard H. Fink, ed., Supply-Side Economics: A Critical Appraisal, 
(Aletheia Books, University Publications of America, 1982), page 
147. 
^^^Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is 
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 24. 
^^^John Maynard Keynes, The Means of Prosperity, (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1933), page 5. 
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In 1963 President Kennedy proposed the most dramatic 
tax cuts since the Coolidge-Mellon tax cuts. The top 
tax rates dropped from 91 percent to 70 percent and the 
bottom rate fell from 20 percent to 14 percent. These 
cuts were viewed as very successful: real GNP grew 
11.1% from 1963 to 1965, the unemployment rate fell 
from 5.7% to 4.5% during the same period and, even 
though tax rates were cut, tax receipts rose by 2.5% 
during the two year period while the federal deficit 
declined from $4.8 billion in 1963 to $1.4 billion in 
1965.^23 
In the late 1960s supply-side economist Robert 
Mundell from Columbia University teamed up with Laffer 
and together they became two of the leading 
spokespeople for the idea of a significant tax cut to 
spur economic growth.For many years they labored 
looking for converts. Finally, they joined with Jude 
Wanniski who at that time was an editor with the Wall 
Street Journal. On December 11, 1974, Wanniski 
produced the first of what were to be many major pieces 
on the Journal op-ed page, calling for a tax cut to 
spur economic growth. The article, in response to a 
^^^Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is 
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 32. 
^^^Anderson, Revolution, page 146. 
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proposal floating within the Republican party to cut 
taxes up to $30 billion, was entitled "Its Time to Cut 
Taxes". In it he wrote: 
A tax cut not only increases demand, but 
increases the incentive to produce...with 
lower taxes it is more attractive to invest 
and more attractive to work; demand is 
increased but so is supply...The $30 billion 
tax cut is needed immediately. 
Wanniski's piece reached thousands of people and 
brought the idea of a massive tax cut into the public 
realm of debate. One person who was very intrigued 
with the idea was Republican New York Congressman Jack 
Kemp. Kemp was a foimier professional football 
quarterback who espoused traditional conservative 
values. In the summer of 1975 he held a series of 
meetings in his Washington office with an array of 
supply-side economists'^®, and soon became an expert 
on supply-side economics. He lobbied other Republican 
congressman and finally on February 23, 1977 the 
Republican side of the House of Representatives offered 
an amendment to the Democratic Budget Resolution 
^“Jude Wanniski, "Its Time to Cut Taxes", Wall Street 
Journal, December 11, 1974. 
^^®Paul Craig Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution; 
Insider's Account of Policymaking in Washington, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1984), page 1. 
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proposing a major tax The amendment failed but 
it was a preview of what was to come. Shortly after 
the debut of the proposal for a tax cut, Kemp teamed 
with Senator William Roth to propose a three year, 30% 
federal income tax cut (10% per year). This became the 
economic position of the Republican Party and on which 
Kemp became a national spokesperson for the party. He 
began an extensive national campaign in support of 
supply-side economics. He presented it very simply: 
The idea is a simple one and an old one. 
When you tax something, you get less of that 
thing. When you tax production, capital, 
work savings and entrepreneurial activity, 
you get less of all of these. 
Kemp undertook this new mantle of conservatism with a 
vengeance. He espoused that government was the source 
of many of the country's problems and the country 
needed to rethink its idea of government. He argued 
that the government should get out of the everyday 
lives of people and business: 
Opportunity, the chance to make it and to 
improve your life, that's what the American 
Dream was and is all about. What poisons 
that dream is when government stands in the 
way, throwing up roadblocks that are really 
unnecessary. More and more people sense 
^^^Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution: An Insider's Account 
of Policymaking in Washington, page 7. 
^^®Jack Kemp, An American Idea; Ending Limits to Growth, 
(Washington, D.C.: The American Studies Center, 1984), page 13. 
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along the way that they're not going to 
fulfill their potential, not because of a 
deficiency in their ambition or ability, but 
because of a deficiency in the political 
structure. Their honest ambitions are 
frustrated. They believe, often rightly, 
that somehow the flaws of government have 
held them back or cut them down, 
Kemp further articulated the need to remove the 
boundaries that he perceived politicians often placed 
on the economic horizon. He became fond of castigating 
what he called the attitude of "zero-sum". He 
explained his thinking as follows: 
[Limits to economic growth] to my way of 
thinking, represents the greatest obstacle to 
opportunity and advancement we face as a 
nation: static thinking, the idea that life 
is a "zero-sum" game. According to this 
view, there are only so many jobs to go 
around. Only so much energy to go around. A 
fixed amount of prosperity, and a fixed 
amount of poverty. And so it is government's 
job to divide up these fixed amounts until, 
say, the sum of prosperity (a plus) and 
poverty (a negative) comes to 
zero... throughout the ages, people have been 
afflicted with political rulers who have 
treated society as if it were zero-sum. 
Individuals can only benefit at the expense 
of others. Nations can only advance at the 
expense of their competitors. Politics 
becomes the art of pitting class against 
class...What I'm really driving at is that 
there are only two ways to approach public 
governance: statically and dynamically. And 
in every nation, among every people, whatever 
the system of government, there are powerful 
tendencies toward static thinking that must 
be overcome by dynamic thinkers. 
^^®Kemp, An American Renaissance: A Stratecrv for the 1980s, 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1979), pages 19-21. 
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His thinking rested on his conviction the country 
could achieve anything it strived for as long as it 
didn't limit its thinking.Kemp referred to 
himself as a "humane" conservative and though he agreed 
with Goldwater about the basic role of the federal 
government in the economic sphere and in the sanctity 
and utmost priority of individual freedom, he argued 
that the federal government had an important positive 
role of providing assistance to the needy and less 
fortunate. Added to Goldwater's position of the 
federal government's role of protecting society from 
internal and external threats and securing what he 
calls natural human rights, Kemp presented a picture of 
a "conservative with a heart". 
Keeping in line with the traditional perspective 
of the role of government in protecting society from 
threats, Kemp and the Republican party were also 
strongly arguing for an increase in military spending. 
Relying on the argument that national defense was one 
of the primary functions of the federal government, and 
therefore its power of taxation, Kemp and the party 
argued that military spending should take precedence. 
“°Kemp, An American Renaissance: A Stratecp/ for the 1980s, 
page 82. 
^^^Kemp, An American Idea: Ending Limits to Growth, page xxv. 
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citing studies that the United States had fallen far 
behind the Soviet Union in military strength, the 
Republicans pressed the Democratic administration of 
Jimmy Carter to increase military spending. 
Therefore, with the approach of the 1980s, the two 
differing philosophies were slowly starting to reveal 
some common ground: limited role of the federal 
government, tax cuts, providing assistance to the needy 
and less fortunate, and increased military spending. 
All that was missing was someone to pull it all 
together. 
The Emergence of Reagan 
It is curious that Ronald Reagan became the person 
that would synthesize these competing perspectives. 
Reagan was well known as a believer in the "minimalist" 
philosophy, having worked as a spokesperson for 
Goldwater during the 1976 presidential campaign^^^, 
and as Governor of California as the leading advocate 
of a proposed amendment to the California state 
constitution that would limit the taxing power of state 
should be noted here that many other studies strongly 
disagreed with the assertion that the United States had fallen 
behind the Soviet Union in military strength and that though this 
assertion became "fact" there is much dispute concerning it. 
^^^William Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the 
Policies and the People, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988) , page 14. 
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government. When he made his first move for the 
White House in the 1976 presidential campaign, he was 
still very much the "minimalist" republican. But in 
that campaign he made some strong statements about 
cutting social programs that backfired on him and it 
became obvious to him and others in the Republican 
party that this "minimalist" perspective made him 
unelectable.The American people didn't want to be 
told they had to suffer and by 1978 Reagan had learned 
his lesson and was changing course. Most importantly, 
he learned that the American electorate wanted an 
optimistic President, someone who would tell them that 
things were going to work out, and who could give them 
hope, even if he and his advisors didn't necessarily 
believe in the workability of supply-side 
economics. 
Reagan managed to reject the baggage of 
"minimalist" politics without really rejecting its 
objectives. He accomplished this by embracing the 
following propositions: that inflation could be brought 
under control without an increase in unemployment; that 
“^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 14. 
“^Stein, Presidential Economics, page 255. 
“®Stein, Presidential Economics, page 257. 
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tax cuts could be made that would help balance the 
budget by increasing revenue; and that he could reduce 
government expenditures without injuring anyone or 
reducing services because every social program was full 
of waste, fraud and inef f iciencies . With this 
argument Reagan was able to merge the "minimalist" and 
"supply-side" wings of the party and avoid the debate 
as to whether to give out tax cuts as a reward after 
the economy had thrived, or to give out tax cuts as a 
way to spur the economy.He would make both tax 
cuts and spending cuts without hurting anyone. He also 
managed to do it in a way that enabled both sides of 
the debate to claim victory. Minimalist economists 
such as Herbert Stein, former economic advisor to 
Richard Nixon, claimed that the real reason behind the 
tax cut was to force the spending cuts by putting 
restrictive pressure on the budget.Meanwhile 
supply-siders like Paul Craig Roberts claimed that 
^^'^Stein, Presidential Economics, page 236. 
“^Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution: An Insider's Account 
of Policymaking in Washington, page 4. 
^^®Arthur B. Laffer and Jan P. Seymour, The Economics of the 
Tax Revolt: A Reader, (New York; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 
page 53. 
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Reagan was now a supply-sider and they were now in 
charge of setting economic policy. 
Still, during the Reagan transition to the White 
House two groups of advisors representing the 
"minimalist" and "supply-side" perspectives differed 
greatly as to the development of economic policy. The 
"minimalist" group, represented by more traditional 
Republicans, wanted a lower growth in federal spending 
as a necessary complement to any reduction in taxes. 
These traditional republicans included most officials 
in previous Republican administrations and senior 
Republicans in the Senate. The new supply-siders felt 
that the reduction in taxes was needed for the economic 
growth that would permit the slowing of federal 
spending because as the economy grew there would be 
less need for a government safety net. They also felt 
that by making the spending cuts first they would use 
up whatever political capital they had gained from the 
election, and make so many enemies that they would 
never get the tax cut through. Younger republicans 
in the House supported this view. To deal with this 
problem Kemp joined David Stockman, then a young 
Congressman from Michigan and soon to be Director of 
““Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution: An Insider's Account 
of Policymaking in Washington, page 1. 
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Office of Management and Budget, in a long memorandum 
that described an "economic Dunkirk" for the 
Republicans unless the proposed tax cuts (Kemp-Roth) 
were matched by a large reduction in spending for 
discretionary domestic programs. This was a powerful 
presentation because Stockman was known as a strong 
advocate for the spending reductions and Kemp as the 
author of the tax cut proposal; their collaboration 
served as the integration of the two philosophies in 
the policy development process of the new 
government. 
The Components of Reaganomics 
The Reagan Administration presented its Program 
for Economic Recovery to the American public and the 
Congress on February 18, 1981. In the presentation of 
the plan the Reagan government made clear the 
underlying philosophy to reduce the scope of the 
federal government: 
The most important cause of our economic 
problems has been the government itself. The 
Federal Government, through tax, spending, 
regulatory, and monetary policies, has 
sacrificed long-term growth and price 
stability for ephemeral short-term goals. In 
particular, excessive government spending and 
overly accommodative monetary policies have 
^^^Niskanen, Reaganomics; An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 4. 
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combined to give us a climate of continuing 
inflation. That inflation itself has helped 
to sap our prospects for growth. In 
addition, the growing weight of haphazard and 
inefficient regulation has weakened our 
productivity growth. High marginal tax rates 
on business and individuals discourage work, 
innovation, and the investment necessary to 
improve productivity and long-run growth. 
Finally, the resulting stagnant growth 
contributes further to inflation in a vicious 
cycle that can only be broken with a plan 
that attacks broadly on all fronts. 
It stated further: 
The budget that is being proposed will 
restore the Federal Government to its proper 
role in American society. It will contribute 
to the health of the economy, the strength of 
our military, and the protection of the less 
fortunate members of society who need the 
compassion of the government for their 
support. Many special interests who had 
found it easier to look to the Federal 
Government for support than to the 
competitive market will be disappointed by 
this budget, but the average worker and 
businessman, the backbone of our Nation, will 
find that their interests are better 
served. 
The plan was a hybrid of the competing philosophies in 
the Republican Party. It called for "minimalist" 
budget cuts, supply-side tax-cuts, a huge military 
build-up and the protection of the social safety net 
for those most in need. This combination of different 
^^^Ronald Reagan, America's New Beginning: A Program for 
Economic Recovery, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 
18, 1981), page 4. 
^^^Reagan, America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic 
Recovery, page 13. 
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philosophies into one proposal was a political strategy 
designed to offer something to everyone, while 
maintaining the fundamental ideology of a "minimalist" 
government. 
The proposal for economic recovery had four 
specific parts: to stimulate the economy through tax 
cuts; to reorder federal spending priorities by 
reducing spending on social programs and increasing 
military spending; to slow monetary growth; and to 
decrease federal regulations. The plan included a 
steady reduction in the Federal deficit, which totalled 
$60 billion when Reagan took office, predicted a 
balanced budget by 1984, and modest surpluses 
thereafter. 
Taxes 
The Reagan Administration's proposal to reduce 
taxes was based on the Kemp-Roth proposal'to reduce the 
marginal tax rates for individuals across the board by 
10% per year for three years. This would reduce rates 
in stages from a range of 14 to 70 percent to that of 
10 to 50 percent by January 1, 1984.^^^ In the 
proposal, the administration argued the supply-side 
perspective, asserting that, as taxpayers moved into 
^^^Reagan, America's New Beginning: A Procrram for Economic 
Recovery, page 14. 
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higher brackets, incentives to work, save, and invest 
were reduced since each addition to income yielded less 
after taxes than before. The proposal focused on the 
marginal tax rate which is the rate a taxpayer pays on 
each additional dollar earned. It is this rate that is 
applied to all additional income. Reagan argued that 
it was the marginal rate that most directly affected 
incentives to work, invest or save and in order to spur 
economic growth, these incentives needed to be 
increased. But the administration did not echo the 
claim of the supply-side perspective that tax revenues 
would actually increase because of the tax cut. In the 
proposal submitted to Congress the administration 
estimated that the reductions in Federal tax revenues, 
compared with those which would have been obtained 
under the existing law, were $6.4 billion n FY 1981, 
$44.2 billion in FY 1982, and would rise to $162.4 
billion in FY 1986.""^ 
The second half of the tax cut proposal called for 
tax relief for businesses. This was described as the 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), which 
substituted depreciation periods of three, five, ten, 
fifteen and eighteen years for different classes of 
^^^Reagan, America's New Beainnincr; A Program for Economic 
Recoveiy, page 14. 
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business equipment and structures for the much more 
complex Asset Depreciation Range, which had 
depreciation periods of up to sixty years. The 
objective of the ACRS was to reduce the effective tax 
rates on the income from business investment and to 
simplify the tax treatment of this income.The 
Reagan proposal estimated that ACRS would result in a 
revenue loss of $2.5 billion in FY 1981, $9.7 billion 





Revenue Effects of 
Reductions 






1984 1985 1986 
Ind. -6.4 -44.2 -81.4 -118.1 -141.5 -162.4 
Bus. -2.5 - 9.7 -18.6 - 30.0 - 44.2 - 59.3 
TOTAL-8.8 -53.9 -100.0 -148.1 -185.7 -221.7 
source: A Program for Economic Recovery, page 16. 
^^®Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 74. 
^^’Reagan, America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic 
Recovery, page 16. 
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Spending 
The second goal of the plan was to reorder 
spending priorities by cutting domestic spending and 
increasing military spending. Although the 
Administration refered to this as a reduction in 
spending, the plan actually called only for a decrease 
in the rate of growth of federal spending from the 16% 
annual rate at the time of the Reagan inauguration to 
approximately 7% by the end of the first term of the 
Reagan Administration. Nevertheless, the plan 
acknowledged that this reduction in the growth rate of 
the Federal budget for the 1982 fiscal year was the 
largest ever proposed. 
The plan listed three spending priorities: to 
increase military spending; to protect the "truly 
needy" by maintaining a "social safety net"; and to 
reduce all other domestic spending. Out of these 
priorities came nine specific guidelines that were 
applied in developing the spending plan: 
- Preserve the social safety net; 
- Revise entitlements to eliminate unintended benefits; 
- Reduce subsidies to middle-and upper-income groups; 
“®Ronald Reagan, "Budget Reform Plan" in America's New 
Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery, (The White House, 
Washington, D.C. 1981), page 1, 
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- Impose fiscal restraint on other national interest 
programs; 
- Recover costs that can be clearly allocated to users; 
- Stretch-out and retarget public sector capital 
investment programs; 
- Reduce overhead and personnel costs of the Federal 
Government; 
- Apply sound economic criteria to subsidy programs; 
- Consolidate categorical grant programs into block 
grants. 
The spending proposal listed the programs included 
in the social safety net: social insurance benefits for 
the elderly (traditional social security payments), 
basic unemployment benefits, cash benefits for the 
chronically poor and veterans programs. These programs 
in 1981 constituted approximately 37% of the total 
federal budget.The administration's proposed a 
defense share of federal spending to rise from 24% in 
1981 to 32% by 1984; social safety net spending to 
increase from 37% to 41%; and all other federal 
^^®Reagan, America's New Beginning; A Program for Economic 
Recovery, page 10. 
^^°Reagan, America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic 
Recovery, page 11. 
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programs to decline from 29% to 18%.^^^ The plan 
called for additional defense spending of $7.2 billion 
in 1982, a 5% increase, with much larger yearly 
increases in 1983 and 1984 so that by the end of the 
first term of the Reagan Administration defense 
spending would be nearly 60% higher than when Reagan 
first took off ice. These increases were in 
addition to a 62% increase in defense spending (real 
spending increase of approximately 5% annually) during 
the Carter Administration: 1977-1981.^^^ 
Among the more prominent aspects of the proposed 
reductions in non-social safety net programs were what 
it called "the first comprehensive proposal in more 
than a decade to overhaul the Nation's overgrown $350 
billion entitlement system;" including revisions of 
fRood stamps, extended unemployment benefits, trade 
assistance, student loans, secondary social security 
benefits, medicaid and other entitlement programs for a 
total savings of $9.4 billion in 1982 growing to $18.9 
billion by 1986. It also called for the substantial 
^^^Reagan, America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic 
Recovery, pages 10-11. 
^^^Reagan, "Budget Reform Plan" in America's New Beginning: A 
Program for Economic Recovery, page 10, 
^^^Niskanen, Reaganomics; An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 28, 
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cutback or elimination of what were called 
"unessential, or ineffective Federal programs" 
including the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA), Amtrak, energy research and development, and 
Federal support for the Arts. In an attempt to 
transfer responsibility for many federal programs to 
the state and local level, the spending plan also 
called for the consolidation of nearly 100 categorical 
grant programs into a few flexible block grants for 
state and local support of education, and health and 
social services, with a 20% reduction in the overall 
allocation resulting in savings of over $4 billion by 
their full implementation in 1983. 
Monetary Policy 
The third component of the Reagan plan for 
economic recovery was for a slowing of monetary growth. 
Monetary policy is the responsibility of the autonomous 
Federal Reserve System so the Reagan program in this 
regard was basically a request of the Federal Reserve 
to follow a slow growth policy. Reagan argued that, in 
order to achieve the goals of his program, the rate of 
money and credit growth would need to be brought down. 
This, he argued, would help control inflation. If 
monetary policy became too expansive inflation would 
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continue to accelerate, and the Administration's 
economic program would be undermined.Reagan 
supported the Federal Reserve efforts to control 
inflation but, in reality, his influence was limited to 
publicly and privately pushing the Federal Reserve to 
adopt policies that were in line with the goals and 
objectives of the plan for economic recovery. 
Deregulation 
The fourth aspect of the program for economic 
recovery was the decrease in federal regulation. 
Reagan argued that the rapid growth in federal 
regulation had impeded economic growth and contributed 
to inflation. He acknowledged the legitimate role of 
government in protecting the environment, promoting 
health and safety, safeguarding workers and consumers, 
and guaranteeing equal opportunity, but argued that 
these regulations had become excessive and were a very 
significant factor in the difficult economic situation 
facing the country in 1981.^^^ In his plan, Reagan 
explained that there were several ways in which 
regulation placed additional costs on the economy: the 
^^^Reagan, Americans New Beginning: A Program for Economic 
Recovery, page 22. 
^^^Reagan, America's New Beginnincr: A Program for Economic 
Recovery, page 18. 
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expenditures for the Federal bureaucracy which 
administered and enforced the regulations; the costs to 
businesses and state and local government in complying 
with regulations; and the longer run and indirect 
effects of regulation on economic growth and 
productivity. 
In order to accomplish the goal of reducing 
Federal regulation Reagan proposed the establishment of 
the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, 
chaired by Vice-President Bush. The charge of the Task 
Force was to review major regulatory proposals, assess 
regulations already in place, and oversee the 
development of legislative proposals designed to 
coordinate the roles of different federal regulatory 
agencies. Reagan also abolished federal efforts to 
control wage and price increases and issued an 
Executive order to strengthen Presidential oversight of 
the regulatory process. In addition Reagan attributed 
over $500 million in spending cuts to the decrease in 
regulations. 
In order to assess the economic impact of 
Reaganomics this study focuses primarily on an 
evaluation of the tax and spending initiatives. This 
is not to say that the monetary and regulatory 
proposals did not play a major role. To the contrary. 
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the ability of the Federal Reserve, whether through its 
own initiative or due to pressure from the 
administration, to curtail inflation had a tremendous 
impact on the economy and the success of the Reagan 
plan. And the deregulatory actions of the 
administration also had a tremendous impact on the 
economy, especially in terms of the savings and loan 
industry where deregulation arguably led to the need 
for the multibillion dollar bailout which has 
contributed heavily to the federal budget deficit. 
However, for the purpose of the examination of the 
results of the attempted implementation of the "supply- 
side" perspective that lay at the core of Reaganomics, 
it is useful to focus primarily on the tax and spending 
proposals and their results, keeping in mind their 
implementation was done in a context that depended on 
many other variables of which‘ monetary and regulatory 
policies were major ones. 
Outcomes 
Taxes 
The tax bill that was eventually passed by 
Congress was called the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 (ERTA). The business aspect of Reagan's proposal 
passed through Congress mostly intact but the personal 
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income tax legislation contained significant changes. 
Because of concern about the potential deficits, the 
first year tax cut was changed from 10% to 5% and 
postponed by four months.Two important aspects 
left out of the Reagan proposal for fear of negative 
political fallout were included by Congress. The first 
was the immediate reduction in the top rate on 
investment income from 70 percent to 50 percent and 
second. Congress inserted tax bracket "indexing" to 
inflation to take effect in 1985. Indexing of the tax 
code for inflation was passed to end the phenomena 
known as bracket creep. Bracket creep was when a 
taxpayer would be pushed into a higher tax bracket by 
inflation even though their actual income had not 
increased after being adjusted for inflation. And 
since tax brackets usually rose most steeply at the 
bottom of the scale i.e. a few thousand dollar increase 
in salary pushed people into a new bracket while in the 
top brackets it took much more to do so and those in 
the highest tax brackets could not go any higher, 
bracket creep affected those near the bottom or middle 
of the scale most severely. Indexing not only 
compensated individuals for inflation, it also removed 
^^®Niskanen, Reaganomics; An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 75. 
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any revenue incentive for the government to "inflate" 
its way into a balanced budget or more spending. 
However, to the dismay of the Reagan administration, 
Congress also loaded up ERTA with an array of other tax 
cuts and incentives. It extended tax incentives for 
charitable contributions, increased tax subsidies for 
child care, provided for adoption expenses, increased 
tax-free profits a retired couple could obtain from the 
sale of their home, and made dozens of other 
adjustments to the tax code. These additions were so 
extensive and costly that the Congressional Joint 
Committee on Taxation estimated that by 1986 half of 
the revenue loss from the bill would come from 
provisions other than the personal tax rate 
reduction.In all ERTA was projected to reduce 
revenues by $787 billion over the period between 82-89. 
More than $500 billion of this total was a reduction in 
individual income taxes, $200 billion in corporate 
income taxes, and $40 billion in other taxes. 
Shortly after the tax-bill was signed serious 
questions were raised about the potential increase in 
^^'^Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is 
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 47. 
^^®Michael Boskin, Reagan and the Economy, (San Francisco, 
California: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1987), page 150. 
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the deficit. The stock market fell 11% between mid- 
August and mid-September and long-term interest rates 
rose substantially. Industrial production fell and 
unemployment rose starting in July signalling the 
beginning of what was to be one of the most severe 
recessions since the Great Depression. By December the 
problem had become even more serious as economic 
conditions deteriorated. Unemployment in the fourth 
quarter was 8.3% (compared to 7.7% predicted) and 
projected deficits were about $100 billion a year.^^^ 
The 1981-82 recession was in full force. In September, 
1982 in response to the recession and the growing 
budget deficit projections, Congress passed the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) which was 
designed to raise an additional $99 billion 
cumulatively through 1985. It increased tax 
enforcement and eliminated some loopholes but left 
undisturbed the individual income tax cuts passed in 
1981, the indexing for 1985 and many of the provisions 
of the corporate tax policy enacted in ERTA. However, 
it repealed further acceleration of depreciation 
scheduled for 1985-86. TEFRA took back about 25% of 
the projected revenue loss for ERTA. The net impact by 
^®®Stein, Presidential Economics, pages 273-274. 
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FY 88 was still to be a $215 billion tax reduction,^®® 
though overall the total cumulative loss of revenue 
between 1982-89 was reduced from the original 
projection of $787 billion to $543 billion, a reduction 
of $244 billion - $72 billion less in individual 
reductions, $131 billion less in corporate reductions, 
and $41 billion less in other taxes. 
TEFRA was one of the largest tax increases in 
history in terms of projected revenue gains but did 
leave alone the individual income tax aspect of ERTA 
which was the heart of the Reagan plan. TEFRA included 
withholding on interest and dividends, acceleration of 
corporate income tax payments, modification of the 
completed contract method of tax accounting, changes in 
the taxation of life insurance companies, increase in 
airport and airways excise taxes, extension of the 
social security hospital insurance taxes to federal 
employees, strengthening the individual minimum tax, 
increasing the floor for casualty and medical expense 
deductions, increasing the cigarette and telephone 
excise taxes and increasing the rate and base of the 
unemployment tax. However, even though TEFRA left 
^®°Boskin, Reagan and the Economy, page 66. 
^®^Boskin, Reagan and the Economy, page 157. 
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intact income tax aspects of ERTA it caused tremendous 
division within the Reagan Administration. Some hard¬ 
core supply-siders like Norman Ture and Craig Roberts 
left the administration in anticipation of what Roberts 
called the "unraveling of Reaganomics". But TEFRA also 
gave Reagan more credibility in Congress as it showed 
many that he was about more than just cutting taxes no 
matter what. He was looking at the bigger picture. 
In 1983 Reagan and the Congress supported the 
recommendations of a bipartisan commission on social 
security to significantly increase payroll taxes to 
protect the solvency of the social security system. 
These increases were projected to raise approximately 
$9 billion annually. In 1986 Reagan proposed a 
substantial simplification of the tax process by 
proposing the elimination of many exemptions including 
those on Individual Retirement Accounts for the 
wealthy, state and local sales tax, medical expenses 
above a certain limit and other items such as union 
dues, consumer interest payments and business meals. 
This proposal was adopted to be "revenue neutral" and 
was not perceived to have a significant effect on the 
distribution or level of taxes. Its primary goal was 
^®^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, pages 78-79. 
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to simplify the system and eliminate many deductions 
that served as loopholes for different sectors of 
society. 
Spending 
One of the major challenges facing the Reagan 
administration's plan to reduce the growth of federal 
spending was the political obstacles to reducing social 
spending. During the presidential campaign Reagan 
talked about being able to reduce spending merely by 
restraining the growth of old programs, avoiding new 
programs and eliminating waste, fraud, extravagance, 
and abuse. He didn't talk about the pain and hardship 
that these yet unspecified cuts would inevitably cause. 
Niskanen claims that Reagan's advisors knew that in 
order to achieve the proposed spending reductions that 
services would be affected and pain and hardship would 
be caused^®^ but to say so would jeopardize the 
campaign. Since Reagan talked only about reducing 
waste, fraud, extravagance, and abuse and made it seem 
that substantial reductions in the growth of federal 
spending could be achieved without any reduction in 
services, the American public was not prepared, nor had 
they given their approval for such reductions. 
^®^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 13. 
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In his proposal Reagan made great efforts to 
portray his efforts to reduce the growth of spending as 
sparing the "social safety net". Some of the advisors 
to the Reagan White House argued later whether this was 
because of his true desire to protect these programs or 
because of the political costs of being portrayed as 
attacking the poor. Martin Anderson, Reagan's first 
chief domestic policy advisor stated that: 
providing a safety net for those who cannot 
or are not expected to work was not really a 
social policy objective. The term safety net 
was used...to describe the set of social 
welfare programs that would not be closely 
examined on the first round of budget changes 
because of the fierce political pressures 
that made it impossible to even discuss these 
programs without involving a torrent of 
passionate, often irrational, criticism...the 
term safety net was political shorthand that 
only made sense for a limited period of 
time.^®^ 
However, Reagan who in the 1940s and 1950s was a 
Democrat, was a strong supporter of the New Deal so it 
was no coincidence that the programs labeled part of 
the safety net were those programs that were part of 
the New Deal. Those that he labelled as "other" and 
therefore not protected from the budget ax were those 
^®^Martin Anderson, "The Objectives of the Reagan 
Administration's Social Welfare Policy," in D. Lee Bawden, ed., 
The Social Contract Revisited: Aims and Outcomes of President 
Reagan's Social Welfare Policy, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban 
Institute Press, 1984), page 113. 
134 
developed primarily during the 1960s and 1970s as part 
of the "Great Society" program of Lyndon Johnson whose 
1964 candidacy Reagan worked against as a spokesperson 
for the Barry Goldwater campaign. However, regardless 
of the reasons, the White House was clear that 
traditional social security payments to the elderly, 
basic unemployment benefits, cash payments to the 
elderly and chronically poor, and government 
obligations to veterans were off limits to the budget 
cuts. This presented quite a difficult problem for the 
members of the Reagan budget cutting team. These 
programs accounted for 36% of the total federal outlays 
and when combined with the 24% that made up defense and 
the 10% for interest payments nearly 70% of the budget 
was termed off-limits for reductions. This left only 
30% of the budget available for reductions. This meant 
that in order to achieve the proposed $41 billion in 
cuts (after a $7.2 billion increase in defense) in 1982 
and the proposed $105 billion by 1984 this 30% of the 





It is very difficult to measure the success of the 
Reagan tax proposal in meeting the goals of supply-side 
economists particularly because there is substantial 
disagreement among the supply-siders themselves as to 
the original goals and objectives. Anderson claims that 
the supply-siders were falsely accused of arguing that 
the tax cut would almost instantly produce large 
increases in tax revenues that would wipe out that 
revenue loss of the cut itself. He argues that the 
Reagan team conservatively estimated that only a little 
over 17% of the tax cut would be recovered over the 
five-year period covered in the initial campaign 
proposal.Stockman, on the other hand, argues that 
Laffer and Wanniski clearly stated that the tax cuts 
would pay for themselves and although Stockman claims 
he never agreed with the argument, and often wondered 
if Laffer and Wanniski themselves did, it was the 
position of the supply-siders.^®® 
Whatever the original claims it is still essential 
to analyze the impact of the tax cut, particularly on 
^®^Anderson, Revolution, page 132. 
^®®David A. Stockman, Triumph of Politics; How the Reagan 
Revolution Failed, (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), page 53. 
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federal revenues. The most exhaustive attempt to 
evaluate the effects of the tax cut for individuals 
isolated from other aspects of the Reagan economic 
program and from other economic factors affecting it 
was done by Professor Lawrence Lindsey of Harvard 
University, who was a member of the Council of Economic 
Advisors during the development and implementation of 
the tax cut proposal. In 1990 he published The Growth 
Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is Transforming the 
U.S. Economy. According to Lindsey the core of supply- 
side economics - that tax rates affect the willingness 
of taxpayers to work, save, and invest and thereby also 
affect the health of the economy - was clearly proven 
as true and is now accepted as a given among 
economists. However, he also states that the most 
controversial claim of the supply-siders - that 
reductions in tax rates would bring in more revenue 
that they lost - was proven to be untrue. Yet he says 
this is only because of the reductions in the 
relatively low rates on moderate and low-income 
taxpayers. He argues reductions on upper-income tax 
rates clearly produced a net increase in tax revenue 
^^^Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is 
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 10. 
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and the tax cuts for the upper-middle class came out 
about even. 
In order to fully measure the effects of the tax 
cut on government revenues Lindsey attempts to measure 
the loss of revenue after taking into consideration the 
effects on the economy of the tax cut itself. He does 
this by starting with the direct effect of the tax cuts 
- the difference between what the new law generated and 
what the old law would have generated if nothing else 
had changed. He finds the direct effect of the tax cut 
from 1981 through 1985 as very large: rising from $44 
billion in 1982 to $115 billion in 1985.^®^ This is 
the loss of revenue from the tax cut assuming all else 
is equal. Then he proceeds to subtract the amount of 
revenue generated by three indirect effects of the tax 
cuts: the demand-side effect, supply-side effect, and 
pecuniary effect from these numbers to arrive at what 
he calls the true cost of the tax cut. 
The demand-side effect is based on the assumption 
that a tax cut will increase consumer demand and thus 
increase economic activity. This is similar to the 
^®®Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is 
Transforming the U.S. Economy, pages 10-11. 
^®®Lindsey, The Growth Experiment; How the New Tax Policy is 
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 65. 
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orthodox Keynesian approach to economics whereby 
stimulating the overall demand in the economy is the 
means by which to influence the economy. Using a model 
developed by a group of economists for the National 
Bureau of Economic Research which is based on the 
actual tax returns of more than 34,000 taxpayers in 
each of six years, Lindsey calculates the demand-side 
effect - the revenue generated by the increased demand 
as a result of the tax cut as $14.1 billion in 1982 and 
$40.1 billion in 1985. When he subtracts these numbers 
from the direct effect the revenue loss is reduced to 
$29.9 billion in 1982 and $74.9 billion in 1985. 
Then Lindsey calculates the supply-side effect 
which measures the revenue changes that resulted from a 
change in the supply of capital and labor. At lower 
tax rates each taxpayer keeps more of each additional 
dollar earned which makes him more willing to work 
longer hours, to work harder and to save or invest more 
or take greater entrepreneurial risks thus generating 
additional tax revenue. Using the same model, he 
calculates the supply-side effect to be $12 billion in 
1982 and $20.7 billion from 1985. After subtracting 
this supply-side effect from the direct effect less the 
demand effect he is left with a revenue loss of $17.9 
billion in 1992, less than half the direct effect 
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revenue estimate of $44 billion and in 1985 he is left 
with $54.1 billion, again less than half of the direct 
effect of $115 billion. 
Finally he estimates the pecuniary effect of the 
tax cut which results not from any change in the size 
of the economy but only from taxpayers realigning their 
assets from tax free bonds to taxable bonds or more or 
less giving to charities etc. This he calculates 
bringing in an additional $12 billion in additional 
revenue in 1982, rising to $21 billion in 1985. When 
he subtracts these figures from the direct effect less 
demand and supply effects he is left with what he calls 
the true revenue cost of the tax cut of only $6 billion 
in 1982 compared to the $44 billion direct effect 
estimate, rising to $33 billion in 1985 compared to the 
direct effect estimate of $115 billion. 
Lindsey argues that this model suggests that the 
actual cost of the tax cut in revenue was substantially 
less than what the direct effect implies and that both 
Keynesian economists and supply-siders were partially 
right in their predictions. Keynesians were right, he 
argues, in claiming that the tax cut would provide a 
boost to demand. The revenue results also vindicated 
the supply-siders in that there was a substantial 
change in taxpayer behavior as a result of the tax cut. 
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The tax cut did not pay for itself as some of the 
supply-siders claimed it would since personal income 
tax collections were lower than they would have been if 
the tax rates had not been cut. However, the 
behavioral responses as seen in the supply-side and 
pecuniary effects were quite substantial and made up 
approximately a third of the estimated direct cost of 
the cut.^^° What is more important, he argues, is 
that everyone in the income spectrum benefited, with 
families above the median doing best early in the tax 
cut era - benefiting directly from the decrease in 
rates - while others gained later as the economic 
recovery continued. However, he points out, and 
Niskanen agrees, that the catching up of the lower 
economic strata had more to do with overall economic 
conditions than with the tax cut directly. 
Spending 
In examining the results of the Reagan spending 
proposals it is clear that the Reagan administration 
was successful at slowing the growth of federal 
spending but not by as much as it had proposed. In 
^’'“Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is 
TransformincT the U.S. Economy, page 76. 
^^^Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is 
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 82 and Niskanen, Reaganomics; 
An Insider's Account of the Policies and the People, page 273. 
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order to fully understand the size and impact of the 
budget reductions it is helpful to examine the results 
in real terms to account for the impact of inflation, 
and in "current services" levels: the amount of funding 
that would have been necessary to maintain services at 
the level they were when Reagan took office taking into 
account inflation and demographic changes that would 
especially affect entitlement outlays. During Reagan's 
first term real federal spending increased at a 3.7% 
annual rate, lower than the 5% annual rate during the 
Carter administration but this still meant that by FY 
1985 real federal spending was 15% higher than the 
initial Reagan proposal. And although the growth 
of domestic spending slowed, federal spending as a 
share of GNP was higher at the end of the first term 
than when Reagan took office {an estimated 24.1% for FY 
1985 versus 23.5% in FY 1981). 
However, the administration was relatively 
successful in reordering federal budget priorities. 
Real defense outlays increased by 7% a year since 1981 
raising the share from 26% to 32% in 1985 and a 
substantially larger portion of this enhanced defense 
budget was being allocated to weapons relative to 
^’^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 26. 
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current operations and maintenance. Congress 
agreed to most of the proposed domestic spending cuts 
for 1982 but far less in the subsequent years so budget 
savings were about half of what Reagan asked for. 
However, this still meant that between 1981 and 1988 
$159 billion was cut from domestic programs beyond what 
was needed to maintain "current services". These cuts 
were divided up by 123.6 billion in grant-in-aid to 
state and local government (a 16.5% reduction) and $35 
billion in payments direct to individuals (a 2.3% 
reduction). 
The grant-in-aid programs that were hit the 
hardest were job training programs, the work incentive 
program for welfare recipients, health planning and 
training grants, special milk programs, appalachian 
regional commission programs, economic development 
administration grants, energy conservation programs, 
and the Urban development action grant which all 
suffered at least a 50% cut in current service levels. 
Juvenile justice assistance, subsidized housing, 
environmental protection agency wastewater treatment 
grants, and the general revenue sharing programs all 
^■'^John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, The Reagan Record, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984), 
page 8. 
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experienced cuts of at least 40% current services. 
General Revenue sharing was completely eliminated at 
the end of FY 1986. Grant-in-aid programs for state 
and local governments in FY 1988 were 20% below the 
level that would have been needed to maintain the level 
of services provided in FY 1981. The deepest cuts in 
programs directly aiding individuals came in student 
benefits, which was cut by 9.5% in current service 
funding and food stamps which was cut by 7.2% in 
current service levels. 
Below is a synopsis of the budget changes in the 
major federal budget categories: 
Social Security 
Social Security represented about 21% of total 
federal outlays in FY 1981 and increased at a 2.9% real 
annual rate during the first term. From the beginning 
of the Reagan administration, the traditional social 
security benefits to the elderly were considered off 
limits to budget cuts. The Reagan budget did, however, 
make significant changes in "peripheral" social 
security programs: reducing the minimum benefit and 
^’^AFSCME, The Republican Record: A 7-Year Analysis of State 
Losses of Federal Funding (FY 1982 - FY 1988), (Washington. D.C.: 
AFSCME, 1988), pages 1-3. 
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disability benefits, while eliminating student benefits 
and death benefits where there was no survivor. 
Health 
Spending for health programs (excluding those for 
the military and veterans but including Medicare and 
Medicaid) was about 10% of total federal outlays in FY 
1981 and increased at a 5.7% real annual rate during 
the first term. These programs were not considered 
part of the core safety net but the initial Reagan 
budget proposed only small changes in these programs. 
The Reagan administration had two major health 
policy objectives upon taking office: reducing the 
growth of federal health care spending and reforming 
private as well as public health insurance to promote 
efficiency through competition. With respect to the 
first goal, the administration had only limited 
success, reducing expected FY 1985 spending by about 6% 
from pre-Reagan policy levels. Reductions in Medicare 
accounted for 75% of the saving but the largest 
proportionate cuts were in the much smaller health 
services grants programs. In promoting competition, 
the administration made little progress. The medicare 
program which is federally financed health insurance 
^"'^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 36. 
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for the elderly and disabled accounted for 75% of total 
federal spending on health care and despite a 17% 
annual growth between 1974 and 1981 the 
administration's FY 1982 and 1983 budgets didn't 
propose any major reforms in the program. The growth 
rate of Medicaid, the state administered entitlement 
health insurance program for low-income people jointly 
financed by the federal and state governments slowed to 
about half the average annual growth rate between 1979 
- 1981 of 18%. Health Service Grants were more 
profoundly affected. The creation of block grants with 
greatly reduced federal funding was the Reagan 
administration's main goal for health services grants. 
Congress agreed with the administration's 1981 proposal 
that consolidated grants into three blocks with more 
state flexibility to spend about 20% fewer federal 
dollars. The states responded by concentrating these 
more limited federal dollars on programs that they had 
traditionally favored (supported heavily with state 
money) so programs without solid state-level 
constituency suffered substantially. 
^^®Palmer and Sawhill, The Reagan Record, page 368. 
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Low-Income Assistance 
Spending for direct assistance of low-income 
families and individuals (exclusive of Medicaid) was 
about 6% of total federal outlays in FY 1981 and 
increased at a .9% real annual rate during the first 
term. This included cash transfers to dependent 
families and the elderly poor, the earned income tax 
credit, and transfer-in-kind of food, housing, and 
energy assistance. Only cash transfers to dependent 
families and the elderly poor were considered to be 
core social safety net programs. The administration's 
initial objectives for these other programs to assist 
low-income and disadvantaged people were to reduce the 
cash and food assistance to those with incomes above 
the poverty line, to simplify administration, and to 
reduce the growth of subsidized housing. In this they 
were largely successful. 
Federal child nutrition programs included free and 
reduced price lunches for lower-income children in 
participating schools, a general subsidy for all meals 
served in those schools, a program of special food 
supplements for pregnant and lactating women, infants 
and children (WIC) and several smaller programs. In FY 
^’'"'Niskanen, Reacranomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 41. 
147 
1985 child nutrition outlays as a whole were 28% below 
the pre-Reagan baseline for FY 1985 because of the 
cutbacks. Participation in the school lunch program 
was reduced by about 3 million children, including 1 
million eligible for free or reduced-price meals. But 
Congress did raise WIC 4% above the baseline despite 
administration opposition. 
The cuts in subsidized housing were also 
substantial. The housing assistance programs are 
designed to improve the quality of housing occupied by 
low-income families, reduce the share of income they 
spend on housing to an acceptable level, and augment 
the overall supply of low-income housing. Programs 
have used rent supplements to help families occupy 
good-quality housing of their choice, as well as using 
subsidies for the development and operation of new 
projects to house families who are income eligible. 
The number of newly assisted households fell from an 
annual average of 300,000 for 1976-1980 period to 
100,000 for 1981-1984 period. As a result there were 
about 1 million fewer households receiving assistance 
and approximately 300,000 more families living in 
substandard housing at the end of 1985 than there would 
^"^^Palmer and Sawhill, The Reagan Record, page 373. 
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have been under a continuation of pre-Reagan policies. 
Overall the administration clearly succeeded in 
curtailing the growth of housing funding levels by 
cutting budget authority appropriations from $27 
billion in FY 1980 to $13 billion by 1984.^’^^. 
Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services 
Spending for education, training, employment, and 
social services was 5% of the FY 1981 budget. These 
services were a primary target of the efforts to reduce 
spending. Many of the proposed changes in these 
programs were approved and total real spending for 
these programs declined at a 7.8% annual rate. The 
federal role in elementary and secondary education is 
actually relatively small, since federal spending is 
less than 10% of total public expenditures for this 
purpose though nearly $7 billion in federal money in 
1984 was appropriated to K-12 education. The major 
federal program, constituting nearly half of this $7 
billion, is Chapter I of the Education Consolidation 
and Improvement Act of 1981. In 1981 Reagan proposed 
consolidating more than forty-five federal education 
programs into two block grants — one to help states 
and localities meet special needs and one to improve 
^■'^Palmer and Sawhill, The Reaaan Record, pages 372-373. 
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the resources and performance of schools -- with a 25% 
reduction in overall funding. Congress agreed to only 
part of the changes. However, education funding was 
still cut well below the pre-Reagan baseline levels. 
Outlays in FY 1985 for Chapter 1 were almost 20% in 
real terms below what they would have been under pre- 
Reagan policies. About 1 million (20% fewer) children 
were served in FY 1984 than in FY 1980.^®° 
When Reagan took office federal spending on 
postsecondary education was primarily in the form of 
student aid - Pell grants to help low-income students 
attend college, student loans and grants to colleges 
for low-income students plus social security dependent 
benefits and veteran payments. Between FY 1978 and 
1981 outlays in these programs increased by 114%. By 
FY 1981 federal spending on student aid was $6 billion 
which constituted nearly 80% of all the tuition and fee 
income of all colleges and universities in the U.S. 
(compared with 39% in FY 1976). The administration won 
enactment of proposals to restore income restrictions 
on the student loan program and to tighten income 
limits on Pell grants. Consequently FY 1985 spending 
was about 23% below what would have been needed to 
^®°Palmer and Sawhill, The Reagan Record, page 364. 
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maintain current service levels. However, Reagan also 
completely eliminated education benefits for social 
security dependents and substantially reduced education 
benefits for veterans. If these payments were included 
under postsecondary allocations, FY 1985 would show 
considerably lower levels of spending in real terms on 
postsecondary education than at any time since the mid- 
1970s. 
The major change in training and employment 
services was the replacement of the public service 
employment program (CETA) with a private employment 
assistance program (JTPA). CETA legislation expired in 
1982 and was replaced by JTPA as a compromise between 
the administration and Congress. The administration 
proposed eliminating income support (training 
allowances) and Congress limited such costs to 15% of 
all funding. The administration proposed that 
responsibility for the entire program be shifted to the 
private sector and Congress specified that the private 
sector and local government be "equal partners". The 
administration proposed that funds for JTPA be in the 
form of unrestricted block grants to states; Congress 
concurred in the block grant but placed restrictions on 
^®^Palmer and Sawhill, The Reagan Record, pages 373-374. 
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how states allocate funds to local jurisdictions. The 
administration proposed federal funds of under $3 
billion and Congress funded the program at a level of 
about 15% above that requested. 
Defense 
Defense was the only major federal program that 
Reagan proposed to increase. Niskanen points out that 
the rapid increase in defense spending began in the 
last two years of the Carter administration and 
continued through FY 1985. Real spending for defense 
increased at a 4.8% annual rate during the Carter 
administration and at a 6.9% annual rate during the 
first term of the Reagan administration. By FY 1985 
annual real spending was about 30% higher than in FY 
1981 and about 50% higher than in 1979.^®^ Real 
spending for procurement increased at a 13.5% annual 
rate and real spending for R&D (including Department of 
Energy spending on nuclear weapons) increased 11%. 
Real spending for military personnel increased at a 
4.1% annual rate and real spending for operations and 
maintenance increased at a 3.7% annual rate. Thus, 
Niskanen argues, the defense buildup was focused on 
^®^Palmer and Sawhill, The Reagan Record, page 366. 
^®^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 28. 
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weapons modernization rather than an increase in the 
size or readiness of the military forces. 
Other 
Spending for the hundreds of other activities of 
the federal government totalled about 14% of total 
outlays in FY 1981. Total real spending for these 
programs declined at a 7.2% annual rate. Some of the 
major changes were (in annual real spending): 
Science and Space - increased 2.5% 
Energy - reduced by 25% 
Commerce and housing credits: - reduced 19% 
Community and regional development: - reduced 12%^®^. 
Conclusion 
In economic terms clearly the most unequivocal 
result of Reaganomics is the huge increase in the 
federal debt and budget deficit. When Reagan took 
office in January, 1981 the budget deficit was 
approximately $72.7 billion. When he left office in 
January, 1989 the deficit was approximately $194 
billion. Between FY 1980-87 the national debt rose 
^®^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 30. 
^®^Niskanen, Reaganomics; An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, pages 48-53. 
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$529 billion more than would have been the case had FY 
1980 fiscal policies stayed in place. This despite 
the fact that following the severe recession of 1981- 
1982 the economy grew at a signfleant rate. Between FY 
1982-1989 the Gross National Product (GNP) grew at an 
average annual rate of 4.1% in real dollars (see Figure 
4.1).^®’^ This strong growth is pointed at by 
supporters of the supply-side plan as proof of the 
success of Reaganomics. But this strong growth should 
have led to increased revenues and decreased demand for 
expenditures. However, the deficit kept rising. In 
fact, during this same period FY 1982-89 the deficit 
grew by 178%, increasing from $74 billion in the 
beginning of FY 1982 to over $206 billion at the end of 
FY 1989 (see Figure 4.2).^®® Since the Reagan Program 
for Economic Recovery planned for a balanced budget in 
FY 1984 what caused this huge deficit? 
There are different answers to this question 
depending on whose perspective you adopt. These 
perspectives fall under three categories: those who 
^®®Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is 
TransformincT the U.S. Economy, page 97. 
^^’’’United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts 
of the United States 1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO), page 563. 
^®®United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts 
of the United States 1991, page 563. 
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argue that the economic forecasts used to make the 
budget were at fault, those who argue that too much was 
spent, and those who argue not enough was taken in. 
Reagan Economic Forecasts 
Stockman argues that the claim that the Reagan 
administration could have a big tax cut, a big defense 
buildup, and still have a balanced budget by 1984 was 
based on economic forecasts that assumed that the 
inflation rate would be gradually reduced and economic 
growth would gradually increase.What occurred 
instead was a dramatic decrease in inflation which 
decreased revenues from income tax rates that were 
still increasing with inflation and therefore bringing 
in new money, a severe recession which decreased 
revenues due to the decrease of economic activity, and 
increased expenditures from the escalating demand for 
social services as a result of the 1981-1982 recession. 
By 1986 revenue generated by the gross national product 
was $660 billion lower than that in the Reagan forecast 
due to this weak economic growth and lower rate of 
^®®Stockitian, Triumph of Politics; How the Reagan Revolution 
Failed, page 397. 
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inf lation. It is also clear that this result was 
not independent of the Reagan plan, but a result of it. 
The faulty revenue forecasts were adopted for one 
of two reasons: either as a result of a genuine 
miscalculation of the impact of the policies to be 
enacted and how quickly and dramatically inflation 
would fall; or as a result of a deliberate attempt to 
paint a picture of how this plan to reduce taxes, 
increase military spending and protect those in need 
would produce a balanced budget in order to get the 
most difficult aspects of the plan, the tax increase 
and the domestic program reductions, enacted. 
It is likely that both of these are true. There 
were both true supply-side believers and minimalist 
supporters involved in the development of the revenue 
forecasts. It is possible that some of the supply- 
siders really believed that cutting taxes would 
actually increase revenue. And it is very likely as 
Stockman and Stein point out that many of those 
involved were going along with the projections as a way 
of selling the plan and obtaining the tax cuts, 
domestic spending reductions, and increases in military 
spending while knowing that the budget would not 
^^“Stockman, Triumph of Politics; How the Reagan Revolution 
Failed, page 399. 
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balance. However, it does seem hard to believe that 
these economists and politicians could be off by $660 
billion in five years. Regardless, these faulty 
forecasts played a large role in the resulting budget 
deficit whether they were developed out of incompetence 
or deliberate lying in order to manipulate the 
political process. 
Spending 
Another perspective on the deficit focuses on the 
level of spending. Niskanen argues that most of the 
increase in the deficit was due to the rapid growth of 
federal spending. Between FY 1981-1985, though 
spending growth was reduced by about 10%, or $56 
billion compared to what it would have been under pre- 
Reagan policies, this was only half of what Reagan 
proposed.Niskanen argues further that this 
difference between the actual and forecast real 
spending was almost identical to the increase in the 
real deficit and therefore the deficit could be 
attributed almost entirely to the failure to control 
the growth of spending. He also points out that the 
deficit was not only a result of the growth in spending 
but also a cause of it as the deficit caused a 
^®^Niskanen, Reaganomics; An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 9. 
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substantial increase in spending every year just to pay 
the interest on the debt.^^^ From FY 1981-85 federal 
interest payments increased about $15 billion a year 
despite a sharp decline in interest rates. 
Lindsey agrees that the major cause of the deficit 
was increased spending but points specifically at the 
increase in defense spending, not domestic spending as 
the major cause of this. Between FY 1980-87 real 
defense spending increased by an average of 6.3% per 
year or 55% total. By FY 1987 the cumulative increase 
amounted to $275 billion of the $417 billion added to 
the national debt by higher spending, or 66% of the 
total increase in the debt.^^^ 
Niskanen's point is an important one. Regardless 
of the social consequences of the proposed Reagan 
reductions in domestic spending growth, the reductions 
did not come close to those proposed by Reagan in the 
original Program for Economic Recovery. It is clear 
that if Reagan had obtained from Congress the cutbacks 
in the rate of growth in federal spending that he 
^®^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, pages 52-53. 
^^^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies 
and the People, page 108. 
^^^Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is 
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 98. 
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proposed the deficit would be much smaller. However, 
what is not clear is the unanticipated consequences of 
such reductions for the economy. What impact would 
such cuts have had on economic growth? How far could 
the cuts go before the populations affected by them 
would create social upheaval further imperiling the 
economy, especially in the urban areas? What would 
have been the impact on the confidence and 
psychological state of the population of these 
reductions? These are questions not even broached by 
Niskanen (or Reagan). To ignore the economic 
repercussions of the withdrawl of another 10% of funds 
needed to maintain service levels while arguing that 
such a withdrawl would balance the budget is again 
either incompetence or deliberate manipulation. 
Lindsey's argument that the increase in military 
spending was the sole cause of the deficit is not 
acceptable. The increase in military spending was 
basically budgeted as such in the original proposal. 
Though it is true that if the increase did not occur 
there would likely be a smaller deficit his argument 
that the increase caused the deficit is false. Not 
only was the increase approximately the same as 
projected by the original plan (in fact it was slightly 
lower) but Lindsey does not take into account the role 
159 
of th.G military spanding in th.G Gconomic growth of FY 
1983-1989 and the impact on federal revenues if this 
significant influx of money into the economy did not 
occur. 
Taxes 
Robert McIntyre of the Citizens for Tax Justice 
argues the perspective that the Reagan tax cut played 
the primary role in causing the deficit because the 
domestic spending cuts were almost exactly offset by 
military spending increases. He writes: 
Reagan came into office promising to increase 
military spending but to reduce Federal 
outlays. Social Security excepted. He 
succeeded. The cost of non-social security, 
nondefense programs has dropped from 10.3% of 
the gross national product in FY 1980 to only 
7.8% of the GNP in FY 1988. That's $120 
billion less this year than if it had stayed 
at the 1980 share of the GNP. Those domestic 
spending cuts were more than enough to pay 
for the big increase in military spending, 
which grew from 5% of the GNP in 1980 to a 
high of 6.5% in 86, and is at 6.1% in 1988. 
To oversimplify only slightly, the Pentagon 
military buildup has been paid for, 
effectively, by cuts in social spending, (his 
emphasis. ) 
Boskin agrees that the tax cut played a prominent 
role in causing the deficit but argues that the 
President is only partially to blame. He attributes 
most of the responsibility to Congress who not only 
^^^AFSCME, The Republican Record, page 17. 
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refused to cut spending the necessary amounts to meet 
the projections but who also added substantially to the 
Reagan tax cut proposal. Congress added about $175 
billion of additional tax cuts to those originally 
proposed by the Administration, about a quarter of the 
total tax cuts enacted. 
Lindsey, however, takes issue with the argument 
that the tax cut played anything but a small role in 
the increased deficit. He argues that the direct 
effect of the tax cut was between $30 billion and $60 
? 
billion per year while the size of the federal deficit 
during the same time period ran between $150-200 
billion per year. Therefore, even without taking into 
account the additional revenue the cuts generated 
(through demand, supply and pecuniary aspects as 
explained earlier) the role of the tax cut was minimal 
in terms of the deficit. Even though the FY 1983 
deficit hit a peacetime record of 5.2% of GNP, nearly 
$100 billion above the level it would have been if FY 
1980 fiscal policies had stayed in place, only 30% of 
this increase was due to the tax cut. Therefore 70% 
^®®Boskin, Reagan and the Economy, page 3. 
^^"^Boskin, Reagan and the Economy, page 122. 
^®®Lindsey, The Growth Experiment; How the New Tax Policy is 
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 94. 
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was due to higher spending. By FY 1987, he argues, the 
entire cause of the increase in the budget deficit 
since FY 1980 was added spending, not lower taxes. 
Between FY 1980-87 only 21% of the increase in the 
national debt was due to the tax reduction. The 
remaining 79% was due to spending increases. 
McIntyre's argument that the domestic spending 
reductions essentially paid for the military spending 
increases is an interesting one and, when added to 
Boskin's analysis that the tax cut played a prominent 
role in the budget deficit, the argument becomes quite 
convincing. Boskin's point concerning the added tax 
cuts put on the original tax cut proposal by Congress 
is also an important one because it is crucial that 
Congress not escape some responsibility for the budget 
deficit. Congress's additional 25% tax cut to the 
original tax bill in the form of loopholes and 
targetted exemptions did serve to throw the budget 
further out of balance. However, Lindsey's 
calculations concerning the direct impact of the tax 
cut on the deficit (21%), even without the positive 
impact on economic activity of the cut, demonstrate 
that the tax reductions cannot be solely, or even 
^®®Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is 
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 97. 
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primarily, to blame for the deficit. The tax 
reductions played a role, but were not the main 
culprit. 
In conclusion, it seems that the explanation for 
the tremendous increase in the budget deficit during 
the Reagan administration lies primarily in the 
original economic forecast from which all the other 
proposals flowed. The economic forecasts used to 
explain how tax cuts, military spending increases and 
the protection of the needy would result in a balanced 
budget were inherently false. A $660 billion gap 
between projected revenues and actual revenues is quite 
significant, implying that the incompetence or 
manipulation was on a very large scale. This 
combination of manipulation and incompetence has 
tremendous consequences for the legitimacy of the 
American political process. However, it does not 
impact greatly on the examination of the economic 
results of Reaganomics or its impact on state-financing 
of public higher education so this study does not 
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Figure 4.2 U.S. federal deficit for fiscal years 1931-1989. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE IMPACT OF REAGANOMICS ON STATE FINANCES 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the impact of Reaganomics on 
state finances. It begins with an extensive history of 
the development of the relationship between the federal 
and state governments primarily concerning the funding 
of domestic programs. It then outlines in detail the 
Reagan administration's proposals concerning this 
relationship specifically focusing on its goals and 
outcomes. The chapter then details the response to 
this program by state governments, in particular the 
reaction to federal cutbacks in aid to state 
governments. After this the 1991 state government 
fiscal crisis is studied and responsibility is linked 
to the Reagan federalism program. 
History of United States Federalism 
Debate over the shape of the American federal 
system was a major theme of discussion throughout the 
writing of the United States Constitution. Forming a 
central authority was a very controversial idea among 
the colonies so the framers ended up drafting a hybrid 
of two distinct political models: a confederal 
relationship where the central governmental authority 
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relationship where the central governmental authority 
could not be primary with a unitary model where the 
central government was viewed as the ultimate 
authority.The framers of the constitution 
carefully limited the powers of the central authority 
through specific articles in the constitution. Yet the 
Supremacy Clause in Article VI clearly indicates that 
the central authority's laws... 
...shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
As a result of this constitutional ambiguity two 
different interpretations of American federalism 
emerged: the states' rights theory and the nationalist 
theory. States' rights advocates argue that the 
Constitution is an intergovernmental compact among 
states and that it cannot interfere with the powers 
reserved by the states in the Tenth Amendment i.e. 
everything that isn't specifically listed as powers of 
the federal government. The nationalist view is that 
^°°Robert Jay Dilger, "The Expansion and Centralization of 
American Governmental functions," in American Intergovernmental 
Relations Today, ed. Robert Jay Dilger (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1986), page 7. 
2oiThe Constitution of the United States as quoted in Dilger, 
American Governmental Functions, page 6-7 
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the Constitution rejects the idea of an interstate 
compact and the central government receives its 
authority from the people, not the state. Therefore 
the central authority is empowered to do whatever is 
necessary to carry out its policy^°^. 
During the first 140 years of the union from 1789- 
1929 American intergovernmental relations functioned 
primarily under a states' rights perspective. 
Governmental powers and responsibilities were divided 
between the central authority, hereafter called the 
federal government, and the states. Each had their 
areas of authority and didn't meddle in the 
other's.^°^ The states were primarily responsible for 
the domestic needs of public goods and services. The 
federal government focused its activities primarily on 
the internal and external defense of the union, 
westward expansion and promoting interstate 
commerce.But the division was not absolute and 
near the end of the 19th century intergovernmental 
exchange of resources began to creep into the economy. 
^°^Dilger, American Governmental Functions, page 7. 
203Diiger, American Governmental Functions, page 8. 
2°^John Shannon, "The Deregulation of the American Federal 
System: 1789-1989," in The Changing Face of Fiscal Federalism, 
eds. Thomas R. Swartz and John E. Peck (Armonk, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1990), page 18. 
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Originally federal grants to states took the form of 
land grants of national land. The federal government 
gave over 3 million acres to the states to help pay for 
wagon roads, 4.5 million acres for canal construction, 
2.25 million acres for river navigation, and 64 million 
acres for flood control. 
The most famous land grant during this period was 
authorized by the Morrill Act which in 1862 provided 
every existing and future state with 60,000 acres of 
federal land plus an additional 30,000 acres for each 
of the state's congressional representatives to be sold 
so as to raise money to build colleges that focused 
primarily on agriculture and the mechanical arts. The 
Morrill Act is also viewed as the beginning of federal 
regulations being attached to intergovernmental 
resource allocations. The Act delineated how the 
states were to pay for the construction of the colleges 
and required the states to report all expenditures 
involving these colleges to Congress on an annual 
basis.Although financial grants from the federal 
government to state governments actually began in 1808 
^°^Morton Grodzins, "The Federal System," in American 
Government, 5th ed., ed. Peter Woll (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 
page 144, as quoted in Dilger, American Governmental Functions, 
page 10. 
^°®Dilger, American Governmental Functions, pages 10-11. 
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with aid for the support of the National Guard they 
dramatically expanded after the Morrill Act to include 
payments to states to establish agricultural experiment 
stations authorized by the Hatch Act of 1887, grants of 
$25,000 for the care of disabled Civil War veterans in 
1888, funding to assist the teaching mission of the 
land grant colleges in 1890, and in 1894 national funds 
were provided to subsidize state initiated irrigation 
projects 
The stock market crash of 1929 set into motion 
events that would forever change the face of the 
American federal system. The tremendous social 
upheaval caused by the depression generated 
unprecedented demands from state government and the 
population on the federal government to help.^°® In 
1930 about 50% of government services were being 
provided by local government, 20% by the state 
government and 30% from the federal government. By 
1940 this pattern had reversed with about 50% being 
supplied by the federal government, 20% by the state 
government, and 30% by local government. The most 
important fiscal cause of this shift was the 
^°^Grodzins, pages 34-37, as quoted in Dilger, American 
Governmental Functions, page 11. 










implementation of national relief programs implemented 
to combat the depression. These programs included the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the Social 
Security Act.^°^ Just between the years of 1932 and 
1936 the federal government intergovernmental and 
individual grants-in-aid expenditures rose from $229 
million to $2.3 billion. The $2 billion increase was 
almost entirely for public welfare programs.The 
states were asked to administer many of these New Deal 
programs and were able to do so independently. The 
implementation of open-ended matching grant programs 
allowed states to control the amount spent in each 
program. 
Federal grants-in-aid expenditures leveled off in 
1940 shortly before the U.S. entered World War II. 
During World War II national expenditures skyrocketed 
but they mostly took the form of defense and foreign 
policy expenditures. In fact, the war effort drained 
off so much of the federal governments resources that 
the total national grants-in-aid expenditures dropped 
2°^John Joseph Wallis, "New Deal Fiscal Federalism," Economic 
Incruiry XXIXX (July 1991): page 510. 
^^°Shannon, "American Federal System," page 15. 
^^^Wallis, "New Deal Fiscal Federalism," page 510. 
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during the war from a peak of $2.4 billion in 1940 to 
$1 billion in 1944. This drop was primarily due to the 
termination of all six emergency relief programs 
enacted during the 1930s so the dramatic reduction in 
federal grants-in-aid was almost entirely in grants to 
individuals. Federal grants to state and local 
governments remained relatively constant from 1936 to 
1944.2^2 
The period between 1953 and 1978 was the era of 
tremendous growth in federal grants-in-aid for 
individuals and state and local governments. During 
this period the number of federal aid programs rose 
from 38 in 1954 to almost 500 by 1978. This expansion 
occurred under both Democratic and Republican 
administrations. After the Korean War national 
expenditures on domestic needs began to rise 
dramatically. Between 1952 and 1960 federal grants-in- 
aid to state and local governments tripled. The most 
significant intergovernmental program of this time was 
the interstate highways program. The federal 
government provided states with 90% of the cost of 
^^^Dilger, American Governmental Functions, pages 14-15. 
^^^Shannon, "American Federal System," page 23. 
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building the highway system.Still, despite this 
tripling of grants to state and local governments, in 
1960 the United States Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) still found 
intergovernmental relations were relatively few, with a 
narrow focus and not very intrusive. 
However, during the Johnson administration from 
1963-1968 national expenditures and the number of 
national grants-in-aid exploded. The number of 
categorical grants increased from 132 in 1960 to 385 in 
1968 and expenditures on federal grants to state and 
local governments also increased dramatically from $7 
billion in 1960 to over $18 billion in 1968. Just in 
the years 1966-67 expenditures for education training 
and employment and social services quadrupled from $1 
billion to $4 billion.This increase primarily 
reflected the liberal agenda of the Johnson 
administration and the Democratic Congress that was 
elected with him in 1964. The programs begun during 
this period were aimed at combatting poverty, disease, 
^^^Dilger, American Governmental Functions, page 17. 
^^^Dilger, American Governmental Functions, page 19. 
^^®John C. Weicher, "The Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts: 
Proposals, Outcomes, and Effects", in Essays in Contemporary 
Economic Problems, 1986; The Impact of the Reagan Program, ed. 
Phillip Cagan (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 
1986), page 24. 
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illiteracy, racial injustice, crime, substandard 
housing, and urban decay.These included the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 which contained a 
number of new categorical programs like the Job Corps 
and the Neighborhood Youth Corp, the creation of 
Medicaid, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
the Housing and Urban Development Act in 1965 and the 
expansion of existing school food programs in 1966 and 
1968. 
A significant proportion of these increases in 
federal grants-in-aid was in grants directly to local 
governments and entirely bypassed the states. This was 
because during the 1950s and 1960s many states lost 
credibility with a changing political electorate and 
the federal government. The birth of the civil rights 
movement and the increased consciousness among the 
white population concerning civil rights and poverty 
issues led to new expectations of state government. 
Many states retreated from these newly identified 
problems and refused to meet the needs of minorities 
and the poor. Local governments in particular felt the 
^^’Dilger, American Governmental Functions, page 20. 
2^®Kenneth T. Palmer, "The Evolution of Grant Policies", in 
The Changing Politics of Federal Grants, eds. Lawrence D. Brown, 
James W. Fossett, and Kenneth T. Palmer (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1984), pages 9-11. 
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void left by unresponsive state governments so they 
appealed directly to congress for help. During this 
time states were also under attack from the judicial 
branch through desegregation, reapportionment and 
voting rights cases. 
When President Richard Nixon took office in 1969 
he expressed concern that the role of state and local 
elected officials was becoming too weak in the 
federalist system. He criticized the new programs of 
the 1960s as ineffective and of having dispersed too 
much responsibility and authority in too many 
directions. In his "New Federalism" initiative he 
proposed more clearly defining governmental 
responsibilities for major programs. Under his urging 
Congress adopted three blocks grants which consolidated 
26 categorical grants. In 1972 Nixon won approval from 
Congress for the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act 
which created the general revenue sharing program where 
federal funds were allocated among states and 
localities by a predetermined formula with no 
conditions. But instead of replacing categorical 
grants with the revenue sharing program as Nixon had 
hoped. Congress added the revenue sharing program to 
^^^Scott M. Matheson and James Edwin Kee, Out of Balance (Salt 
Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1986), page 19. 
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existing intergovernmental expenditures. Thus during 
the Nixon presidency intergovernmental expenditures 
rose from $18.6 billion to $43.3 billion. 
There were no major changes in the 
intergovernmental system during the Ford or Carter 
administrations except for the massive growth in the 
public-employment programs which were developed to 
counter downturns in national employment levels. 
However, the level of intergovernmental expenditures 
peaked in 1978 when more than 25% of state and local 
government expenditures were provided by the federal 
government. The number of intergovernmental programs 
also increased from 448 in 1975 to a peak of 498 in 
1978. Swartz and Peck argue that in some ways the 
success of these programs is what did them in.^^^ By 
the late 1970s the general population didn't seem to 
feel the same urgency of the 1960s in providing federal 
aid to "level the playing field".So it turned out 
to be Carter who actually began the reductions in 
federal aid to states and local governments. In 1978 
Carter eliminated the 25% of general revenue sharing 
22°Dilger, American Governmental Functions, page 23. 
^^^Thomas Swartz and John E. Peck, The Changing Face of Fiscal 
Federalism, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), pages 6-9. 
^^^Weicher, "Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts," pages 6-9. 
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that was designated for states.Still, though many 
people in hindsight now see Carter's 1978-79 budget as 
the beginning of the slowdown of federal grant 
spending, at the time it seemed that these dips were 
nothing more than the dismantling of temporary job and 
public work programs put in place to deal with the 1977 
recession."" During these last years of the Carter 
administration (1978-1981) spending grew in nominal 
terms but the rapid inflation of the period converted 
nominal increases into a real decline of about 
Reagan's "New Federalism" 
In his inaugural address Reagan outlined eight 
basic principles of his federalism initiative. 
1. Substitute state and local governments for 
the federal governments in dealing with 
private institutions that receive federal 
aid. 
2. Cap open-ended federal matching programs. 
3. Use block grants to combine and move 
categorical federal programs to state and local 
level. 
^^^George E. Peterson, "Federalism and the States," in The 
Reagan Record, eds. John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984), 
pages 222-223. 
224peterson, "Federalism and the States," page 211. 
^“Richard P. Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle and Associates, Reagan 
and the States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), page 
50. 
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4. Utilize planning, audit and review 
functions at the state and local level. 
5. Move federal regulatory power, to the 
state and local government. 
6. Remove federally imposed mandates. 
7. Replace federal funding with the movement 
of revenue sources from federal to state and 
local governments. 
8. Substitute state government for federal 
government in dealing with local 
government. 
Reagan was not only challenging the workings of the 
intergovernmental relationships but also the prevailing 
ideological foundation of federalism in the United 
States. His vision focused on enhancing the 
delineation between the role of the federal government 
and state governments and implementing a devolution of 
responsibilities to the governments closer to the 
people. 
Reagan had two strategies: first to enlist state 
and local governments as partners in the effort to 
restrict public spending; second to devolute domestic 
policy authority. He also had public opinion on his 
side. In 1980 public opinion polls showed that the 
level of support for governmental activities was 
226Matheson, Out of Balance, page 23. 
227 Peterson, "Federalism and the States," page 222. 
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shifting from the federal to the state and local 
levels. 
The heart of Reagan's initiative lay in his 
proposal to allocate state and local grants in blocks. 
Under Reagan's proposals block grants would group 
together 90 categorical grants into seven lump-sum 
allocations. Reagan's purpose was threefold: to 
simplify the grants making their administration more 
efficient; to increase state and local flexibility, and 
to make State and local officials more directly 
accountable to their taxpayers. 
During the summer of his first year in office 
Reagan addressed the National Conference of State 
Legislatures at their annual convention in Atlanta, 
Georgia. Here he flushed out his block grant 
proposals: 
Our economic package, which consists of tax 
cuts, spending cuts, block grants, and 
regulatory relief, is a first phase in our 
effort to revitalize federalism. For too 
long, the Federal Government has preempted 
the States' tax base, regulatory authority, 
and spending flexibility. It has tried to 
reduce the States to mere administrative 
districts of a government centralized in 
Washington. With our economic proposals, 
we're staging a quiet federalism revolution. 
^^®Matheson, Out of Balance, page 23. 
^^^President, Report, Federalism; The First Ten Months 
(November 1981), page 3. 
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It's a revolution that promises to be one of 
the most exciting and noteworthy in our 
generation...Block grants are designed to 
eliminate burdensome reporting requirements 
and regulations, unnecessary administrative 
costs, and program duplication. Block grants 
are not a mere strategy in our budget as some 
have suggested; they stand on their own as a 
federalist tool for transferring power back 
to the State and to the local level...The 
ultimate objective is to use block grants, 
however, as only a bridge, leading to the day 
when you'll have not only the responsibility 
for the programs that properly belong at the 
State level, but you will have the tax 
sources now usurped by Washington returned to 
you, ending that round trip of the peoples' 
money to Washington, where a carrying charge 
is deducted, and then back to you.^^° 
According to the then Governor of Utah, Scott M. 
Matheson, Reagan took advantage of the states' growing 
disillusionment with the federal government to push his 
block grant proposals. Governors had supported the 
concept of block grants in a 1980 resolution and 
indicated their willingness to accept a 10% cut in 
total federal aid in return for greater flexibility and 
control over the use of the funds. But the Reagan 
proposals called for a 20% spending reduction and when 
Congress finally passed legislation consolidating 57 
categorical grants into nine new, or modified, block 
grants at a budget authority of approximately $7.5 
billion it represented a cut of approximately 25% or 
^^°as quoted in President, Federalism; The First Ten Months 
(November 1981), pages 31-36. 
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almost 33% in real dollars, from the previous year's 
authorization.Between 1980 and 1982 the state and 
local share of the federal budget shrunk from 
approximately $105 billion to $78 billion. 
Reagan was thus more successful at reducing grant 
expenditures than in cutting the rest of the federal 
domestic budget. In the first year total federal 
grants to state and local government were cut by 13.1% 
from baseline levels or more than double the rate of 
the overall reduction in the domestic budget. This was 
because direct grants to state and local growth as 
opposed to income support and medicaid payments to 
4 
individuals, bore the greatest reductions. The nine 
block grants, seven of which were blocks for health and 
social services, one for some educational grants, and 
one for community development programs, did reduce 
paperwork and helped shift decision making away from 
the federal government. They gave states wide 
discretion in selecting their own priorities, removed 
most of the regulatory rules limiting states's choices 
about how to implement them, and bundled together many 
small programs which had been sustained primarily by 
^^^Matheson, Out of Balance, pages 22-24. 
^^^Matheson, Out of Balance, page 37. 
181 
federal dollars giving states the option of withdrawing 
altogether from these program areas if they chose. 
And since domestic programs were destined to be 
targeted for reduction regardless, the enactment of the 
block grant plan at least provided states and local 
officials some ability to allocate smaller resources to 
areas where they were needed most.^^^ 
Unlike Nixon who had also advocated greater 
flexibility for state governments in the spending of 
federal aid, and offered financial incentives to the 
states to win their support, the Reagan administration 
proposed to greatly reduce the amount of this grant 
aid, which it believed had mistakenly stimulated local 
spending because of the matching requirements contained 
in many programs.The block grant initiative 
encouraged greater spending restraint in the large 
entitlement programs, such as Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and unemployment 
insurance, in which expenditures vary with the number 
of people seeking assistance and financing is shared by 
233peterson, "Federalism and the States," page 229. 
^^^Matheson, Out of Balance, page 27. 
^^^John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, The Reagan Record, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984), 
pages 13-16. 
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different levels of government. The reduction in the 
number of separate grant programs from 361 in 1981 to 
259 in 1983 by eliminating some and consolidating 
others into block grants^^® helped the administration 
reverse the trend of growing financial dependence on 
the federal government and put in place a less 
restrictive grant structure that provides less 
encouragement to local spending. This action helped 
Reagan challenge the assumption that there should be 
uniform national standards for public services and more 
fully engaged the states, willingly or not, as partners 
in the effort to contain domestic program spending. 
The reductions in funding for the programs grouped 
in the block grants fell disproportionately on the 
poor. Cuts in entitlement programs, public service 
jobs, community service programs, aid to large cities, 
aid to schools serving low-income student in large 
cities, and housing assistance affected the poor more 
than any other economic group.Half of the 
reduction for 1982 was in the education, training and 
^^®Palmer and Sawhill, The Reagan Record, pages 16-17. 
^^'^Palmer and Sawhill, The Reagan Record, page 18. 
^^®Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 65. 
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employment and social services category.Overall 
funding for federal aid to state and local governments 
dropped sharply in the first Reagan budget ($6.6 
r 
billion in nominal dollars or $9 billion or 12% in real 
dollars) the first annual drop in nominal terms in more 
than 25 years. 
The 1981 block grants and accompanying funding 
reductions would turn out to be the last major 
accomplishment of the Reagan federalism agenda. In 
1982 he offered an ambitious plan that would have 
turned over to the states the two basic income support 
programs, AFDC and Food stamps, while the federal 
government would assume full responsibility for 
Medicaid. In addition he proposed that 61 smaller 
government programs would be returned to the states for 
their sole financing and administration, and in return 
the federal government would surrender a comparable 
amount of tax revenues. If passed intact, this plan 
would have lowered the federal grant-in-aid share of 
state and local budgets to 3-4% by 1991 the lowest 
since the first year of the New Deal.^^° Reagan 
proposed establishing a special trust fund to be 
”®Weicher, "Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts," pages 25-27. 
^^°Peterson, "Federalism and the States," pages 219-220. 
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created to handle the transition but this 1982 
initiative never got anywhere. Congress had become too 
occupied with the rising federal deficit and much of 
Reagan's ability to push his agenda through the 
Democratic congress had disappeared.But as far as 
the states were concerned the major changes had already 
occurred and it was up to them to adjust to new 
responsibilities for developing, financing and 
administering social programs. 
State Government Responses 
Three major studies have been conducted concerning 
the response of state governments to these reductions 
in federal aid. The most extensive was done by Nathan, 
Doolittle and Associates who conducted field surveys of 
a cross section of 14 states between 1981-1986. The 
Urban Institute conducted a similar study under the 
direction of George E. Peterson which looked at the 
national picture and considered aggregate data for 
particular grant areas and by state. The third study 
was conducted by John C. Weicher on behalf of the 
American Enterprise Institute. All three of these 
studies came to a similar conclusion that there was a 
24ipeterson, "Federalism and the States," page 231. 
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large degree of replacement of federal funds with state 
funds by state governments. They also all found that 
the goal of Reagan to aid his retrenchment goals 
through the devolution of management authority from the 
federal to state level did not come true. Nathan et al 
found this especially surprising:. 
Evidence is that Reagan's federalism reforms 
have stimulated and are continuing to 
stimulate state governments to increase their 
efforts to meet domestic needs in the 
functional areas in which the national 
government either was cutting grants-in-aid 
or threatening to do so.^^^ 
Peterson argues the same point slightly differently. 
He says that explicit devolution never really happened 
because it was given a fair public test and was 
rejected. But Peterson points out that Reagan was 
still able to accomplish more of intergovernmental 
reform than most previous administrations. 
All three studies found that state and local 
governments chose to replace some of the federal grant 
reductions despite the severe 1981-82 recession. In 
some cases the states moved to replace the grants. For 
example, state governments increased their grants to 
local governments to operate mass transit systems as 
^^^Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 8. 
^^^Peterson, "Federalism and the States," page 217. 
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federal operating subsidies were decreased. States 
also took advantage of new flexibility in federal 
grants to shift funds away from energy assistance 
(which Congress did not cut) to social services (which 
Congress did cut) and have also provided money from 
their own revenues for social services. The net effect 
was to significantly compensate for the federal grant 
reductions. As stated earlier, the most severe cuts 
came in grants for job training and employment. In 
these cases state governments developed their own 
substitute programs, but spent much less than the 
federal government used to. Community services, on the 
other hand, were hit the hardest because states did not 
replace these funds. However in many cases the 
community service agencies found new private sources of 
revenue. 
What kind of effect did these cuts have on state 
priorities? The studies found that individual states 
differed quite a bit in their overall responses to cuts 
in federal aid. It became clear that when the states 
became reliant on their own funds, they would select 
very different budget priorities from those chosen in 
the past with federal aid as an incentive. These 
^^^Weicher, "Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts," pages 7-8. 
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responses depended primarily on the political and 
economic climate of the particular state. In 
supportive political environments (pro-social programs) 
and supportive economic culture (where the state's 
economy and finances were strong enough to permit 
replacement efforts) more federal aid was replaced. 
Nathan et al found that the way that state governments 
responded for a particular program depended on three 
things: the incidence of the benefits or services 
provided; the strength of the grant's constituency and 
the level of general public support and visibility; and 
the identification in the mind of state and local 
officials of the programs "federal, state or local 
natureNathan et al also found that the stronger 
the redistributive purpose of a given program the less 
likely it would be protected.The more a program 
was targeted for the poor the more likely it was to be 
cut by the federal government and the less likely it 
was that these cuts would be replaced by state and 
local governments.^^® This was most evident in the 
^^^Peterson, "Federalism and the States," page 238. 
^^®Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 96. 
^^'^Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 112. 
^^®Nathan, Reagan and the States, pages 7-8. 
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entitlement programs. With the exception of Medicaid, 
the general tendency was for the state governments to 
ratify {not replace) these cuts and to pass them along 
to the recipients in programs such as AFDC, food 
stamps, and the school lunch program.The 
replacement of cuts within block grants was greatest in 
programs that historically were areas of greatest state 
and local activity and where organized and politically 
active local constituencies cared about the activities. 
Examples of these are disease-focused public health 
services, social services for the elderly, child abuse 
and day-care. More amorphous programs like community 
services programs didn't get replacement funds.In 
some cases actions by states made it so that there were 
little or no policy or service changes at all.^^^ 
The additional expenditures by states to replace 
much of the federal aid cut by the Reagan program 
coincided with a sharp decline in the growth of state 
tax revenues as a result of the 1981-1982 recession. 
Between FY 1979-1981 state tax revenues grew by 3.9% in 
real dollars. Between FY 1981-1982 state tax revenues 
^^^Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 78. 
^®°Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 86. 
^^^Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 11. 
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actually declined slightly in real dollars (see Figure 
5^1)^ 252 This combination of increased spending 
responsibilities and decreased tax revenues put a 
severe strain on state budgets. In January 1983, 41 of 
the 50 states faced revenue shortfalls totalling $8 
billion. As a result, two-thirds of the states were 
forced to reduce spending in mid-year to less than the 
originally appropriated levels for the 1982 fiscal 
year. To compensate, in FY 1982 and 1983, 44 states 
raised taxes and revenue raising measures were again 
implemented by many states in fiscal 1984.^^^ As a 
result, between FY 1982-1983 state tax revenues 
increased 3.5% in real dollars.When the economic 
recovery began to take hold in 1983 these new taxes 
brought in substantial new revenues.The Gross 
National Product increased 3.6% in FY 1983, 6.8% in FY 
1984, 3.4% in FY 1985 and 2.7% in FY 1986^^® so 
^^^U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(various years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO,). 
^“Scott M. Matheson, "The Federal budget Deficit: Impact on 
the States," in Facing the Facts: The Democratic Governors' View^ 
From the States, ed. Bernard Aronson (Washington, D.C.: Democratic 
Governors' Association, 1984), page 93. 
^^^U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(various years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO). 
^^^Weicher, "Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts," page 34. 
^^®U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of the 
United States: 1991, (Washington, D.C.: GPO), page 563. 
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combined with the new state taxes, state tax revenues 
between FY 1983-1984 increased 6.5% followed by a 6.3% 
increase in FY 1985 and 6.9% in FY 1986.^^’^ What 
makes these tax increases even more significant was 
that they were passed in the midst of a strong tax- 
limitation movement that was thriving in states across 
the country. What started in California with 
Proposition 13 and Massachusetts with Proposition 2 1/2 
had spread throughout the country and in almost every 
state there was a strong movement to oppose new taxes. 
It took significant political capital for state 
governments to pass these tax increases. 
This combination of tax increases and economic 
recovery put state finances on what seemed to be sound 
footing and enabled them to absorb the new 
responsibilities placed on them by the Reagan program. 
Since it took awhile for some of the federal cuts to 
make their way through the system by the time they did 
Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(various years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO). 
2^^For more on tax-limitation efforts see John J. Kirlin, The 
Political Economy of Fiscal Limits, (Lexington, Massachusetts: 
Lexington Books, 1982); Clarence Y.H. Lo, Small Property versus 
Big Government: Social Origins of the Property Tax Revolt, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Jerome G. Rose, 
ed. , Tax and Expenditure Limitations: How to Implement and Live 
Within Them, (Piscataway, New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy 
Research, 1982); and David O. Sears and Jack Citrin, Tax Revolt: 
Something for Nothing in California, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1985). 
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many states were in a position to make up the 
difference with new funds. And they were further 
spurred by the signals from the federal government that 
the importance of the role of the state government in 
domestic programs would continue to increase^^^ and 
that the mounting federal deficit would inhibit any 
spending for new programs.^®® 
The 1991 State Fiscal Crisis 
By the end of the Reagan administration grant-in- 
aid cuts to state and local governments totalled $123.6 
billion from baseline levels (16.5%), a reduction of 
37% in real dollars.This reduction also 
represented a decrease in the share of state revenues 
from federal aid from 22% in 1979 to 18.8% in FY 1990 
(see Figure 5.2).^^^ As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the grant-in-aid programs that were hit the 
hardest were job training programs, the work incentive 
program for welfare recipients, health planning and 
^^^Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 14. 
^®°Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 13. 
^®^American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, The Republican Record: A 7-Year Analysis of State 
Losses of Federal Funding (FY 1982 - FY 1988) (Washington, D.C.: 
AFSCME), page 1. 
^®^U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(Various Years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO). 
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training grants, special milk programs, Appalachian 
regional commission programs, economic development 
administration grants, energy conservation programs, 
and the Urban development action grant which all 
suffered at least 50% cut from baseline levels. 
Juvenile justice assistance, subsidized housing, 
environmental protection agency wastewater treatment 
grants, and the general revenue sharing programs all 
experienced cuts of at least 40% from baseline levels. 
General Revenue sharing was finally terminated at the 
end of FY 1986. 
In addition to the $123.6 billion cut in federal 
aid state and local government also suffered from 
localized economic dislocations arising from the 
administration's agriculture, trade, and energy 
policies, interstate competition to keep taxes as low 
as possible in the belief that this would attract new 
jobs, new demands arising from changing demographics 
and social trends e.g. the Baby-boom "echo" of school- 
age children, a new wave of immigration from Latin 
American and Asia, AIDS, demands for tougher prison 
sentences, crack epidemic, an increase in the number of 
elderly needing long-term care, and more need for child 
^®^AFSCME, The Republican Record, page 2. 
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care because of the growing proportion of two-earner 
families. 
Throughout the 1980s another factor was at work 
that deeply affected state finances: rising health care 
costs. In contrast to the stated goals of the 
devolution of policy making responsibility from the 
federal government to state governments during the 
Reagan Administration Medicaid policy making shifted 
disproportionately the federal government which then 
passed on new mandates to the states thus substantially 
increasing state expenditures. Medicaid was designed 
originally as a partnership between the states and the 
federal government. However, during the 1980s major 
unilateral changes in federal Medicaid requirements 
became more frequent. These changes often 
significantly increased costs for the states to 
implement. Sometimes the states had to start entirely 
new programs or make a series of changes in a program 
even while new requirements were enacted in final 
regulations. New federal requirements also involved 
costly changes in computer programs and additional 
staff training. 
^®^AFSCME, The Republican Record, pages 12-13. 
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The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) in a 
study found that these new conditions and requirements 
exacerbated the states' fiscal problems that were 
already in place as a result of the changes in federal 
aid policies and the recession of 1981-82. Many states 
found it extremely difficult to finance the new 
conditions and requirements without raising taxes, 
shifting Medicaid resources by eliminating optional 
services or closing public clinics, or reducing other 
state spending (emphasis added) Medicaid 
expenditures accounted for 14.8% of state general 
expenditures in 1990, up from 11.3% in 1979 (see Figure 
5.3). As of 1990 Medicaid was the second largest 
category of spending.^®® These increased health care 
costs contributed significantly to the financial 
difficulties of states in FY 1991-92.^®^ 
The distribution of tax responsibility also 
changed with spending responsibilities. Both state and 
local taxes rose in the 1980s compared to federal 
^®^Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
Medicaid: Intergovernmental Trends and Options (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1992), page 1. 
2®®Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
Medicaid, page 2. 
^®’'Edward M. Gramlich, "The 1991 State and Local Fiscal 
Crisis," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol\ime 2 (1991): 
page 247. 
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taxes. In 1987 states accounted for 26.1% of'total tax 
revenue raised by all levels of government not counting 
trust funds like Social Security up from 23.9% in 1980 
and 2 0.6% in 1970.^®® Much of this increase in state 
tax burden was in the form of personal income tax which 
rose from 19.1% of state tax revenue in 1970 to 30.8% 
of state tax revenue in 1987.^®® 
Still, the economic expansion of the mid 1980s 
enabled state governments to temporarily absorb these 
increased responsibilities. Between FY 1983-89 state 
tax revenues rose a total of 34.1% in real dollars, an 
average of 5.7% per year in real dollars. This 
compared to 7.6% increase in real dollars between 1979 
and 1983, an average of 1.9% in real dollars.This 
increased revenue served to gloss over the significant 
transformation in the relationship between federal and 
state government and the increased responsibilities 
taken on by the states. However when the economic 
expansion ended in 1990 and recession took hold the 
structural changes in the federal-state relationship 
^®®Steven Gold, "State Finances in the New Era of Fiscal 
Federalism," in The Changinq Face of Fiscal Federalism, eds. 
Thomas R. Swartz and John E. Peck (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
1990), page 92. 
2®®Gold, "State Finances," page 93. 
^’'°U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(Various Years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO). 
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crystallized and state governments were suddenly in 
deep financial difficulties. Between FY 1989-1990 
state tax revenues rose 3.5% in real dollars but in 
1990-1991 they rose only 1.1% in real dollars. At the 
same time state expenditures between FY 1989-1990 rose 
4.8% in real dollars and between FY 1990-1991 rose 6.3% 
in real dollars (see Figure 5.4).^”^^ This significant 
increase in state spending was largely attributable to 
rising health care costs. 
By the middle of FY 1991 at least 30 states were 
facing serious budget shortfalls^”^^ with the number 
rising to at least 37 states in FY 1992.^”^^ And 
though 26 states did manage to raise taxes for FY 1991 
in anticipation of these difficulties, half of the 
extra revenue was accounted for by three states - New 
Jersey, Massachusetts, and New York.^’^^ 
Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(Various Years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO). 
^’^Gramlich, "The 1991 State and Local Fiscal Crisis," page 
247. 
^’^Larry Tye, "Downturn Forces Deficits in 30 States," Boston 
Globe, 23 November, 1990, page 1. 
^^^Chronicle of Higher Education. 9 January 1991, page A20. 
^^^Robert Pear, "Governors Facing a Fiscal Squeeze and Tough 
Choices," New York Times. 11 November 1990, page 1. 
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Conclusion 
The Reagan era represented a significant change in 
the relationship between the federal government and 
( 
state governments. Reagan clearly articulated an 
ideology of state government being the primary vehicle 
for the providing of most social services and set out 
to transfer federal financial and administrative 
responsibilities for social services to state 
government. Though he was only partially successful in 
this effort what he did accomplish had a considerable 
effect on state governments. 
The most successful aspect of this effort was the 
development of block grants which grouped together 
previously separate line item allocations for specific 
social programs into lump-sum allocations. The 
administration had three goals for the block grant 
proposals: first to entice Governors to agree to 
reductions in federal aid allocations for the programs 
contained within the block grants in exchange for the 
increased state authority; second to shift 
responsibility and any subsequent political 
repercussions for cutting individual programs from the 
federal government to state governments; third to 
enlist the states in Reagan's goal of reducing total 
(federal, state and local) spending on social programs. 
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The first two goals were largely met. During the first 
year of the administration, federal budget allocations 
for programs contained in the block grants declined 33% 
in real dollars and Reagan managed to avoid any 
significant political responsibility for the resulting 
strains on state government and the impacted social 
services. However, contrary to the hopes of the Reagan 
administration state governments replaced a large 
amount of the withdrawn federal funds with state funds 
despite the severe impact on state tax revenues of the 
1981-1982 recession. 
In order to accomplish this replacement effort 
most states were forced to raise taxes during a time of 
substantial anti-tax sentiment throughout the country. 
And by spending large amounts of political capital to 
raise taxes and meet these new responsibilities state 
governments unwittingly laid the groundwork for the 
difficulty they were to face in the early 1990s. 
Though further efforts by the Reagan 
administration to radically change this federal-state 
relationship were largely unsuccessful, the 
administration did shift more responsibility for 
Medicaid to state governments. This shift, combined 
with the explosion of health care costs also placed 
substantial new burdens on state governments and has 
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contributed to the problems now facing state 
governments. The national economic recovery and growth 
era of FY 1983-89 served to mask the difficult 
situation state governments were in. They had accepted 
new financial responsibilities and raised taxes to meet 
them. Now economic recovery filled state coffers with 
additional revenues which were used to further increase 
state spending. However, when the economic growth era 
ended and stagnation and recession hit in the early 
1990s state governments were unable to meet the 
spending obligations they had absorbed. And because of 
the large tax increases in 1982, 1983, and 1984 states 
were politically unable to adequately raise taxes to 
meet these obligations. This situation led to the 
state budget difficulties in FY 1991-93 and the 
spending reductions implemented to address these 
difficulties. 
Therefore, the financial crisis facing state 
governments in the early 1990s can be attributed to 
three causes all linked to Reaganomics: the increased 
responsibility to fund many social programs and the 
state tax increases to meet them; increased state 
responsibility for Medicaid and subsequent skyrocketing 
health care costs; and the declining tax revenues as a 
result of the FY 1990-91 recession and inability of 
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states to adequately raise taxes to meet them due to 
the huge state tax increases of 1982-84. This 
combination of events, all linked to the economic 
policies of the Reagan Administration, put state 
governments in an extremely difficult position where 
rising costs and decreasing revenues have led to 
significant state budget deficits that, given the 
political climate, could only be eliminated by 
substantial spending reductions. 
201 
'S bil lions 
Figure 5.1 Total U.S. state revenues for fiscal years 1979-1991 in 




1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
fiscal year 
Figure 5,2 Percentage federal aid of state revenue for fiscal years 




Figure 5.3 Percentage medicaid of state expenditures for fiscal 









1979IQ80 1961 196219831984 198519861987 198819891990 1'.''9’! 
11 seal year 
$ bl 11 ions 
J_L_I I I_I-1 
Figure 5,4 Total state expenditures for fiscal years 1979-1991 in 
1987 dollars. Source: U.S, Bureau of the Census. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE IMPACT ON STATE FINANCING AND ACCESS OF PUBLIC 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the impact of the 
difficulties in state finances as explained in Chapter 
5 on state financing of public higher education and 
access to these institutions. First the chapter 
presents a brief historical survey on the growth of 
public higher education between 1862-1980. Then 
national data is used to measure the changes in state 
funding for public higher education, the cost of 
attending institutions of public higher education, and 
total available student financial aid during the Reagan 
Administration. In order to do this the Reagan 
administration is divided into three periods: the 
implementation (1981-84); the growth period (1984- 
1988); and the aftermath (1988-1993). Then the 
relationship between Reaganomics, state financing of 
public higher education and access to public higher 
education institutions in California, Massachusetts, 
and New York is analyzed. Finally conclusions are 
drawn concerning this relationship and are compared to 
research on this issue. 
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Historical Overview 
During the period between the passage of The 
Morrill Act of 1862 and World War II public higher 
education grew steadily in the number and size of 
institutions. However, World War II brought a 
revolutionary change to the financing of public higher 
education. Before the war, student financing was 
primarily the responsibility of the student and family. 
Tuition was generally very low so there were relatively 
few scholarships or loan programs. But after World War 
II the passage of the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 
1944 (GI Bill) dramatically increased enrollments. By 
1951, 2.35 million former servicemen were in some sort 
of institution of higher education.The total 
enrollment in public higher education jumped from 
approximately 800,000 in 1939 to 2,181,000 in 1959, an 
increase of over 250%. During this period the 
percentage of students seeking degrees in college that 
were attending public institutions rose from 53% to 
60%.^^^ Also during this period state appropriations 
^■^^Elchanan Cohn and Larry L. Leslie, "The Development and 
Finance of Higher Education in Perspective", in Subsidies to 
Higher Education, Howard P. Tuckman and Edward Whalen eds., (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1980) page 18. 
Department of Education, Digest of Education 
Statistics 1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), page 12. 
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increased dramatically. From 1939 to 1959 state 
expenditures on higher education (all types) increased 
from $151 million to $1.3 billion, an increase of 860%, 
yet this represented an increase of only 3% in the 
proportion of spending on higher education provided by 
state government.This indicates that other 
revenue sources were also expanding at a similar rate 
including tuition and fees and the federal government 
funding. Nevertheless the role of state government, 
though not necessarily increasing in relation to other 
higher education revenue sources, was still increasing 
dramatically. 
During the period from 1960-1980 public higher 
education continued to grow. Enrollments in 
institutions of public higher education went from 
2,181,000 in 1959 to 9,457,000 in 1980, an increase of 
434%. 
The years of the Carter administration continued 
the steady growth of public higher education. During 
the period FY 1977-1981 public higher education in the 
United States received an average of 6% real growth per 
Department of Education, Digest of Educational 
Statistics 1991, page 309. 
208 
year in state support^”^® while the average cost of 
attendance decreased slightly in real dollars^®® and 
total financial aid increased at an average rate of 
2.3% per year in real dollars.^®^ However, when 
Reagan took office the situation changed significantly. 
To facilitate study of the Reagan era it is divided 
into three periods; the initial three year period of 
implementation (1981-84); the four years of growth 
(1984-1988); and the aftermath (1988-1993). 
The National Impact of Reaganomics On State Financing 
of Public Higher Education and Cost of Attendance 
1981-1984: Implementation 
During the implementation of the initial 1981 
Reagan program of income tax cuts, block grants and the 
transfer of responsibility for social services to state 
government, state funding for public higher education 
suffered significantly. During these three years state 
appropriations for public higher education increased 
less than 1% per year in real dollars, down from the 6% 
^■'^Center for the Study of Higher Education State 
Appropriations for Public Higher Education: 1976-1993 (Normal, 
Illinois: Unpublished Data). 
^®°U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education 
Statistics 1991, pages 296-7, 
^®^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid: 1980 to 1989 
(Washington, D.C.: College Board Publications, 1989), page 13. 
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per year real growth of the Carter era (see Figure 
1)^ 282 This decline in the growth of state support 
for public higher education reflected the decline in 
total state expenditures in real dollars^®^ which was 
caused primarily by the cutbacks in federal aid to 
state governments and by the negative impact on state 
revenues of the national recession. One of the major 
consequences of this decline in the rate of growth of 
state support to public higher education was the 
significant increase in the cost of attendance that was 
used to offset the declines in the rate of state 
support. This replacement of state dollars with 
student dollars had a negative impact on access to 
public higher education institutions. During this 
period of less than 1% per year real growth in state 
support the average cost of attendance of public higher 
education rose an average of 5.4% per year in real 
dollars (13% in nominal) a steep rate of increase 
especially during one of the most serious recessions 
since the Great Depression (see Figure 6.2). And a 
^®^Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations. 
^®^U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(various years) (Washington, D.C.: GPO) 
^®^U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education 
Statistics 1991, page 296. 
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significant decline in student financial aid compounded 
the negative impact on access of the decline in the 
rate of state support and the increased cost of 
attendance. During the three year period 1981-1984 
total state, federal and institutional financial aid 
declined at a rate of 3.5% per year in real dollars 
(see Figure 6.3). This decline in total financial aid 
was entirely attributable to declines in federal 
financial aid. During the three year period federal 
financial aid declined at a rate of 5.4% per year in 
real dollars. Though states and institutions increased 
slightly their financial aid in an attempt to 
compensate for the federal reductions, the 80% federal 
share of total financial aid made these compensation 
efforts ineffective (see Figure 6.4). In addition the 
percentage of total financial aid available in loans as 
opposed to grants rose from 40.4% in 1981 to 47% in 
1984 indicating that not only was the total amount of 
aid declining in real dollars but a significant 
proportion of available aid was being reallocated from 
grants to loans.This combination of high 
increases in tuition and fees and significant decreases 
in financial aid, both happening during a severe 
2®^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid, pages 7-9. 
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- recession, put a tremendous strain on the accessibility 
of the public higher education institutions. 
1984-1988: The Growth Era 
During the growth period of the Reagan presidency 
the plight of public higher education eased, though 
only slightly. During this period state appropriations 
for public higher education increased at an average 
rate of 3.6% per year in real dollars.^®® This was 
primarily because state expenditures increased at an 
average rate of 5% per year in real dollars.As a 
result of the increased state appropriations for public 
higher education the increase in the average cost of 
attendance eased. During the period 1984-1988 the 
average cost of attendance at institutions of public 
higher education increased by an average of 4.8% per 
year in real dollars (8% nominal) More 
importantly concerning access during this period the 
level of total financial aid increased an average of 
4.6% per year in real dollars including a 3.5% increase 
per year in real dollars of federal aid. The 
^®®The Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations. 
^®’U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(various years). 
2®®U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education 
Statistics 1991, page 296. 
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reallocation from grants to loans did continue, though 
at a slower pace so that by 1988 loans represented 52% 
of the total aid.^®^ 
1988-1993: The Aftermath 
During the aftermath of the Reagan presidency the 
situation began to deteriorate for public higher 
education. Between FY 1988-91 state support for public 
higher education grew at an average rate of less than 
1% per year in real dollars.This was despite the 
fact that state expenditures continued to grow at an 
average rate of 5% per year in real dollars during the 
same period.During this same period the cost of 
attendance rose an average of 1.8% per year in real 
dollars^^^ but total financial aid declined slightly 
in real dollars.Between 1991-1993 things have 
gotten even worse. During these past two years state 
support for public higher education has declined an 
2®^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid, page 9. 
^®°The Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations. 
^®^U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(various years). 
^^^U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education 
Statistics 1991, page 296. 
^®^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid, page 9. 
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average of 3.75% per year in real dollars^^^ while the 
cost of attendance has increased at an average rate of 
8% per year in real dollars.And between FY 1991- 
1992 (FY 1993 data not yet available) total financial 
aid increased only 5% in real dollars.During the 
entire period of FY 1988-1993 total state support for 
public higher education declined 4.4% in real dollars 
while the cost of attendance increased 22.4% in real 
dollars and total available financial aid between FY 
1988-1992 increased 10% in real dollars. 
Overall during the period FY 1981-1993 total state 
support for public higher education increased 12% in 
real dollars or 1% per year in real dollars, while the 
cost of attendance increased 69% in real dollars or 
5.7% per year in real dollars. During the period FY 
1981-1992 total available financial aid increased 12.8% 
in real dollars or 1.2% per year in real dollars while 
the percentage of total aid available in the forms of 
loans increased from 40.4% to 49%. 
Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations. 
^^^Jean Evangelauf, "Tuition at Public Colleges is Up 10% This 
year. College Board Study Finds," Chronicle of Higher Education, 
21 October 1992, page A36. 
^^®The College Board, Trends in Student Aid; 1982-1992 
(Washington, D.C.: College Board Publications, 1992), page 4. 
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Case Studies 
In order to further illustrate this relationship 
between Reaganomics, state financing of public higher 
education, the cost of attendance, financial aid, and 
access to the institutions three states are briefly 
examined: California;, Massachusetts; and New York. 
California 
Setting 
When Reagan proposed in 1981 his initial plan for 
reductions in federal aid to state governments 
California was already in serious financial difficulty. 
The huge impact on California state finances of the 
1978 passage of a property tax limitation initiative 
called Proposition 13 had already taken hold. At the 
time of the passage of Proposition 13 the state had 
accumulated a surplus of nearly $5 billion. During the 
first three years after Proposition 13 these funds were 
used to replace the immediate 60% decline in property 
tax revenue as a result of the referendum. As a 
result, a substantial increase in the responsibility of 
the state for funding local services shifted from local 
governments to the state government without additional 
revenues to compensate. And when three other 
initiatives were passed: limits on expenditures 
(Proposition 4, 1979); indexing of the personal income 
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tax (Proposition 1, 1982); and the abolishment of the 
inheritance tax (Proposition 6, 1982)^^'^ even a bigger 
burden was placed on the California state government. 
Because of the impact of these initiatives on 
California state government finances, the Reagan cuts 
seemed minor in comparison. These initiatives reduced 
revenues available to California state, county and 
local governments by $14 billion in 1982-83, more than 
twice the amount of the nationwide reductions in 
intergovernmental aid that occurred between 1981- 
82.^^® By the Fall of 1982 the surplus was gone 
and the state was faced with falling tax revenue as a 
result of the initiatives and the onset of the national 
recession. 
Reagan Cuts and the California State Response 
This decline in tax revenue was placing a 
tremendous strain on state finances that was only 
compounded by the reductions of federal aid that had 
already begun to decline under Carter and now increased 
dramatically under the first Reagan federal budget. 
The projected deficit for the FY 1982 state budget was 
^^’Richard Nathan et al, Reagan and the States, (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), page 332. 
^®®Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 3 50. 
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$2.8 billion.Overall, state revenues came in 
well below projected levels for three continuous years. 
And the scale of the shortfalls dwarfed the size of the 
federal reductions. The California revenue shortfalls 
in 1981-83 were ten times as large as their reductions 
in federal aid indicating that the primary 
responsibility for the financial problems facing the 
state were the shifting of responsibility from local 
governments to the state government as a result of 
Proposition 13 and the national recession which caused 
significant declines in state tax revenues. 
In this context it is clear why the Reagan 
reductions received little public attention in 
California and why state officials ratified the cuts in 
federal aid without much public response. The state 
austerity measures and tax increases implemented to 
deal with this budget deficit and that projected for FY 
1983 were so large that the Reagan reductions seemed 
somewhat insignificant. Over $1 billion in services 
was cut and a revenue raising package of nearly $800 
million was enacted for FY 1983.^°° The FY 1983 
budget represented the first time since 1943 that the 
^®®Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 335. 
^°°Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 350. 
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total state spending would be less than the previous 
year. 
By the time planning for the FY 1984 budget 
occurred the national economic recovery was underway 
and the resulting increase in state revenues combined 
with the increased revenues from the tax increase 
brought the state finances back into balance and even 
allowed limited spending to be restored. The FY 1985- 
89 budgets were all growth budgets so the increased 
revenue as a result of the increased economic activity 
enabled the state to meet spending levels with no 
general tax increases. However, the reductions in the 
level of federal funds needed to maintain current level 
of services continued, shifting more responsibility 
from the federal government to the state government. 
Overall, during the period 1982-1987 California lost 
over $13 billion in federal funding needed to maintain 
pre Reagan service levels, a drop of 16%.^°^ 
In January 1987 the first alarms were sounded 
about shrinking state revenues. A $1 billion reserve 
fund accumulated during the growth years was drained 
^°^New York Times, 5 March 1982, page 1. 
^“^American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, The Republican Record: A 7-Year Analysis of Stat^ 
Losses of Federal Funding (FY 1982 - FY 1988) (Washington, D.C.: 
AFSCME), Tables. 
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and the state was predicting a $500 million revenue 
shortfall for FY 1987.^°^ In response the state 
raised taxes approximately $1 billion for FY 1988. But 
by January, 1989 state economic growth had slowed and 
revenues began to drop off again. And in the spring of 
1991 in the planning for the FY 1992 budget things got 
much worse. The gap between projected revenues and 
expenditures had reached $12.6 billion, or 23% of the 
total state budget. In response the states enacted a 
tax increase that included raising the sales tax and 
the income tax for taxpayers with incomes of more than 
$200,000 which generated $7.3 billion in taxes. At the 
same time the legislature cut another $5 billion from 
spending programs. Still, this wasn't enough. The FY 
1993 budget was projected to be another $10.7 billion 
in the red and there seemed no political will to 
further raise taxes. Instead, after tremendous 
political upheaval in the state government draconian 
spending cuts were made, deeply affecting both social 
services and education. 
Impact on California Public Higher Education 
State funding for public higher education in 
California reflected this trend of initial decrease. 
^°^New York Times, 18 January 1987, page 23. 
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significant increase, and then dramatic decrease. 
Between FY 1981-84 state funding for public higher 
education declined a total of 16% in real dollars or an 
average of slightly more than 5% per year in real 
dollars. During the period FY 1984-89 public higher 
education in California received an increase of 40% in 
the real dollars of their state appropriation, or an 
average of 8% per year in real dollars. But from FY 
1989 to FY 1993 state appropriations dropped 23% in 
real dollars, or an average of 5.75% per year in real 
dollars and show no signs of levelling off. Overall, 
between FY 1981 and FY 1993 California state funding 
for public higher education had declined a total of 
9.4% in real dollars (see Figure 6.5).^°^ While this 
decrease, increase and then decrease was going on in 
appropriations, the cost to attend California public 
higher education institutions was following the same 
pattern. Using the "flagship" campus of the public 
higher education system, the University of California 
at Berkeley, as the gauge, between FY 1981-1984 the 
cost of attendance increased 44% in real dollars or an 
average of 14.6% per year in real dollars. Then during 
the period FY 1984-1989 the cost of attendance actually 
Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations. 
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declined by 3.8% in real dollars. But during the 
period FY 1989-1993 the cost of attendance again 
increased, this time by 64% in real dollars or an 
average of 16% per year in real dollars. Overall, from 
FY 1981-93 the increase in cost was 126% in real 
dollars (see Figure 6.6). 
Massachusetts 
Setting 
When Reagan took office in January, 1981 the 
Massachusetts state economy was in relatively good 
health and had been so during the late 1970s. During 
the recessions of 1969-70 and 1973-75 the state was hit 
harder than most, the first time because of Vietnam war 
era defense cutbacks and the second time because of the 
state's 80% dependence on foreign oil for its energy 
needs. But each time the state economy rebounded 
strongly. In the late 1970s Massachusetts joined 
California as a leader in the national "tax revolt." 
In November, 1980, along with the election of Ronald 
Reagan, a property tax-limitation referendum. 
Proposition 2 1/2 won overwhelming approval. This 
referendum severely cutback property tax revenues thus 
placing a tremendous strain on local governments who 
turned to the state for increased local aid. The state 
government provided this help by making program cuts in 
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other areas of the budget and using the saved revenue 
to increase state aid to local governments. This 
increase in local aid came on top of an already 
increasing state appropriation for such aid. Total 
direct state aid to local governments increased from 
$871 million in FY 1978 to $1,288 billion in FY 1981. 
After Proposition 2 1/2 the aid increased to $1,539 
billion in FY 1983, $1,696 billion in FY 1983 and 
$1,827 billion in FY 1984.^°= 
Reagan Cuts and the Massachusetts State Response 
During the period FY 1982-1987 Massachusetts state 
government lost more than $3.4 billion in federal 
funding needed to maintain pre-Reagan service levels, a 
drop of 19.5%.^°^ More than most states, 
Massachusetts chose to cushion the impact of Reagan's 
federal grant reductions by replacing them with state 
funds. However, this response varied significantly by 
grant type. 
The state ratified most of the cuts in entitlement 
programs resulting from changes in federal eligibility 
requirements. This peimiitted the government to drop 
^°®Nathan, Reagan and the States, pages 139-141. 
^°®AFSCME, The Republican Record, tables. 
^“"'Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 138. 
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individuals from AFDC, Medicaid and food stamp programs 
so between 1982-83 the AFDC caseload in Massachusetts 
declined by 27%, resulting in a drop in spending of 16% 
in one year. Though the state did increase the clothing 
allowances given beneficiaries these allocations were 
small relative to the cut in federal appropriation. As 
a result of the drop in AFDC cases the Medicaid 
caseload also dropped 10% between 1981-1983 because a 
substantial part of the Medicaid cost is for AFDC 
recipients who are automatically eligible for 
Medicaid. 
Massachusetts funding for the new health, social 
service, and employment and training block grants all 
declined between 10% and 46%. Given the opportunity of 
more control inherent in the block grant format the 
state government took over the authority for three of 
the four health block grants, the community services 
block grant, the elementary and secondary education 
block grant and the new job training programs. 
Massachusetts chose to replace a larger proportion of 
these federal cuts than it did in the entitlement 
programs, but did not replace all the cuts. The most 
significant replacement effort was for social services 
^°®Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 142. 
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programs. In some cases funding for these programs was 
actually increased on top of replacement of lost 
federal funds. In FY 1983 the state replaced more of 
the federal cuts including appropriations for maternal 
and child health programs. But there was no 
replacement effort in community services or employment 
and training programs . 
In Massachusetts subsidized housing programs were 
the most seriously affected capital programs by the 
Reagan budget cuts. Subsidized housing funds to 
Massachusetts shrank by 46% in FY 82 and in 1983 were 
still 39% below the pre-Reagan levels. The state did 
attempt to replace and even augment some of the 
subsidized housing funding but was not able to replace 
all of the reduction in federal funds. 
In FY 1984 the economy recovered and the state 
budget regained its good health. Things were going so 
well that between FY 1985 and FY 1986 the state 
legislature reduced the income tax from 5.375% to 5.0%. 
This resulted in a loss of $400 million in revenue 
which was made up by the growth in tax revenues due to 
3”Nathan, Reagan and the States, pages 148-151. 
^^°Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 155. 
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the economic expansion underway.This expansion 
continued until halfway through FY 1988 (in the midst 
of the Presidential campaign) when revenues began to 
drop. To help compensate in FY 1989 a $2 64 million tax 
increase on tobacco and cigarettes was enacted. But 
this was only a fraction of what was needed because 
soon state tax revenues were in a virtual freefall. 
The FY 1990 budget was passed with an income tax hike 
to cover the previous year's deficit but the budget was 
soon out of balance and a series of mid-year spending 
reductions were implemented. In FY 1990 total state 
revenues were nearly $1 billion less than the previous 
year. For FY 1991 a $1.2 billion tax increase was 
passed but this still didn't stem the tide of declining 
revenues so more spending cuts were made during the 
early months of FY 1991. However, in Fall, 1990 the 
Massachusetts population sent a mixed message when they 
elected a new Governor who campaigned on a no new taxes 
pledge but rejected a income tax rollback initiative by 
a 60-40% margin. But, regardless, a $1 billion budget 
gap for FY 1992 was met entirely through spending 
^^^Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, State Budget Trends; 
1979-1988, (Boston: Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, 1987), 
page 6-7. 
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reductions putting tremendous strain on social services 
and education. 
Impact on Massachusetts Public Higher Education 
State funding for public higher education in 
Massachusetts maintained a steady growth throughout the 
Reagan administration peaking in FY 1988. Between FY 
1981 and FY 1988 Massachusetts state funding for public 
higher education doxibled in real dollars, an average of 
14% growth per year in real dollars (see Figure 
6.7).^^^ During this period the cost of attending the 
"flagship" campus of the Massachusetts system, the 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, increased 33% 
in real dollars or an average of 4.6% per year in real 
dollars (see Figure 6.8).^^^ 
However, when the Massachusetts economic boom 
peaked in FY 1988 funding for public higher education 
began a long decline that left it near the real dollar 
value of the appropriation at the beginning of the 
Reagan term. Between Fy 1988-1992 Massachusetts state 
appropriations for public higher education declined 44% 
in real dollars or an average of 11% per year in real 
Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations 
^^^University of Massachusetts, FACTBOOK (various years) 
(Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts). 
226 
dollars.To accentuate this decline in state 
support the cost of attendance during this same period 
increased dramatically. Between FY 1988-1992 the cost 
of attendance of the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst increased 105% in real dollars or an increase 
of 26% per year in real dollars. In addition, during 
the period FY 1988-1992 state financial aid was 




New York has historically had a strong commitment 
to high government spending, high taxes, and state- 
mandated public services programs. This comes from a 
liberal political culture that values the role of the 
public sector in aiding those in need. Spending for 
the needy is among the most generous in the nation, the 
multibillion dollar public higher education system 
receives strong bipartisan support, and most laws 
concerning special education services, preventive 
mental health services protective and health care 
Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations. 
^^^The Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations. 
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services for the children and elderly are much more 
comprehensive than federal programs. During the 1950s 
New York's government expenditures and taxes per capita 
were the highest in the nation. But income in the 
state was also high; tax burden as measured by the 
ratio of revenues to personal income was lower than in 
many states, exceeding the national average by only 
16%. 
However, in the mid-1960s growth in spending, 
especially to assist low-income people, exceeded the 
growth of the economy. By 1975 not only were taxes per 
capita the highest in the nation, but the tax burden 
was also the highest, 36% above the national average. 
This caused the era of rising spending to come to an 
end and during the 1975 New York City fiscal crisis 
state finances grew suspect as well. A new governor 
argued that high taxes were driving business out of the 
states and thereby contributed to the deterioration in 
the tax base. Therefore, the fiscal crisis of 1975 
essentially served the same function as the 
constitutional and statutory tax and expenditure 
limitations instituted in California and Massachusetts. 
It encouraged lower income tax rates and cuts in the 
^^®Nathan, Reagan and the States, pages 169 172. 
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growth of spending. Between 1975 and 1981 revenues 
decreased in real dollars due to reductions in personal 
and business taxes and the slow growth in the economy. 
But expenditures, though growing much less than before, 
still remained relatively unchanged in real dollars. 
This resulted in deficits and in 1981 the need to 
borrow over $3 billion. So, when Reagan proposed his 
reductions in federal aid in 1981 the New York state 
budget was already extremely tight. 
Reagan Cuts and New York State Response 
In 1980-81, just prior to the Reagan initiative, 
federal grants to New York State amounted to $6.7 
billion, 24% of state expenditures. Federal grants 
directly to New York local governments amounted to $1.8 
billion, or 5% of their expenditures.^^® New York 
lost $12.5 billion in federal grants-in-aid during the 
Reagan Administration from the levels of funding needed 
to maintain pre-Reagan service levels.®^® When the 
cuts were announced then Governor Carey reluctantly 
proposed an increase in the sales tax and other 
miscellaneous taxes. But the option of raising any 
^^^Nathan, Reagan and the States, pages 172-173. 
^^®Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 174. 
319AFSCME, The Republican Record, Tables. 
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taxes, including the sales tax, was rejected by the 
legislature.^^® However, the legislature, while 
rejecting the tax increases continued to add to 
expenditures which made the 81-82 recession a further 
strain on the budget. When Governor Cuomo took office 
in 1983 the deficit was estimated at $1.8 billion, the 
largest in state history. Because of the scope of this 
internal state finance problem the cuts in federal aid 
proposed by Reagan, although significant for the state 
budget, received little attention. 
Even though little public attention was focused on 
the impact of the Reagan cuts the state did move to 
compensate for them. Compensation tended to occur 
mostly in programs that were structured to 
automatically fill gaps in federal support as in the 
case of AFDC and compensatory education aid. 
Compensation also occurred in programs offering 
mechanisms for replacing federal cuts without enacting 
special legislation. These mechanisms were crucial in 
replacing cuts in the social services block grant, 
where state mandates permitted the state and localities 
to finance services after the block grants were 
^^°Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 173. 
^^^Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 174. 
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exhausted. This made the impact of the 1981 cuts 
important not so much for any reordering of 
intergovernmental relationships between New York and 
Washington, but rather for the reinforcing of those 
characteristics of big state government and liberalism 
that had long existed in the state.However, in 
the face of the severe 1981-82 recession and budget 
deficit already facing the state,these 
compensatory actions placed additional strain on the 
state budget so that taxes were raised $900 million to 
balance for the FY 1984 state budget. 
Economic recovery began in earnest in late 1983 so 
the combination of this tax increase and spurred 
economic growth led to significant increases in state 
revenues for FY 1984. This led to increased spending 
and a three-year tax cut, with the FY 1987 budget still 
ending with a substantial surplus. This situation 
reflected the national economy's recovery that had 
pulled out of recession in FY 1983 and continued 
through FY 1987. However in January, 1988 the state 
growth slowed substantially and the state was faced 
^^^Nathan, Reagan and the States, pages 206-207. 
^^^Nathan, Reagan and the States, page 174. 
^^^New York Times, 19 March 1983, page 1. 
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with a budget gap of nearly $2 billion. By May, 1988 
revenues had dropped even more and even before the ink 
had dried on the FY 1989 budget it was thought to be 
out of balance, resulting in large spending reductions. 
But by January, 1990 revenues had fallen so much that 
planning for the FY 1991 state budget entailed closing 
a $4 billion gap. To do so the state legislature 
passed the FY 1991 budget with the largest tax increase 
in New York state history; $1.4 billion plus a deferral 
of a planned $400 million income tax cut, in addition 
to making deep cuts in social spending. But this still 
did not stem the erosion of revenues. During late FY 
1991 deficit projections for FY 1992 reached $6 billion 
or 20% of the state budget. And even after 
unprecedented spending reductions and another $1.2 
billion in tax increases the state revenues continued 
to fall resulting in a new deficit for FY 1993. 
Impact on New York Public Higher Education 
State funding for public higher education in New 
York, like Massachusetts, maintained a steady rate of 
growth throughout the Reagan years. Between FY 1981-89 
New York state funding for public higher education 
increased 29% in real dollars or an average increase of 
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3.5% per year in real dollars (see Figure 6.9).^^^ 
During this period the average cost of attendance at 
the State University of New York at Albany increased a 
total of 2% in real dollars (see Figure 6.10).^^® 
However, like Massachusetts, when the economic growth 
period ended in 1988 funding for public higher 
education in New York dropped significantly. Between 
FY 1989-1993 state support declined 24% in real dollars 
or an average of 6% per year in real dollars. In 
addition, the cost of attending SUNY/Albany during this 
period increased 67% in real dollars or an average of 
16.8% per year in real dollars. At the same time state 
financial aid increased a total of 2.7% in real dollars 
or an average of .7% per year in real dollars. 
Conclusion 
The’ national data indicates that when state 
governments were placed in serious financial 
difficulties by changes in federal policies during the 
years of the Reagan administration the burden on the 
Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations. 
^^®State University of New York at Albany Student Accounts 
Office, unpublished data. 
^^■'The Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations. 
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states to fund public higher education became very 
difficult. However, the three case studies show that 
there were differences in the impact on individual 
states and the response of their 
governments. As Arthur Hauptman in The College Tuition 
Spiral points out: 
...a state's ability to fund higher education 
may be constrained by increased competition 
between higher education and other state 
priorities brought about by changing federal 
priorities... that lead to more state 
responsibility for functions previously 
performed at the local level. 
What also becomes clear from examining this data is 
that when the rate of growth in state support for 
public higher education declined the rate of growth in 
the cost of attendance increased. These findings are 
consistent with previous research conducted on this 
issue. 
The replacement of lost state higher education 
support with tuition and fee dollars is explored by 
Hauptman in his article "Trends in the Federal and 
State Financial Commitment to Higher Education". 
Hauptman writes that the way in which states provide 
funding for higher education has a "large and inverse" 
impact on the rate of increase in the cost of 
^^®Arthur M. Hauptman, The College Tuition Spiral (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), pages 14-15. 
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attendance that public institutions charge their 
students. This, he argues, is because the revenue from 
tuition and mandatory fees at public higher education 
institutions are generally used to fill the gap between 
state appropriations and the size of institutional 
budgets. So when state funds increase rapidly, the 
cost of attendance tends to increase less since there 
is a smaller gap to fill between state funding and 
institutional spending levels. When the growth of 
state funds slows, then the cost of attendance tends to 
increase faster to make up for the larger difference 
between institutional budgets and state funds. 
Hauptman writes that since the extent of state funds 
available to public higher education is tied in a 
direct way to the state economy there is a "disturbing" 
relationship between changes in economic conditions and 
increases in cost of attendance. When economic 
conditions are bad a state cannot afford to increase or 
even maintain institutional budgets so the cost of 
attendance rises faster. As the economy improves, 
state funding increases so cost of attendance increases 
slow down. Hauptman finds that this is what happened 
in the 1980s. When the economy went into recession in 
the early 1980s and state resources were scarce the 
cost of attendance skyrocketed. When the economy 
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recovered in the mid-1980s the cost of attendance 
increases at public institutions eased. Hauptman 
argues that this runs counter to what the policy should 
be. He explains that students are asked to pay the 
highest cost of attendance increases when times are 
good and the least increase when they can least afford 
them, when economic conditions are bad.^^^ These 
findings were confirmed by Mcpherson et al in an 
empirical analysis found in their article "Recent 
Trends in U.S. Higher Education Costs and Prices: The 
Role of Government Funding 
The relationship between decreases in state 
financing of public higher education and increases in 
the cost of attendance, linked to the earlier 
established relationship between federal economic 
policies and state finances, provides the basis for the 
argument put forth in this dissertation. 
^^^Arthur M. Hauptman, "Trends in the Federal and State 
Financial Commitment to Higher Education," in The Uneasy Public 
Policy Triangle in Higher Education: Quality, Efficiency and 
Budgetary Efficiency, David H. Finifter, Roger G. Baldwin, and 
John R. Thelin eds. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1991): pages 124-125. 
^^°Michael S. McPherson, Morton Owen Schapiro, and Gordon C. 
Winston, "Recent Trends in U.S. Higher Education Costs and Prices: 
The Role of Government Funding," AEA Papers and Proceedings 79 
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This concluding chapter has two objectives. The 
first is to present a summary of the findings of this 
study in terms of Reaganomics, its impact on state 
finances, and the subsequent impact on state financing 
and the cost of attendance of public higher education. 
The second is to offer thoughts on the implications of 
these findings for future state funding and access of 
public higher education. 
Summary of Findings 
This study makes clear that Reaganomics was 
developed and implemented based on the faulty 
assumption that taxes could be cut, the needy 
protected, military spending increased and the budget 
balanced. This study further demostrates that the 
economic forecasts used to argue this plan's validity 
were false. This was due to a combination of 
incompetence on the behalf of members of the 
administration developing these forecasts and 
deliberate deception by others interested in ulterior 
agendas. 
During the years of the Reagan administration and 
the term of George Bush that succeeded it the national 
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During the years of the Reagan administration and 
the term of George Bush that succeeded it the national 
economy followed a pattern of first a severe recession 
in 1981-1982, then sustained growth from 1983-89 and 
then stagnation and recession between 1990-92. 
However, throughout the entire period of 1981-92 the 
federal deficit kept growing. This was primarily a 
result of the faulty economic forecasts that ended up 
over $660 billion off in projected revenues during the 
period FY 1982-87.^^^ 
The Reagan administration was, however, somewhat 
successful in three of its major goals: to cut income 
tax levels; to cut the growth in domestic spending; and 
to increase military spending. During the first year 
of the Reagan administration personal income tax rates 
were cut dramatically and though many other federal 
taxes increased during the Reagan and Bush 
administrations, these individual income tax levels 
remained below the levels when Reagan took office. 
Spending growth throughout the FY 1982-87 term of the 
Reagan administration was cut 10% and even though this 
^^^David Stockman, Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan 
Revolution Failed, (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), page 399. 
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was only half of what Reagan proposed, it was still 
a significant curtailment of the growth in spending. 
Military spending was also increased significantly 
during the Reagan administration, rising an average of 
6.3% per year in real dollars before peaking in FY 
1989. 
The impact of these economic policies on state 
government finances was significant in two major ways: 
the substantial reduction in federal aid to state 
governments during the initial phase of the 
implementation of Reaganomics; and the transferring of 
responsibility for certain social services from the 
federal government to state governments, particularly 
in the Medicaid program. 
Reagan was very successful at cutting federal aid 
to state governments during the initial phase of his 
administration. As explained earlier, in the first 
budget of the Reagan administration total federal 
grants to state and local government were cut by 13.1% 
from baseline levels. When Congress passed a modified 
version of the Reagan proposed legislation that 
consolidated 57 categorical grants into nine new, or 
^^^William Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the 
Policies and the People, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988), page 9. 
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modified, block grants at a budget authority of 
approximately $7.5 billion, it represented a cut of 
approximately 25% or almost 33% in real terms, from the 
previous year's authorization.Overall funding for 
federal aid to state and local governments dropped 
sharply in the first Reagan budget, $6.6 billion in 
current dollars or $9 billion in real terms (12%), the 
first annual drop in nominal terms in more than 25 
years. 
It is also important to note that the reductions 
in funding for the programs grouped in the block grants 
fell disproportionately on the poor. Cuts in 
entitlement programs, public service jobs, community 
service programs, aid to large cities, aid to schools 
serving low-income student in large cities, and housing 
assistance affected the poor more than any other 
economic group.Half of the reduction for FY 1982 
was in the education, training and employment and 
social services category. 
^^^Scott Matheson, Out of Balance, (Salt Lake City, Utah: 
Peregring Smith Books, 1986), pages 22-24. 
^^^Richard P. Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle, and Associates, 
Reagan and the States, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), page 65. 
^^^John C. Weicher, "The Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts: 
Proposals, Outcomes, and Effects," in Essays in Contemporary 
Economic Problems, 1986: The Impact of the Reagan Program, pp. 
7-44, edited by Phillip Cagan, (Washington, D.C.: American 
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By the end of the Reagan administration grant-in- 
aid cuts to state and local governments totalled $123.6 
billion from baseline levels (16.5%).^^® This 
reduction also contributed to the decrease in the share 
of federal aid in state spending from 25% in the late 
1970s to 17% in FY 1991. Though it was the hope of the 
Reagan administration that these reductions in federal 
aid to state governments would enlist the states in 
Reagan's efforts to retrench social spending across the 
board, there was a large degree of replacement of 
federal funds with state funds by state governments, 
despite the severe 1981-1982 recession. However, it 
was also clear that when the states became reliant on 
their own funds, they would select very different 
budget priorities from those chosen in the past with 
federal aid as an incentive. These state responses to 
federal aid cutbacks depended primarily on the 
political and economic climate of the particular state. 
In supportive political environments (pro-social 
programs) and supportive economic culture (where the 
state's economy and finances were strong enough to 
Enterprise Institute, 1986), pages 25-27. 
^^®Artierican Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, The Republican Record: A 7-Year Analysis of State 
Losses of Federal Fundino (FY 1982 - FY 1988) (Washington, D.C.: 
AFSCME), page 2. 
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permit replacement efforts) more federal aid was 
replaced. Another aspect of the replacement effort 
also was clear: the stronger the redistributive purpose 
of a given program and the more a program was targeted 
for the poor the less likely it would be protected, 
even though these programs were more likely to be cut 
by the federal government. This became most 
evident in the entitlement programs. The replacement 
of federal cuts by state governments was the greatest 
in programs that historically were areas of the most 
state and local activity and where organized and 
politically active local constituencies cared about the 
activities. So, even though states attempted to 
replace federal aid reductions, they aimed their 
replacement efforts at those with the most political 
clout. This served to affect the poor the most 
severely. 
The will of states to replace federal aid 
unfortunately coincided with a sharp decline in the 
growth of state tax revenues as a result of the 1981- 
1982 recession. As documented earlier, between FY 
1979-1981 state tax revenues grew by 3.9% in real 
terms. Between FY 1981-1982 state tax revenues 
^^■'Nathan et al, Reagan and the States, page 112. 
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actually declined slightly in real terms.This 
combination of increased spending responsibilities and 
decreased tax revenues put a severe strain on state 
budgets. In January 1983, 41 of the 50 states faced 
revenue shortfalls totalling $8 billion. As a result, 
two-thirds of the states were forced to reduce spending 
in mid-year to less than the originally appropriated 
levels for the 1982 fiscal year. To compensate, in FY 
1982 and 1983, 44 states raised taxes and revenue 
raising measures were again implemented by many states 
in fiscal 1984.^^^ As a result, between FY 1982-1983 
state tax revenues increased 3.5% in real terms. 
When the economic recovery began to take hold in 1983 
these new taxes brought in substantial new 
revenues.Tax revenues of states between FY 1983- 
1984 increased 6.5% followed by a 6.3% increase in FY 
1985 and 6.9% in FY 1986.^^^ What makes these tax 
Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(various years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO). 
^^^Scott M. Matheson, "The Federal Budget Deficit: Impact on 
the States," in Facing the Facts: The Democratic Governors' View^ 
From the States, ed. Bernard Aronson (Washington, D.C.: Democratic 
Governors' Association, 1984), page 93. 
^^°U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(various years)., (Washington, D.C.: GPO). 
^^^Weicher, "Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts," page 34. 
^^^U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(various years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO). 
253 
increases even more significant was that they were 
passed in the midst of a strong tax-limitation movement 
that was thriving in states across the country. It is 
likely that state governments used significant amounts 
of political capital to pass these tax increases. 
Throughout the 1980s another important factor was 
at work that deeply affected state finances: rising 
health care costs. In contrast to the stated goals of 
the Reagan administration to devolute policy making 
responsibility from the federal government to state 
governments, Medicaid policy making shifted 
disproportionately the federal government which then 
passed on new mandates to the states thus substantially 
increasing state funding responsibilities. Medicaid 
was designed originally as a partnership between the 
states and the federal government. However, during the 
1980s major unilateral changes in federal Medicaid 
requirements became more frequent. These changes often 
contained significant costs for the states to 
implement. Many states found it extremely difficult to 
finance the new conditions and requirements without 
raising taxes, shifting Medicaid resources by 
eliminating optional services or closing public 
clinics, or reducing other state spending (emphasis 
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added) Medicaid expenditures accounted for 14.8% 
of state general expenditures in 1990, up from 11.6% in 
1980 and 7.0% in 1970.^^'^ These increased health care 
costs contributed significantly to the financial 
difficulties of states in FY 1991-92.^^^ 
Still, the economic expansion of the mid 1980s 
enabled state governments to temporarily absorb these 
increased responsibilities. Between FY 1983-89 state 
tax revenues rose a total of 34.1% in real terms, an 
average of 5.7% per year in real terms. This compared 
to a 7.6% increase in real terms between 1979 and 1983, 
an annual average of 1.9% in real terms.This 
increased revenue served to gloss over the significant 
transformation in the relationship between federal and 
state government and the increased responsibilities 
taken on by the states. However, when the economic 
expansion ended in 1990 and recession took hold the 
structural changes in the federal-state relationship 
^^^Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
Medicaid: Intergovernmental Trends and Options (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1992), page 1. 
^’‘‘Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
Medicaid, page 2. 
^^^Edward M. Gramlich, "The 1991 State and Local Fiscal 
Crisis," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Volume 2 (1991): 
page 247. 
Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(Various Years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO). 
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crystallized and state governments were suddenly in 
deep financial difficulties. Between FY 1989-1990 
state tax revenues slowed to an increase of 3.5% in 
real terms and between FY 1990-1991 rose only 1.1% in 
real te2nns. At the same time state expenditures 
between FY 1989-1990 rose 4.8% in real terms and 
between FY 1990-1991 rose 6.3% in real terms.This 
significant increase in state spending was largely 
attributable to rising health care costs.By the 
middle of FY 1991 at least 30 states were facing 
serious budget shortfalls^^^ with the number rising to 
at least 37 states in FY 1992.^^° 
The distribution of tax responsibility also 
changed with spending responsibilities. Both state and 
local taxes rose in the 1980s compared to federal 
taxes. In 1987 states accounted for 26.1% of total tax 
revenue raised by all levels of government not counting 
trust funds suck as Social Security, up from 23.9% in 
Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(Various Years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO). 
^^®Gramlich, "The 1991 State and Local Fiscal Crisis," page 
247. 
^^®Larry Tye, "Downturn Forces Deficits in 30 States," Boston 
Globe, 23 November 1990, page 1. 
^®°Chronicle of Higher Education. 9 January 1991, page A20. 
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1980 and 20.6% in 1970.^^^ Much of this increase in 
state tax burden was in the form of personal income 
taxes which rose from 19.1% of state tax revenue in 
1970 to 3 0.8% of state tax revenue in 1987.^^^ This 
made it politically very difficult for states to raise 
taxes again to offset the budget deficits in 1991 and 
1992. 
These changes in state finances during the period 
FY 1982-1992 had a significant impact on state funding 
of public higher education and access to these 
institutions. The implementation of federal reductions 
in aid to state governments and the 1981-1982 recession 
led to significant cutbacks in state financing of 
public higher education. Between FY 1981-84 state 
appropriations for public higher education increased 
less than 1% per year in real terms, down from the 6% 
per year real growth during the Carter administration. 
One of the major consequences of this decline in the 
rate of growth of state funding of public higher 
education was the significant increase in the cost of 
attendance that was used to offset the declines in the 
^^^Steven Gold, "State Finances in the New Era of Fiscal 
Federalism," in The Changing Face of Fiscal Federalism, eds. 
Thomas R. Swartz and John E. Peck (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
1990), page 92. 
^^^Gold, "State Finances," page 93. 
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rate of state support. During this period of less than 
1% per year real growth in state support the average 
cost of attendance of public higher education rose an 
average of 5.4% per year in real terms (13% 
nominala steep rate of increase especially during 
one of the most serious recessions since the Great 
Depression. This replacement of state dollars with 
student dollars had a negative impact on access to 
public higher education institutions which was 
exacerbated by the simultaneous decline in available 
student financial aid. During the three year period FY 
1981-1984 total state, federal and institutional 
financial aid declined at a rate of 3.5% per year in 
real dollars. 
During the growth period, the impact of the Reagan 
program on public higher education was mitigated 
somewhat because state expenditures increased at an 
average rate of 5% per year in real dollars. 
During this period state appropriations for public 
higher education increased at an average rate of 3.6% 
^^^U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education 
Statistics 1991, (Washington, D.C.: GPO), page 296. 
^^^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid: 1980 to 1989, 
(Washington, D.C.: College Board Publications, 1989), pages 7-9. 
^®^U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(various years). 
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per year in real dollars.As a result of the 
increased state appropriations for public higher 
education the increase in the average cost of 
attendance also eased, though only slightly. During 
the period FY 1984-1988 the average cost of attendance 
at institutions of public higher education increased by 
an average of 4.8% per year in real dollars (8% 
nominal) More importantly concerning access 
during this period, the level of total financial aid 
increased an average of 4.6% per year in real dollars 
including a 3.5% increase per year in real dollars of 
federal aid.^^® 
In the aftermath of the Reagan presidency the 
situation deteriorated for public higher education. 
Between FY 1988-91 state support for public higher 
education grew at an average rate of less than 1% per 
year in real dollars.This was despite the fact 
that state expenditures grew at an average rate of 5% 
^^®Center for the Study of Higher Education State 
Appropriations for Public Higher Education; 1976-1993 (Normal, 
Illinois: Unpublished Data). 
^®’U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education 
Statistics 1991, page 296. 
358The College Board, Trends in Student Aid, page 9. 
^^^The Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations. 
259 
per year in real dollars during the same period.^®® 
During this same period the cost of attendance rose an 
average of 1.8% per year in real dollars^®^ while 
total financial aid declined slightly in real 
dollars.Between FY 1991-93 things became much 
worse. During these past two years state support for 
public higher education has declined an average of 
3.75% per year in real dollars^^^ while the cost of 
attendance has increased at an average rate of 8% per 
year in real terms.And between FY 1991-1992 (FY 
1993 data not yet available) total financial aid 
increased only 5% in real terms. 
Overall during the period FY 1981-1993 total state 
support for public higher education increased 12% in 
real dollars or 1% per year in real dollars, while the 
cost of attendance increased 69% in real dollars or 
Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances 
(various years). 
Department of Education, Digest of Education 
Statistics 1991, page 296, 
^®^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid, page 9. 
363The Center for the Study of Higher Education, State 
Appropriations. 
^^‘‘Jean Evangelauf, "Tuition at Public Colleges is Up 10% This 
year. College Board Study Finds," Chronicle of Higher Education, 
21 October 1992, page A36, 
^^^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid: 1982 to 1992, 
(Washington, D.C.: College Board Publications, 1992), page 1-9. 
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5.7% per year in real dollars. During the period FY 
1981-1992 total available financial aid increased 12.8% 
in real dollars or 1.2% per year in real dollars while 
the percentage of total aid available in the forms of 
loans increased from 40.4% to 49%. 
This national data indicates that when state 
governments were placed in serious financial 
difficulties by changes in federal policies during the 
early years of the Reagan administration the burden on 
the states to fund public higher education became very 
difficult. State increases in real funding for public 
higher education were limited to 1% per year while real 
increases in cost of attendance grew to 5.4% per year. 
When the economy recovered during the mid-1980s state 
finances also rebounded and using increased tax 
revenues from the recovery as well as from tax 
increases implemented before the recovery, states were 
able to handle the increased responsibilities and fund 
state public higher education at a reasonable rate of 
real growth. Real state funding grew by 3.6% per year 
while real cost increases averaged 4.8% per year. But 
when the economy slowed during the years immediately 
following the Reagan administration and state 
expenditures continued to rise due to increased state 
responsibilities, especially for Medicaid costs, public 
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6d.uca.tion funding slowed to nean zeno gnowth in 
real terms. And when the recession hit in FY 1991 
causing a slowdown in state revenues, the bottom fell 
out of state financing of public higher education. 
Real state support declined by 3.75% per year while the 
real cost of attendance increased 8% per year. 
These findings are consistent with previous 
research which found that a state's ability to fund 
higher education may be constrained by increased 
competition between higher education and other state 
priorities that was brought about by changing federal 
priorities. 
Implications of These Findings for Future State 
Financing and Accessibility of Public Higher Education 
The findings of this study have significant 
implications for the understanding of future state 
financing and accessibility of public higher education 
because they clearly establish the relationship between 
federal economic policies, state finances, state 
financing of public higher education, and access to 
public higher education. Because of these 
relationships it becomes clear that the future levels 
of state financing of public higher education and 
^®®Arthur M. Hauptman, The College Tuition Spiral (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), pages 14-15. 
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access to these institutions will depend greatly on the 
economic policies of the Clinton administration. 
Obviously the general recovery of the national 
economy, whether brought about by Clinton's economic 
policies or other economic variables, will go far in 
the restoration of real growth in state funding of 
public higher education. An economic recovery will 
likely lead to increased economic activity on the state 
level and, therefore, increased tax revenues. However, 
it is important to note that an economic recovery will 
likely not entirely solve state governments' financial 
problems. The findings of this study show that the 
rising cost to state government for health care has 
played a major role in state financial difficulties 
between FY 1989-1993. This indicates that in order to 
solve state government financial difficulties 
significant health care reform must accompany any 
economic recovery. The fact that state expenditures 
continued to rise at a significant rate during the Bush 
Administration while state funding levels for public 
higher education lagged well behind indicates the 
consuming nature of rising health care costs and their 
direct impact on public higher education. This finding 
increases the urgency of the effort by the Clinton 
administration to reform health care. Clinton spoke 
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often during the presidential campaign of the 
tremendous strain of rising health care costs on state 
government finances. And since becoming President he 
has demonstrated his understanding of the importance of 
health care reform in restoring financial health to 
state governments. However intent is different than 
success and it remains to be seen how successful his 
health care reform efforts are (if at all). However, 
there can be no doubt that lessening this health care 
burden on state governments will go far in freeing 
state funds that could be used for public higher 
education. 
Still, even if this money is freed it remains to 
be seen whether states will actually respond by 
increasing their funding of public higher education. 
The fact that the growth of state funding for public 
higher education has lagged behind the growth in state 
expenditures during the past few years likely reflects 
the growing movement towards "privatization" of public 
services. The concept of privatization has taken root 
in many corners of the country and has contributed to 
the significant increases in the cost of attendance of 
public higher education. Whether this rush to 
privatization represents an ideological shift in state 
government or a tactic to deal with severe financial 
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constraints on state governments will only be known 
when the financial pressure on state government eases. 
However, the fact that despite significant increases in 
the rate of state spending on public higher education 
during the mid 1980s the growth in the cost of 
attendance only eased slightly indicates that 
privatization has a deeper hold in state politics than 
otherwise thought. 
The other issue concerning access that must be 
addressed is the impact of the growth in the cost of 
attendance on the economic background of those students 
able to attend institutions of public higher education. 
Data is difficult to obtain on the economic background 
of students as only those applying for financial aid 
are required to submit financial information to public 
higher education institutions. This makes it difficult 
to gauge this impact. However, it seems reasonable to 
hypothesize that the combination of high increases in 
cost of attendance and lagging levels of financial aid 
has changed the economic composition of the student 
body of public higher education institutions. This 
question certainly deserves further study. 
Nevertheless, the findings of this study give much 
needed direction to higher education administrators, 
policy professionals, union and student advocates, and 
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state government officials involved with public higher 
education. When attempting to identify the causes of 
the present financial crisis in public higher education 
these people have tended to focus primarily on the 
narrow question of state tax and expenditure policies. 
The discussion concerning the decreases in state 
revenue seems to focus on whether there should be tax 
increases, if so which one, who are the players 
involved in the decision, and what are their 
motivations. The discussion about expenditures has 
been about how to pay for various services,'what are 
the choices that state government should make, who has 
the most influence, and who will suffer most in the 
population. Although these are important questions 
that need to be addressed in the discussion concerning 
the present financial crisis in state funding of public 
higher education, the lack of attention paid to the 
role of federal policies is striking. 
The findings of this study clearly indicate that 
in order to restore state finances to good health the 
economic policies of the federal government will have 
to play a major role. The study also indicates that 
the federal government has the capability of cushioning 
the impact of national recessions on state governments 
which could also ease the burden on public higher 
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education. Hopefully this understanding will encourage 
those interested in the financial well-being of public 
higher education to broaden the discussion to include 
the responsibility of the federal government for the 
present financial crisis and its alleviation. 
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